SPEECHES, WRITINGS AND STATEMENTS OF IQBAL

COMPILED AND EDITED

By

LATIF AHMAD SHERWANI

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN
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PUBLISHER’S NOTE

Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal is by far one of the most important collections of ‘Allamah Iqbal’s prose writings. Its first edition appeared, in 1944, under the title Speeches and Statements of Iqbal. The compiler, who was in the service of the government at that time, had used his pen-name Shamloo. The collection went through a hasty reprint in 1948 which, while making a few additions, allowed a host of misprints to creep in. The same error-ridden edition was pirated several times until in 1977, during the Iqbal centenary celebrations, Iqbal Academy decided to bring out a revised and enlarged edition. Mr. Latif Ahmad Sherwani, the compiler, thoroughly revised the collection, corrected the text and added fresh material to it that had been unearthed during the intervening decades.

The book was out of print again after a couple of years. It was always in demand. The present edition has been prepared to meet the requirement. There remained a few omissions in the 1977 edition and a number of typing errors that have been corrected in the present edition. The footnotes that Allamah Iqbal wrote to his article on ‘Abd al-Karim Jili’s concept of Unity were left out of the earlier editions. These have been added to the present edition as well as some additional information about the sources from which the material had been collected. “Muslim Community — A Sociological Review” an extremely important article of Iqbal, had been included in parts only in the earlier editions, adopted from the Report on the Census in India. The present edition offers the complete text with some explanatory notes that were regarded necessary in order to put it in proper perspective.

It is hoped that the present edition, which is an improvement on the earlier editions, would be received as a useful and much needed addition to the corpus of ‘Iqbal material’.

Director
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Thirty three years ago when I compiled Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, I was employed in a Government office and, to avoid red tape, the volume was published under my pseudonym “Shamloo,” which I was then using while writing for newspapers. In 1948, with a few additions, this volume was reprinted and, because it was not properly proof read, a number of mistakes remained uncorrected in it. Some sixteen years later, a scholar from Karachi included in his own compilation almost all the material which I had collected from different sources. In 1973, a scholar from Lahore virtually reprinted the 1948 edition (along with many printing mistakes in it), under his own name. This scholar even retained the title of my volume and, incredible though it seems, he claimed to reserve for himself the copyright of the material.

After these bitter disappointments, the invitation of the Executive Committee of the Centenary Celebrations of Allamah Muhammad Iqbal that I should revise my collection has come as a very great encouragement indeed, and I am most grateful to the Committee. Accordingly, I have rechecked for this volume most of the material as it was printed in the 1944 edition, which itself had been taken from original sources and reproduced with much care. I have also included fresh material in the present volume and given in the footnotes the particulars of the sources from which the material has been rechecked or taken. As a number of articles contributed by the Allamah to various periodicals have been included in the present volume, its title has been changed to read Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal.

In preparing this volume I have extensively used a number of public and private libraries, particularly the Punjab University Library, the Punjab Public Library, and the library of the Iqbal Academy. I am grateful to the gentlemen in charge of these libraries for all the facilities which they extended to me.

30 April 1977

LATIF AHMED SHERWANI
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Among the literary remains of the late Allamah Sir Muhammad Iqbal are two addresses, some speeches delivered in the Punjab Legislative Council and a number of Press statements on current topics which lie scattered in small pamphlets, Proceedings of the Punjab Legislative Council and old files of newspapers. There was a great risk of their getting lost and the compiler has collected them in the present volume in the hope that lovers of Iqbal will welcome them in this form.

Iqbal was not a prolific speaker or writer. He spoke from the public platform but rarely and his Press statements are also not many. He spoke only when he had something weighty to say and for this reason his utterances, though delivered in response to current demands, possess a perennial interest.

Iqbal was not a politician. Indeed, he has confessed his inability to be one. His mind was incapable of the intrigues, trickeries and machinations, which constitute the mental and moral equipment of the common run of politicians. First and foremost, he was a student of Islam. As a matter of fact that was the chief occupation of his life. “I have given the best part of my life,” he says in his address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League, “to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its civilisation.” Now, Islam is not a cult. It is a whole philosophy of life and political philosophy is an essential and indispensable part of it. He could not, therefore, avoid being a political thinker as well. Indeed, it is his special merit, which distinguishes him from most other Muslim thinkers in history, that he took a comprehensive and sympathetic view of Islam and treated it as a completely integrated unity. He had the vision to see that “politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man,” and that “religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as nations”. At a time when everybody in India and abroad was shouting himself hoarse to prove in his own way that religion must be kept apart from politics, the Allamah had the
courage to declare that separation of religion and politics was the greatest misfortune of man and that it was the divorce between the two which was threatening to destroy the whole superstructure of civilisation.

Profoundly interested as he was in Islam and its principles as the only factor of stability in a world which seemed to have lost its moorings, the Allamah kept a keen watch on all political, religious and cultural movements of the day. Says he: “It is because present day political ideals, as they appear to he shaping themselves in India, may affect its [Islam’s] original structure and character that I find myself interested in politics.”

Realising, as he did, the intimate relationship between spiritual and mundane life, the Allamah depicted the political thought of the Indian Muslims thus: “The Indian Muslim has long since ceased to explore the depths of his inner life. The result is that he has ceased to live in the full glow and colour of life and is consequently in danger of an unmanly compromise with forces which, he is made to think, he cannot vanquish in open conflict.” Considerable change has since come over the Indian Muslims through the Muslim League movement. But before 1937, which may be said to be the year of the awakening of the Indian Muslims, the politics of the Muslims of India could only be called one of unmanly compromise. A body among us frankly believed that safety lay only in British protection, while those who considered themselves advanced sought safety in compromise with—or rather surrender to—the Hindu majority as represented by the Indian National Congress. Those, on the other hand, who stood uncompromisingly for the integrity of Muslims as a nation in their own right with their own cultural and political ideals were a very small group indeed, and the Allamah’s thought was their hope and their consolation.

But what the Allamah says about exploring the depths of inner life stands almost as true to-day as it did then, and the suggestion he then made for remedying the defect is one that deserves serious consideration at the hands of all educated Muslims. The Allamah suggested “the establishment of male and female cultural institutes in all
the big towns of India. These institutes as such should have nothing to do with politics. Their chief function should be to mobilise the dormant spiritual energy of the younger generation by giving them a clear grasp of what Islam has already achieved and what it has still to achieve in the religious and cultural history of mankind. The progressive forces of a people can be roused only by placing before them a new task calculated to enlarge the individual and to make him comprehend and experience the community, not as a heap of isolated fragments of life, but as a well-defined whole possessing inner cohesion and solidarity. And when once these forces are roused, they bring fresh vigour for new conflicts and that sense of inner freedom which enjoys resistance and holds out the promise of a new self.”

Politicians are apt to trim their sails to the winds that may he blowing at a particular time. This is particularly the case with the majority of Muslim leaders in India who are the product of an age when the Indian Muslims had no politics except that of compromise with the British or the Congress and had no consciousness whatsoever of their own national identity and so long as leadership of the community remains in the hands of such persons, Muslim interest will be always in jeopardy. The nation will be safe only when the common mass of the people become sufficiently enlightened and organised to take their destiny in their own hands, and the most effective way of bringing about such an enlightenment is the establishment of what the Allamah called cultural institutes.

Also, the politician is apt to regard the acquisition of political power as an end in itself, and there must be many among our politicians to whom Pakistan signifies nothing more than a means of escape from Hindu domination. It is sheer fear of the majority community in India or perhaps hope of some material gain for the Muslims, that determines their political policies. Saturated as his whole thought was with the spirit of Islam, neither power nor material gain had any attraction for Iqbal. He demanded the establishment of a separate sovereign Muslim State in North-West India, not as an escape from Hindu domination, but in order that Muslims might be able to live a truly Islamic life and
establish an ideal society. According to the Allamah, such a sovereign State would furnish an opportunity for Islam “to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its original spirit and with the spirit of modern times”. Of course there is no conflict between the policy of the League and Iqbal’s ideal so far as Pakistan the ideology of is concerned. The Allamah lays down an ideal and points out the ultimate purposes which the sovereign State of Pakistan will seek to serve while the Muslim League’s objective is the establishment of the State itself, without which those ultimate purposes cannot possibly be attained. Given the State, it will be up to the Muslims, if they believe in Islam and its purposes, to utilise the State for the realisation of those purposes. In fact, Muslim thought throughout India is already moving in that direction.

It is not the compiler’s aim to review in this Preface the whole thought content of the speeches and statements included in this volume. The object of these lines is only to point out that these speeches and statements contain matter of great political and cultural importance to the Muslims of India which would be a source of guidance to them in their political struggles today and in their endeavours for their cultural and spiritual uplift for a long time to come. Iqbal stands in the front rank of Muslim thinkers of all times and the Indian Muslims cannot at this juncture afford to ignore or lose sight of anything that the great sage has said.

A number of footnotes have been added by the compiler which will, no doubt, help the reader in understanding the text better. The compiler’s thanks are due to a number of friends and others who have helped in collecting the speeches and statements of the great Muslim thinker.

For the benefit of those who are not familiar with English, an Urdu edition of this volume is being published simultaneously.

Lahore
12 May 1944

“SHAMLOO”
I. Addresses and Speeches

PART ONE

ADDRESSES AND SPEECHES
Gentlemen, I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberations of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make today. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.

* All-India Muslim League, Allahabad Session, 29th December 1930, Presidential Address, Lahore, n.d. (Ed.)
It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people-building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is, under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this church organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think he did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe, his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement
I. Addresses and Speeches

initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually un-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved and national lines, i.e. on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national system of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man’s temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realising i-tself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Manichaean thought. Her best thinkers are realising this initial mistake today, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of the spiritual and the temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European States. The result is a set of mutually un-adjusted States dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted States, after trampling over the moral and religious convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e. the need of a unity which the Christian church organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ’s vision of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon; for
here there is no church organisation, similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, inviting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed but whose structure, owing to our legists want of contact with the modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of a different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict. Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: “It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam.” At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam.

I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as States, and finally who believes that Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny. Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct
cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it today. It is open to a people to modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure, but it is absolutely necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideals of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone it is possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

*The Unity of An Indian Nation*

What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to he in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic-order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of the spirit, led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet’s religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experient and necessitating no
reactions on its social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because Their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a policy on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. “Man,” says Renan, “is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation.” Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically re-making men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan’s sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and cooperation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist but to recognise facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with
nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other’s intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interest of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the cause of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home—lands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my
life and behaviour, and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness. Even the authors of the Nehru Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say:” To say from the larger viewpoint of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created, is, in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international viewpoint that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international State. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation.”

_Muslim India Within India_

Communalism in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries, India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have
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no doubt that this House will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally, I would go farther than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population the State contemplated by the proposal would he much less than some of the present India provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population—so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in the country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with 56 percent. Muslim population supplies 54 percent. of the total combatant troops in the Indian Army, and if the 19,000 Gurkhas recruited from the independent State of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to 62 percent. of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into
account nearly 6,000 combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West Muslims in regard to the defence of India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon’ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along the North-West border is actuated by a desire “to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India”. I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.

Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion, as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a Church. It is a state conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character of a Muslim state can be judged from what the Times of India pointed out sometime ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Inquiry Committee. “In ancient India,” the paper points out, “the State framed laws regulating the rates of interest; but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realisation of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates.” I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp.
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that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.

Federal States

Thus it is clear that in view of India’s infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interest, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India. The conception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly; and makes it an assembly of the representatives of the federal States. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both. I give my wholehearted support to this view of the matter, and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the introduction of the new constitution and must be so devised as to finally solve the communal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of true nationalism, because he understands the word nation to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private individuality. Such a state of things, however, does not exist. Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is a land of racial and religious variety. Add to this the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in
the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate electorates. In such a country and in such circumstances territorial electorates cannot secure adequate representation of all interests, and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.

**Federation as Understood in the Simon Report**

But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the pundits of India and the pundits of England. The pundits of India do not disturb the Central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The pundits of England, on the other hand, realising that democracy in the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experience of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals; yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly different to those which determined its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India’s most difficult problem, i.e. the communal problem. The Royal Commissioners’ view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim
at responsible government for federal states. Indeed it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly disregards the communal problem by leaving it where it was.

Thus it is clear that, in so far as real federation is concerned, the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realising Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called ‘residuary nower’ must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal States. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation or fails to recognise them as a distinct political entity.

**Federal Scheme as Discussed in the Round Table Conference**

The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was seen probably long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at rather a late stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to
the people of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an all-India federation and, as a result of their declaration, Hindu delegates, uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of government quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastri who only a few days before had severely criticised Sir John Simon for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his Wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and for the Hindus who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution of an all-India federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes, among whom only a few are Muslims, in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is; on the other hand, it gives overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of the Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians-through the agency of the Princes who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian federation, thus created, will be practically controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern; and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism you perpetuate me in India and I in return
give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If, therefore, the British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous States, the Princes’ participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned—Muslims — with the word federation, Hindus with a majority in the Centre, the British Imperialists—whether Tory or Labourite—with the substance of real power.

The number of Hindu states in India is far greater than Muslim States; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 percent. seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met within a House or Houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian States. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed all-India federation has not yet been discussed. “The interim report,” says Reuter’s summary, “contemplates two chambers in the Federal Legislature, each containing representatives both of British India and States, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Committee.” In my opinion the question of proportion is of the utmost importance and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.

The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British Indian Federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India, and to the Indian Princes; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims, unless they get majority rights in
five out of eleven Indian provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total House of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attainment of sovereign powers by the British-Indian provinces is concerned, the position of His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the Princes in the Indian Federation we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-Indian Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 percent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-India Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim States entering the Federation.

The Problem of Defence

The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India’s defence. In their discussion of this problem the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the Army. “India and Britain,” say the Commissioners, “are so related that India’s defence cannot, now or in any future which is within sight, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of the agents of Imperial Government. Now, does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realisation of responsible government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance. All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the
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ultimate goal prescribed in the declaration of 20th August 1917, are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated, if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature.” Further to fortify their argument they emphasise the fact of competing religions and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look insoluble by remarking that “the obvious fact that India is not, in the ordinary and natural sense, a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest”. These features of the question have been emphasised in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the “neutral guardians” of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, i.e. external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers, and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which, to my mind, furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners.” At the present moment,” says the Report, “no Indian holding the King’s Commission is of higher army rank than a captain. There-are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War.” Now, however genuine may be the desire, and however earnest the endeavour to work for this
transformation, overriding conditions have been so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary, were Indian gentlemen) in these words: “Progress ... must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained, though it must in any case render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior rank and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class—and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers—flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for the high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianisation to a point which will bring a completely Indianised army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed.”

Now I venture to ask: who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races, or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army, as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence, the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.

Again, it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India’s land
frontier, but has made only passing references to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from her land frontier; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than land frontiers.

I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree, for purposes of India’s defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme for a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion.

The Alternative

I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought, in my opinion, to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims’ of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 percent. representation in any Central Legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders
fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity, in the interests of what may be called Punjab ruralism resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.

The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslim stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognises that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the Councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned—and this is the most crucial point—it endorses the so-called “carefully balanced scheme” worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 percent. of the House as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total House. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognise that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extension of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further unless a two-thirds majority of the Muslim members in a provincial Council unanimously agree to surrender the
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right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognised the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance, have not had the courage to recommend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.

Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilisation the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas′udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said: “Sind is a country nearer to the dominions, of Islam.” The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt: “Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia.” With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, it is unwise to keep her attached to a Presidency which, though friendly today, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.

As to the North-West Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to reform.
They fall far short of the Bray Committee, and the Council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the autocracy of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioners’ epigrammatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of full self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interest of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of self-government in the rest of India. I only hope that British statesmanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hood-winking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes.

The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the North-West Frontier Province made in the Government of India’s despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt, the despatch goes farther than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of representative Council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim province on equal footing with other Indian provinces. Indeed the Afghan is, by instinct, more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India.

**Round Table Conference**

I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference. Personally I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this Conference. It was hoped
that away from the actual scene of communal strife and in a changed atmosphere, better counsels would prevail and a genuine settlement of the differences between the two major communities of India would bring India’s freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a different tale. Indeed, the discussion of the communal question in London has demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the two great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that “his Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates, since joint electorates were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments”. Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement. The whole question will have to go before the British Parliament; and we can only hope that the keen-sighted representatives of British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians, will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security in a country like India. To base a constitution on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past.

I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates fully realise the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is
finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word—communalism—expressly devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls British democratic sentiments, and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India. Great interests are at stake. We are 70 millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and, in the case of Hindu India, involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, i.e. territorial, lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, to the “people of the Book”. There are no social barriers between Muslims and the “people of the Book”. A Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the law of Islam allows intermarriage with the “people of the Book”. Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realisation of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares: “O people of the Book! Come, let us join together on the ‘word’ (Unity of God), that is common to us all.” The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. Today it is being gradually realised in the countries of Islam.
in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism.

It is hardly necessary for me to add that the sole test of the success of our delegates is the extent to which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution. If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals-and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking, and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside India. But, I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suffering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irwin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community had failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by Divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God’s gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that the community is fast losing what is called the herd instinct. This makes it possible for individuals and groups to start independent careers without contributing to the general thought and activity of the community. We are doing today in the domain of politics what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion. But sectional bickerings in religion do not do much harm to our solidarity. They at least indicate an interest in what makes-the sole principle of our structure as a people. Moreover, the principle is so
broadly conceived that it is almost impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at a moment when concerted action is needed in the best interests of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. How shall we, then, remedy these two evils? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil, I think it is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise, leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions, but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mention this alternative only because I wish that you may keep it in mind and give some serious thought to it in the meantime.

The conclusion

Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a community, and in the interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since 70 millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally
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performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India, such an equipment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganised condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an intercommunal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not vice-versa. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scatters forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Quran, “Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well guided” (5:104).
Gentlemen, the Muslims of India have listened to so many addresses from their political platforms that the more impatient of them have already begun to suspect our deliberations which, they think, tend to enfeeble, and eventually to kill, the spirit of action that lies dormant in the heart of Islam. “The present situation in the country,” said one of them, “whets our appetite for action; and if our leaders fail to point to a definite course of action, suitable to the peculiar position of the Indian Muslims, the sheer force of imitation will do its work, and make our youth thoughtlessly plunge into the stream of events.” “Action,” said another with characteristic youthful impatience, “does not need a previously thought out plan; it is not subject to the logic of schools, but develops its own peculiar logic as it emerges out of the heart of man into open space.” Such is the present psychology of our youth. I am grateful to you for the confidence you have placed in me at this critical moment; but I certainly cannot congratulate you on your choice of a man who is nothing more than a visionary idealist. Perhaps you think you need a visionary at this juncture; for where there is no vision the people perish. Perhaps you think I am better equipped for the presidential chair of this assembly after my experiences at the London Conference. To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitations is one function: to show the way how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function his task is comparatively easy, for it involves a clean jump over

*A large portion of the text of this address has been rechecked from the Indian Annual Register. January-June 1932, pp. 301-06.*
temporal limitations which waylay the practical politician at every step. The man who has
got the courage to migrate from the former to the latter function has constantly to take
stock of, and often yield to, the force of those very limitations which he has been in the
habit of ignoring. Such a man has the misfortune of living in the midst of perpetual
mental conflict and can be easily accused of self-contradiction. However, I gladly accept
the difficult position in which you have placed me, not because I consider myself fit for
that position, but because the issues have fortunately become so clear that the whole thing
now depends not so much on the guidance of one particular individual as on the force of
all the individual wills focused on a single purpose.

Politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man. It is my belief that Islam is not
a matter of private opinion. It is a society, or, if you like, a civic church. It is because
present-day political ideals, as they appear to be shaping themselves in India, may affect
its original structure and character that I find myself interested in politics. I am opposed
to nationalism as it is understood in Europe, not because, if it is allowed to develop in
India, it is likely to bring less material gain to Muslims. I am opposed to it because I see
in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to
modern humanity. Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life
of man. Yet that which really matters is a man’s faith, his culture, his historical tradition.
These are the things which, in my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the
piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated. In view
of the visible and invisible points of contact between the various communities of India I
do believe in the possibility of constructing a harmonious whole whose unity cannot be
disturbed by the rich diversity which it must carry within its own bosom. The problem of
ancient Indian thought was how the One became many without sacrificing its oneness.
Today this problem has come down from its ethereal heights to the grosser plane of our
political life, and we have to solve it in its reversed form, i.e. how the many can become One without sacrificing its plural character. In so far then as the fundamentals of our policy are concerned, I have got nothing fresh to offer. Regarding these I have already expressed my views in my address to the All-India Muslim League. In the present address I propose, among other things, to help you, in the first place, in arriving at a correct view of the situation as it emerged from a rather hesitating behaviour of our delegation at the final stages of the deliberations of the Round Table Conference. In the second place, I shall try, according to my lights, to show how far it is desirable to construct a fresh policy now that the Premier’s announcement at the last London Conference has again necessitated a careful survey of the whole situation. Let me begin with a brief history of the work of our delegation.

The first two meetings of the Minorities Committee were held on the 28th of September and the 1st of October 1931, respectively. On both occasions the meeting was adjourned for a private settlement of the communal problem. Mahatma Gandhi first told the Muslim delegation that matters could not proceed until the Muslim delegation had Shifted the embargo on Dr. Ansari. Failing in this, he gave the Muslim delegation to understand that he would personally agree to Muslim demands and would try to persuade the Congress, the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to them, provided the Muslims agreed to three things: (i) adult suffrage; (ii) no special representation for the Untouchables; and (iii) Congress demand for complete independence. The Mahatma declined to refer the matter to the Congress and failed in his efforts to get the Hindus and the Sikhs to agree to this arrangement. On the 7th of October two prominent Hindu leaders proposed that the whole matter might be referred to a hoard of seven arbitrators. This too was rejected by Hindu and Sikh representatives. On the 8th the

1. See p. 3-26
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Minorities Committee met for the third time. In this meeting Mahatma Gandhi set to the account of the British Government his failure to bring about a communal settlement, since, according to him, they had deliberately chosen for the British Indian delegation men who, as he said, had no representative character. On behalf of the Muslim delegation, the late Sir Muhammad Shafi refuted the Mahatma’s uncalled for remarks questioning the representative character of the various delegations, and opposed the proposals put forward by him. The meeting came to an end, and, owing to the British general elections, could not meet till the 12th of November. In the meantime, private conversations recommenced on the 15th October. A prominent feature of these conversations was Sir Geoffrey Corbett’s scheme relating to the Punjab. This scheme, very similar to the one I had suggested in my address to the All-India Muslim League, proposed the adoption of joint electorates with the exclusion of the Ambala Division from the Punjab. It, too, was rejected by Sikh and Hindu preventatives who could not tolerate a Muslim majority in the Punjab even with a system of joint electorates. These conversations also remaining fruitless, the representatives of the Indian minorities, which constitute nearly half of India, began to consult one another on the possibility of an Indian Minorities Pact. On the 12th of November all these minorities, with the exception of Sikhs, signed a pact, which was formally handed over to the British Premier in the last meeting of the Minorities Committee held on the 13th of November.

Provincial Autonomy

This brief account of our informal conversations speaks for itself. It is obvious that our delegates did their best to arrive at a communal settlement. The only thing which is mystery to me, and which will perhaps ever remain a
mystery, is the declaration made on 26th of November by our spokesmen in the Federal Structure Committee to the effect that they agreed to the simultaneous introduction of provincial autonomy and central responsibility. Whether this was due to their anxiety for conciliation and political advance of the country, or to some conflicting influences which operated on their minds, I cannot say. On the 15th of November—the day on which I dissociated myself from our delegation — Muslim delegates had decided not to participate in the discussions of the Federal Structure Committee. Why did they participate then in these discussions contrary to their own decision? Were our spokesmen on the Federal Structure Committee authorised to make the declaration of 26th November? I am not in a position to answer these questions. All that I can say is that the Muslim community considers the declaration a very grave error and I have no doubt that this Conference will give an emphatic expression to their views on this important matter.

In my address to the All-India Muslim League I raised my voice against the idea of an all-India federation. Subsequent events have shown that it is working only as a drag on the political advance of India. If the introduction of central responsibility is dependent on the completion of an all-India federation, which, I fear, will take a fairly long time, then the Government should immediately introduce responsible government in the British Indian provinces, so that the foundation thus delineated may, till the coming of central responsibility, fully prepare itself, by experience, to hear the weight of the federal superstructure. A great deal of spade-work is needed before we can have a really modern federal State.

I have reasons to believe, and had suspected this some days before I dissociated myself from our delegation, that our spokesmen were badly advised by certain English politicians in rejecting the immediate introduction of responsible government in The provinces of British India. Recently Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy has expressed
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the same view. He says: “I understand that the moderate leaders in London were badly advised on this matter by certain English politicians, that they listened too readily to their advice and rejected the great instalment of provincial autonomy. And the curious thing is that the Mahatma was apparently ready to consider this instalment sympathetically.” Who are the moderate leaders alluded to by the Lieutenant-Commander? In view of the attitude taken up by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru in London and now in the Consultative Committee regarding the immediate introduction of provincial autonomy, it is obvious that the writer of the passage quoted could not have meant Hindu Liberals. I think he probably means Muslim moderate leaders whose declaration in the Federal Structure Committee on the 26th of November seems to me to be really responsible for the British Premier’s announcement regarding the simultaneous introduction of central and provincial responsibility. And since immediate introduction of responsible government in the provinces would have involved a definite announcement regarding the demands of our community as to majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, we must not forget, while judging the present situation, that the conduct of our own leaders is mainly responsible for the British Premier’s silence which has raised all sorts of suspicions in the mind of the Muslim community.

The next question is to explore the possibilities of shaping, if necessary, a new policy after the disappointing announcement made by the British Premier at the close of the last London Conference. Muslims have naturally grown apprehensive of Government’s attitude towards the problem of communal settlement. They suspect that the Government will purchase Congress co-operation at any cost, and that its delay in conceding Muslim demands is only a cover for the possibility of finding some basis for negotiations with that body. The policy of trusting the Government in regard to political issues seems to be rapidly losing its hold on the mind of the community. The Franchise Committee has
postponed consideration of matters relating to the formation of constituencies. As for the promised provisional settlement, it is obvious that no communal settlement, provisional or permanent, can satisfy the Muslim community, which does not recognise, as its basic principle, the right of the community to enjoy majority rights in provinces where it happens to be in actual majority. The continuance of separate electorates and the status of the Frontier Province are no doubt assured, but complete provincial autonomy, transfer of power from Parliament to Indian provinces, equality of federal units, classification of subjects, not into federal, central and provincial, but into federal and provincial only, majority rights in the Punjab and Bengal, unconditional separation of Sind, and one-third share in the centre, constitute no less essential elements of our demand. The Premier’s silence on these points has only resulted in the unsound policy of war with the Congress and no peace with the rest of the country. Shall we then join the Congress in their present campaign? My answer without a moment’s hesitation is “No”. A careful reading of the underlying motives of this movement will make it perfectly clear.

The Congress Movement

To my mind this movement has its roots in fear and resentment. The Congress leaders claim that they are the sole representatives of the peoples of India. The last Round Table Conference made it abundantly clear that they were not. This they naturally resent. They know that the British people and the rest of the world now fully realise the importance of communal settlement in India. They further know that the minorities of India have arrived at a pact, and that the British Government has given a notice to enforce a provincial settlement of their own, in case the Indians themselves failed to arrive at one. The Congress leaders fear
that the British Government in their provisional settlement of the communal problem may concede to the minorities what they demand. They have, therefore, started the present campaign to bolster up a claim which has no foundation in fact, to defeat a pact which, they fear, may find a place in the coming constitution, and to force the Government to settle the matter of minorities with the Congress alone. The Congress resolution, in pursuance of which the civil disobedience campaign was launched, made it perfectly clear that since Government had refused to regard Mahatma Gandhi as the sole representative of the country, the Congress decided on civil disobedience. How can then a minority join a campaign which is directed as much against itself as against the Government?

In the circumstances, therefore, to join the Congress in their present campaign is simply out of the question. But there is no denying that at the moment you are called upon to make important decisions. I am sure you are fully aware of the present state of the community’s mind. Government’s delay in conceding Muslim demands, and the treatment meted out to our brave Frontier brethren on the eve of constitutional reform in their province, are making Indian Muslims suspicious of British methods; and most people are already asking the question whether the power of a third party in India does constitute a real safeguard of the Muslim minority against a politically hostile and economically exploiting majority in India. There seems to be a deeper reason also. The rapid movement of events, and often sudden changes of situation in the political world, cannot permit an Imperial democracy, especially in the case of Party Government, to adhere for any long periods of time to definite policies. Lack of imagination is a virtue rather than a fault in a modern politician. And owing to this lack of imagination, which is incapable of synthesising permanence and change in a higher political concept, modern politics is driven to live from hand to mouth. In the case of a subject country like India, therefore, co-operating communities are
naturally led to think that the firmness of their political attitude in difficult times for the Government may be of little or no value in the eyes of this or that political party which may come to power at any time in England. Whatever may be the character and ideals of political parties in England, you must base your policy on enlightened self-interest and conceive it in a spirit calculated to impress the whole British nation. It is folly to fight a battle in which there is likelihood of the fruits of victory going to those who are either hostile to, or have no sympathy with, our legitimate political aspirations. The present circumstances are such that in thinking out a line of policy with a view to get over the immediate difficulties of the community, it is your duty to see that the likelihood I apprehend is eliminated, and the benefit of the action advised by you finally accrues to your community.

**British Government’s Attitude**

Let me state the position as plainly as possible. The British undertook to give a provisional decision of the communal problem in case the communities of India did not arrive at a mutual settlement after their representatives had returned from the second Round Table Conference. This undertaking was thoroughly consistent with the claim and policy of the British as a third party, holding the balance between the contending communities of India. The British Government’s present attitude, however, would show that they do not mean to function as an impartial holder of balance in India, and are indirectly driving the Indian communities, which are mainly Hindus and Muslims, to a kind of civil war. We tried the majority community and found them unwilling to recognise the safeguards which we can forgo only at the risk of complete extinction as a nation determined to live its own life. The alternative was to hope for justice from the British who, ever since they took the
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country from the Muslims, have claimed, as I have said above, to function as an impartial
holder of balance in India. In their case, too, we find that the old British courage and
straightforwardness are replaced by a constantly shifting policy which can inspire no
confidence and seems to be calculated only to facilitate their own position in India. The
Muslim community is thus brought to face the question whether it is in the interest of the
community that their present policy which has so far obviated British difficulties and
brought no gain to the community shall continue for any further period of time. This is a
question for the open Conference to decide. All that I can say at the present stage is that,
if you decide to discontinue this policy, your immediate duty is to prepare the whole
community for the kind of self-sacrifice without which no self-respecting people can live
an honourable life. The most critical moment in the history of the Indian Muslims has
arrived. Do your duty or cease to exist.

Gentlemen, I now request you to turn for a moment to two matters of gravest
concern to the Muslims of India—I mean the Frontier Province and Kashmir which, I
have no doubt, are uppermost in your mind.

Frontier Province

It is indeed gratifying to see the Government has at least conceded our demand
regarding the political status of North-West Frontier Province, though it remains to -be
seen what this status means in the actual administration of that province. Newspaper
reports show that in the matter of franchise, Government rules have been more liberal
than in other provinces. The reform machinery will, it is understood, be set in full
working order from the next month. What, however, has taken grace out of the whole
affair is the simultaneous launching of a campaign of repression which is not essentially
different from martial law. The consideration
shown in the matter of constitutional issue has been more than neutralised by the severity and short-sightedness shown in the case of the administrative issue. Government may have reasons for counteracting extremist activities of certain people in that part of the country, but it has surely not been able to defend a policy of wholesale repression. During this struggle in other parts of India Britain’s dealing with the situation has not been entirely devoid of restraint. In the Frontier Province alone repression has assumed forms unworthy of a civilised Government. If oral reports are true, then the heart of the British official in the Frontier Province stands in need of a reform far greater in importance for the British Empire than the constitutional reform sought to be introduced into that province. There is no definite and final information about the number of arrests and persecutions; but as it is roughly mentioned in newspapers, thousands have been arrested and convicted or interned. It is for the Government to consider whether the incongruent policies of concession and repression will result in the pacification of a proud race like the Afghans. Abdul Ghaffar Khan certainly commands a great deal of influence among the young border Afghans, but what has extended the sphere of his influence to the farthest ends of the territory and to the ignorant folk of the Frontier villages, is the present thoughtless policy of repression. Government cannot be unaware of the fact that the all-India policy of the Indian Muslims was, at this juncture, effectively keeping in check the tendencies of the Muslims of that province to join hands with those who Were for an unconditional alliance with the Congress. Perhaps there have been difficulties from the Government point of view; yet I think a little different handling of the administrative action could have saved the whole situation. The political situation in the Frontier, it appears, was allowed to deteriorate during the period when a policy of relaxation was the order of the day, and attempts to deal with it in a repressive manner have been made at a time when the real remedy of the disease had been prescribed. The sooner the Government withdraws all repressive
measures from the province, the better for the province and the Government itself. The situation has caused deep concern to the whole Muslim community in India, and it is hardly wise for the Government not to allay Muslim feeling in this respect.

Kashmir

As to Kashmir it is hardly necessary for me to describe the historical background of events which have recently happened in that country. The apparently sudden resurrection of a people in whom the ego-flame had been almost extinguished, ought to be, in spite of the suffering which it has necessarily involved, a matter of rejoicing to all those who possess an insight into the inner struggle of modern Asiatic peoples. The cause of the people of Kashmir is absolutely just, and I have no doubt that the rebirth of this sense of the reality of their own personality in an intelligent and skilful people will eventually prove a source of strength not only to the State but also to the people of India as a whole. What, however, is most deplorable is that the communal ill-feeling existing in India, and the perfectly natural sympathy of the Indian Muslims with their Kashmir brethren, led to a kind of counter-agitation among the Hindus, which, in its despair, sought to protect a barbarous administration by attributing its inevitable consequences to such wild fancies as Pan-Islamic plots and conspiracies for British occupation of Kashmir. Such agitation and the communal colour thereby given, to the Kashmir question could have led only to one thing—resort to violent repression leading to prolonged lawlessness in the State. In parts of The Jammu Province, as newspaper reports tell us, the administration has completely broken down and it is only the presence of British troops which is keeping things in control at least in places where they are present. Oral reports of a most violent and shameful repression practised
by State authorities in many places are still pouring in. Nor can commissions of enquiry be of any help in such a state of things. The Middleton Report which admits important facts and fails to draw legitimate conclusions therefrom has already failed to satisfy Muslims. The truth is that the matter has passed the stage in which enquiries can lead to effective results. The growing sense of self-consciousness in the people all over the world is now demanding recognition in the shape of a desire for an increasing share in the administration which governs them. Political tutelage is good for a primitive people; but it is in the best interests of an administration itself not to shirk from radical reform when a change in the outlook of a people demands it. Among other things which have probably arisen from the peculiar conditions obtaining in Kashmir, the people of that country demand some kind of a popular assembly. Let us hope that the Ruler of the State and the Government of India will consider the people’s demands as favourably as they possibly can. I have no doubt that the new Prime Minister, with characteristic British administrative acuteness, will see into the heart of the matter, and provide scope for the activity of a fine but down-trodden people who gave some of the best intellects to ancient India, and later added a real charm to Mughal culture. There may be difficulties in the way of constitutional reform in Kashmir as in the case of our own country; but the interests of permanent peace and order demand that these difficulties must be speedily overcome. If the meaning of the present upheaval is not properly understood and its causes are sought in directions where they cannot be found, the Kashmir Government, I fear, will have made its problem much more complicated.

It is obvious, therefore, that the attitude of the British Government towards our demands and the gravity of the situation in the Frontier Province and Kashmir claim our immediate attention. But what claims our immediate attention is not our only concern. We must have a clear perception of the forces which are silently moulding the
future, and place a relatively permanent programme of work before the community in view of the probable direction of events in the country. The present struggle in India is sometimes described as India’s revolt against the West. I do not think it is a revolt against the West; for the people of India are demanding the very institutions which the West stands for. Whether the gamble of elections, retinues of party leaders and hollow pageants of parliaments will suit a country of peasants to whom the money economy of modern democracy is absolutely incomprehensible is a different question altogether. Educated urban India demands democracy. The minorities, feeling themselves as distinct cultural units, and fearing that their very existence is at stake, demand safeguards, which the majority community, for obvious reasons, refuses to concede. The majority community pretends to believe in a nationalism theoretically correct, if we start from Western premises, belied by facts, if we look to India. Thus the real parties to the present struggle in India are not England and India, but the majority community and the minorities of India which can ill-afford to accept the principle of Western democracy until it is properly modified to suit the, actual conditions of life in India.

Nor do Mahatma Gandhi’s political methods signify a revolt in the psychological sense. These methods arise out of contact of two opposing types of world-consciousness, Western and Eastern. The Western man’s mental texture is chronological in character. He lives and moves and has his being in time. The Eastern man’s world-consciousness is non-historical. To the Western man things gradually become; they have a past, present and future. To the Eastern man they are immediately rounded off, timeless, purely present. That is why Islam which sees in the time-movement a symbol of reality appeared as an intruder in the static world-picture of Asia. The British as a Western people cannot but conceive political reform in India as a systematic process of gradual evolution. Mahatma Gandhi as an
Eastern man sees in this attitude nothing more than an ill-conceived unwillingness to part with power, and tries all sorts of destructive negations to achieve immediate attainment. Both are elementally incapable of understanding each other. The result is the appearance of a revolt.

These phenomena, however, are merely premonitions of a coming storm, which is likely to sweep over the whole of India and the rest of Asia. This is the inevitable outcome of a wholly political civilisation which has looked upon man as a thing to be exploited and not as a personality to be developed and enlarged by purely cultural forces. The peoples of Asia are bound to rise against the acquisitive economy which the West has developed and imposed on the nations of the East. Asia cannot comprehend modern Western capitalism with its undisciplined individualism. The faith which you represent recognises the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create a new world where the social rank of man is not determined by his caste or colour, or the amount of dividend he earns, but by the kind of life he lives; where the poor tax the rich, where human society is founded not on the equality of stomachs but on the equality of spirits, where an Untouchable can marry the daughter of a king, where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth. This superb idealism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists. Spiritually we are living in a prison-house of thoughts and emotions which during the course of centuries we have woven round ourselves. And be it further sad to the shame of us—men of older generation—that we have failed to equip the younger generation for the economic, political and even religious crises that the present age is likely to bring. The whole community needs a complete overhauling of its present mentality in order that it may again become capable of feeling the urge of fresh
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desires and ideals. The Indian Muslim has long ceased to explore the depths of his own inner life. The result is that he has ceased to live in the full glow and colour of life, and is consequently in danger of an unmanly compromise with forces which, he is made to think, he cannot vanquish in open conflict. He who desires to change an unfavourable environment must undergo a complete transformation of his inner being. God changeth not the condition of a people until they themselves take the initiative to change their condition by constantly illuminating the zone of their daily activity in the light of a definite ideal. Nothing can be achieved without a firm faith in the independence of one’s own inner life. This faith alone keeps a people’s eye fixed on their goal and saves them from perpetual vacillation. The lesson that past experience has brought to you must be taken to heart. Expect nothing from any side. Concentrate your whole ego on yourself alone, and ripen your clay into real manhood if you wish to see your aspirations realised. Mussolini’s maxim was: “He who has steel has bread.” I venture to modify it a bit and say: “He who is steel has everything.” Be hard and work hard. This is the whole secret of individual and collective life. Our ideal is well defined. It is to win in the coming constitution a position for Islam which may bring her opportunities to fulfil her destiny in this country. it is necessary in the light of this ideal to rouse the progressive forces of the community and to organise their hitherto dormant energies. The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others; - it must be kindled in the temple of one’s own soul. This requires earnest preparation and a relatively permanent programme. What then shall be our future programme? I am inclined to think that it should be partly political, partly cultural. I venture to offer a few suggestions for your consideration.

First, we must frankly admit that there is yet a sort of chaos in the political thought of those who are supposed to guide the activities of the Indian Muslims in the present-day political struggle. The community, however, is not to blame
for this state of things. The Muslim masses are not at all lacking in the spirit of self-sacrifice when the question of their ultimate destiny in this country is involved. Recent history bears ample testimony to what I say. The fault is ours, not theirs. The guidance offered to the community is not always independently conceived, and the result is ruptures, sometimes at critical moments, within our political organizations. Thus these organizations cannot properly develop the kind of discipline which is so absolutely essential to the life and power of political bodies. To remedy this evil I suggest that the Indian Muslims should have only one political organization with provincial and district branches all over the country. Call it whatever you like. What is essential is that its constitution must be such as to make it possible for any school of political thought to come into power, and to guide the community according to its own ideas and methods. In my opinion this is the only way to make ruptures impossible, and to reintegrate and discipline our scattered forces to the best interests of Islam in India.

Secondly, I suggest that this central organisation should immediately raise a national fund of at least 50 lakhs of rupees. No doubt we are living in hard times but you may rest assured that the Muslims of India will not fail to respond to your call if a genuine effort is made to impress upon them the gravity of the present situation.

Thirdly, I suggest the formation of youth leagues and well-equipped volunteer corps throughout the country under the control and guidance of the central organisation. They must specially devote themselves to social service, customs reform, commercial organisation of the community and economic propaganda in towns and villages, especially in the Punjab where enormous indebtedness of Muslim agriculturists cannot be allowed to wait for the drastic remedies provided by agrarian upheavals. Things appear to have reached the breaking point as in China in 1925 when peasant leagues came into being in that country. The Simon
Report admits that the peasant pays a “substantial portion” of his means to the State. The State, no doubt, gives him in return peace and security, trade and communication. But the net result of these blessings has been only a kind of scientific exactitude in taxation, destruction of village economy by machine-made goods and the commercialisation of crops which makes the peasant almost always fall a prey to money-lenders and commercial agents. This is a very serious matter especially in the Punjab. I want the proposed youth leagues to specialise in propaganda work in this connection, and thus to help the peasantry in escaping from its present bondage. The future of Islam in India largely depends, in my opinion, on the freedom of Muslim peasants in the Punjab. Let then the fire of youth mingle with the fire of faith in order to enhance the glow of life and to create a new world of actions for our future generations. A community is not merely a purely present and numerable whole of men and women. Indeed its life and activity as a living reality cannot be fully understood without a reference to that unborn infinity which lies asleep in the deeps of its inner being.

Fourthly, I suggest the establishment of male and female culture institutes in all the big towns of India. These institutes as such should have nothing to do with politics. Their chief function should be to mobilise the dormant spiritual energy of the younger generation by giving them a clear grasp of what Islam has already achieved and what it has still to achieve in the religious and cultural history of mankind. The progressive forces of a people can be roused only by placing before them a new task calculated to enlarge the individual to make him comprehend and experience the community, not as a heap of isolated fragments of life, but as a well-defined whole possessing inner cohesion and solidarity. And when once these forces are roused they bring fresh vigour for new conflicts, and that sense of inner freedom which enjoys resistance and holds out the promise of a new self. These institutes must keep in close touch with our educational institutions-old and new with a view to
secure the ultimate convergence of all the lines of our educational endeavour on a single purpose. One practical suggestion I can immediately make. The Hartog Committee’s interim report, now apparently forgotten in the rush of other political problems, makes the following recommendation which I consider of the utmost importance for the Muslims of India:

There can be no doubt that if in provinces where the educational progress of the Muhammadan community is impeded by religious difficulties, such arrangements for religious instruction can be made as will induce that community to send its children to ordinary schools, the public system will gain both in economy and efficiency and much will be done to free the community from the handicap and the reproach of educational backwardness.

We are fully aware that such arrangements are not easy to make and that in other countries they have given rise to much controversy.... But in our opinion the time is ripe and more than ripe for a determined effort to devise practical plans (pp. 204-05).

And Again on p. 206, while discussing reservations, the Report says:

If therefore special arrangements inside the public system were made now, and possibly for some time to come, to enable the Muhammadan community to take its full share in the life and in the advance of the nation, this would not, in our opinion, be inconsistent either with sound democratic or sound educational principles. We wish we could say that no reservations are necessary and we should certainly wish that they should be as small as possible. As complications of an educational system they are undesirable in themselves, but since, in our belief they represent a necessary alternative to leaving the Muhammadan community in its present backward state, and leaving it to take the poor changes afforded by a system of segregate institutions, we have no hesitation in
embracing that alternative as justifiable on broad grounds of national policy.

The proposed cultural institutes or till their establishment the All-India Muslim Conference must see that these recommendations, based as they are on a clear perception of the present handicaps of our community, are carried into effect.

Fifthly, I suggest the formation of an assembly of ulema which must include Muslim lawyers who have received education in modern jurisprudence. The idea is to protect, expand and, if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light of modern conditions, while keeping close to the spirit embodied in its fundamental principles. This body must receive constitutional recognition so that no bill affecting the personal law of Muslims may be put on the legislative anvil before it has passed through the crucible of this assembly. Apart from the purely practical value of this proposal for the Muslims of India, we must remember that the modern world, both Muslim and non-Muslim, has yet to discover the infinite value of the legal literature of Islam and its significance for a capitalistic world whose ethical standards have long abdicated from the control of man’s economic conduct. The formation of the kind of assembly I propose will, I am sure, bring a deeper understanding of the usual principles of Islam at least in this country.
Sir, I would pass a few general remarks on the Budget that was presented to the Council on the 28th February. No one who has read the speech made by the Honourable the Finance Member and the memorandum prepared by the Finance Secretary can remain unimpressed by the remarkable lucidity of these documents. I must say as a layman that I have learned a great deal from them. In fact, the Finance Secretary has very candidly suggested the criticism to which the general financial position of the province is open. He has told us that we spent 23 lakhs more than our income last year; and we are going to spend 60 lakhs more than our income this year: that is to say, in two years we shall have spent 83 lakhs more than our income. The question, therefore, arises whether we are justified in pending large sums of money on development. The general financial position, however, in view of the various considerations set forth in the review by the Finance Secretary, is satisfactory; though he has told us that it is not permissible to reduce the taxes in the absence of permanent funds. Now, in so far as the reduction of taxes is concerned, I will offer a few remarks presently. But in view of the fact that the general financial position of this province is satisfactory some provision ought to have been made in the Budget at least for rural sanitation as well as for medical relief for women. In fact, medical relief for women is badly

2. Sir Geoffrey d'Emontmorency. (Ed.)
3. Mr (later Sir) H.W. Emerson. (Ed.)
I. Addresses and Speeches

needed in this province and no provision seems to have been made for this in the Budget. I would, therefore, draw your attention, Sir, and the attention of the honourable members of the Council to this very important consideration. As to the reduction of taxes, I suppose the Finance Secretary, when he prepared his admirable review of the financial position of the province, was not aware of the remission made by the Government of India. We now know that 86 lakhs have been remitted (Mr. H.D. Craik: May be remitted) of which 60 lakhs are recurring and 26 lakhs non-recurring. If this large amount is remitted, as I hope it will be remitted, my submission is that money should be spent towards the reduction of taxes, that is to say, towards the removal of the anomaly which exists in our system of taxation. The anomaly I mean is this: that we do not apply the principle of progression in the case of land revenue whereas we apply that principle in the case of income-tax.

The reason why this principle is not applied to land revenue is sometimes found in the barbarous theory that all land belongs to the Crown. Neither in ancient India nor even in the days of the Mughals the Sovereign ever claimed universal ownership. This is the historical aspect of the matter. The Taxation Enquiry Committee also has accepted this position, though half the members of that Committee were of the opinion that land revenue could not be described as a tax, the other half being of the opinion that it is in the nature of a tax. But the fact remains that in this country the Sovereign never claimed any such rights. We are told that the Mughals claimed such rights; but the people of the Punjab owned and possessed the land of this country long before the race of Babar entered into history—the unmistakable lesson of which is that Crowns come and go; the people alone are immortal.

I submit, therefore, that in this twentieth century such a theory, even if it existed in any country at any -time, cannot hold good. In case this money is remitted we should apply it
towards the reduction of taxes. We should apply the principle of progression to land revenue. At present all land is subject to land revenue. Whether a man holds two kanals or 200 kanals of land, he is liable to pay the revenue. In the case of income-tax the principle of ability or the principle of progression is applied—that is to say, there is a graduated scale and some people do not pay income-tax at all. My submission, therefore, is that the Council should consider the question of the reduction of taxes in the light of this principle.

(ii) On the Cut Motion on Government’s Demand for Grant under “Education,” 10th March, 1927

Sir, the question of education is extremely important and I am glad to see that the honourable members who have preceded me have spoken with great enthusiasm on the subject. They have emphasised the fact that education is a common interest, that it affects all classes of the people of this land—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, capitalists and labourers—but they have not looked at the problem from the standpoint of a foreign government. A disinterested foreign government is a contradiction in terms. The foreign government in this country wants to keep the people ignorant. A foreign government is a kind of Roman-Catholic Church trying to suppress all the agencies but tend to enlighten the laity. The honourable gentleman who preceded me has conclusively proved from facts and figures given in the Report on the Progress of Education in the Punjab for the year 1925-26 that we are wasting tremendous amounts of money on education with no results. Can anybody deny in this House or outside this House that mass

5. Pandit Nanak Chand and Chaudhri Afzal Haq. (Ed.)
6. Pandit Nanak Chand. (Ed.)
education is absolutely essential in the interest of the people? Primary education, secondary education, professional or vocational education are all various aspects of the same problem of mass education. Well, the ancient sages of this country used to say that the world is maya but I am absolutely certain that whatever happens inside this House is nothing but maya, though I must say that I am also a part and parcel of this illusion. Let us take the various stages of education, that is to say, primary education, secondary education and higher education. Now, whatever interpretations may he put upon this Report, one fact is perfectly clear from it, and it is this—that the principle of compulsion must be immediately applied. If you turn to p.2 of this Report—I mean the Proceedings of the Ministry of Education, you will find the following:

Thus, as the Director has observed, compulsion should not be regarded as an ideal of the distant future, but rather as a present and practical means of ensuring that the sums of money devoted to vernacular education are spent to the most fruitful purpose. It is hoped, therefore, that local authorities and all concerned will take immediate and effective steps towards a more rapid extension of the compulsory principle.

At the same time the education expert, Mr. Mayhew, whom I have the privilege to know personally, has told us that, in so far as the voluntary system is concerned, the present outlook is gloomy. This is an argument in favour of the fact that the principle of compulsion must be applied. We are told that it is applied in the case of 42 municipalities and some 400, perhaps more than 400, rural areas. What happens there? We do not know anything from this Report. We do not know whether any persons were ever fined for not sending their children to schools. Nor do we know the number of teachers who are teaching in these schools. Unless we are given sufficient information, we cannot say what these rural areas and municipalities are doing. As far as my personal information goes, I can tell the members of
this House, that nothing is being done and that there is an absolute waste of money. Only you have opened some schools and ostensibly compulsory, but not at all different to voluntary primary schools. I submit, Sir, that these schools are doing nothing at all, and in fact the way in which they are working does not amount to the adoption of the principle of compulsion. The Report virtually establishes that the principle of compulsion must be adopted. In fact in the amount of money that we are wasting on primary education the Report before us finds an argument in favour of the adoption of this principle. It says that a very large number of boys join the first class but the money spent upon them is wasted as most of them fail to reach the higher classes. If you are spending a very large amount of money on them, then it is your duty to see that they reach the higher classes. Make them reach the higher classes by compulsion. Therefore my submission is that in so far as primary education is concerned, it is absolutely necessary in the interest of this province to adopt the principle of compulsion at once.


Sir, I had no intention to say anything on the subject before the House, and even now I do not rise to oppose the motion. I propose to say a few words only because I think it is absolutely necessary to give public expression to our feelings on the matter with a view to impress on the mind of the Government the seriousness of the affair. When the events related by my friend Chaudhri Afzal Haq took place I made personal enquiries and the next day interviewed the Deputy Commissioner in his office. During the course of our conversation which took place in the presence of two police officers...

7. Debates, 1928, X-13, 782
officers, I related all that I had come to know of as a result of my enquiries. But to my great surprise the two police officers tried to defend their action. One of them cited an instance (in England) in which some revolutionaries were beaten on their refusal to disperse. But, Sir, the use, the highly shameless and brutal use, of the danda made by the police in Lahore is a blot on the fair name of civilization. I told the Deputy Commissioner that even Muhammad Irfan who is one of the most learned men of India was beaten. But I was told by the Deputy Commissioner that my report was incorrect and that such a thing had not happened at all. I believed his statement, hesitatingly though, for I thought that his resources of obtaining correct information were greater than mine. But on my return, I met Maulvi Irfan, and Sir, I regret very much to have to say that the information of the Deputy Commissioner proved to be wrong and that Maulvi Sahib, whose hurts I saw with my own eyes, had been mercilessly beaten and at a time when the meeting had already been dispersed and the Maulvi was proceeding to his place of residence. I therefore request the Honourable Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency to see that such a thing is not repeated at all. With these words I resume my seat. I do not think that we should refuse the grant.

(iv) On the Motion For Adjournment regarding Communal Riots in Multan, 18th July, 1927.8

Sir, the disease with which we are dealing is a chronic one. There are a good many physicians who have tried to diagnose it. Some have achieved a certain amount of success; others have failed signally in their undertaking. Different physicians have prescribed different remedies for the disease, but in the words of the poet

8. Ibid., pp. 824-25.
these remedies have failed’ to achieve the desired end, viz. they have failed to discover a panacea for the evil which has fallen to the lot of this unhappy province.

Some people have ascribed this evil to the struggle for securing more posts under the Government while others have assigned reasons which are diametrically opposed to this contention. From the speech made by Pandit Nanak Chand one gathers the impression that his heart is full of love for humanity, but all this pious talk is nothing more than a mere cloak for the idea uppermost in the Pandit’s mind. We are not prepared to let go what we have already got hold of. Lip service to God with an eye stealing glances at the property of others!

Some of the members are of opinion that the gutter press of the province is responsible for the existing state of affairs, while others are of opinion that the struggle for votes and posts is responsible for it. There is no dearth of suggestions, but nobody seems willing to act upon them. Just after the occurrence of the Lahore riots a joint committee representing all shades of opinion and thought was constituted at Lahore, and a meeting of the same was held at the house of R.B. Moti Sagar. But I regret very much to say that this meeting was the first and last meeting of this joint committee. In this meeting I suggested that in order to eradicate the spirit of mutual hatred it behoved the committee to appoint a number of small sub-committees whose business it should be to go about the different parts of the city and impress upon the people the futility of mutual warfare. But my suggestion met the usual fate of all such proposals. We indulged in much pious talk and everything ended in a fiasco.

In this Council impassioned speeches for intercommunal unity are made. We are asked to constitute joint committees
I support Chaudhri Zafarullah Khan from the bottom of my heart that a round table conference should be held at the earliest possible moment in which Government should also be asked to participate. This conference should carefully consider the present situation and suggest ways to suppress the existing communal tension. If this communal hatred permeates the rest of the country and the people living in villages also come to loggerheads, God alone knows where eventually it will land us.

(v) **On the Resolution regarding Filling of Posts by Open Competitive Examination, 19th July, 1927.**

Sir, after the Honourable Finance Member’s’ speech, which to my mind constitutes a most crushing reply to the resolution as framed,” it is hardly possible for anyone in this House to make a substantial addition to the discussion. However, I cannot but admire the innocent idealism of Sardar Ujjal Singh, which idealism, like all idealisms, sees everything except realities. I can assure my

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9. Ibid., pp. 888-90
10. Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency. (Ed.)
11. The resolution as moved by Sardar Ujjal Singh and read: “This Council recommends to the Government that in future all posts under Government in all departments should be filled by open competition as far as possible; and where this cannot be done and selection has to be made the most highly qualified candidate should be selected without regard to caste, creed or colour.” (Ed.)
friend that the principle of competition, pure and simple, is absolutely inapplicable in this country, especially in this province. I suppose many honourable members of this House know that such a non-communal institution as, the Punjab University has had to adopt the system of fictitious roll numbers in the various University examinations. The examiner, according to this system, does not know as to the caste or creed or colour of the candidate whose paper he is examining or the college from which he comes. This system was adopted because it was feared that Hindu examiners might fail Muhammadan candidates and Muhammadan examiners might fail Hindu candidates (Voices: Shame.) Yes, it is a shameful thing; but it does exist. With all that both Hindu and Muhammadan candidates leave certain marks in their examination papers to indicate to the examiner the candidate’s caste or creed. Only the other day, I was reading the LL.B. examination papers. I found the number “786” which is the numerical value of an Arabic formula and on others I found “Om” marks meant to invoke the blessing of God as well as to reveal to the examiner the community of the candidate. Such is the state of things in a non-communal institution. Take another instance. During the recent riots in Lahore, both Hindu and Muhammadan citizens went in deputations to the Deputy Commissioner on several occasions—each community complaining of the investigating officers belonging to the opposite community. I happened to be a member of one such deputation. (Voices: Shame.) It is not a matter to be ashamed of. We have to see things as they are; and it is a pity that they have come to such a pass. You know, Sir, what the Deputy Commissioner told us. I think he was perfectly right in saying what he did. He said: “Before the Reform scheme came into operation, there were 120 British Officers in the police department, but that they were only 68 now. We have not got a sufficient number of British officers. Both communities want European officers.”

My friend, Pandit Nanak Chand, is unfortunately not
here at the present moment. He told us that Government had removed the colour distinction, so that the posts which formerly went to British gentlemen now go to Hindus and Muslims; but I assure my friend that Government had made a very great mistake and I would welcome if there were more British officers. (Voices: No, no.) I fully realise my responsibility when I say this and I also realise the meaning of this voice of “no, no.” I am not enamoured of that false and shallow nationalism which speaks like this. (Dr Shaikh Muhammad Alam: Everybody is not the same.) Well, it may be so, yet the talk of a united nationalism is futile and will perhaps remain so far a long time to come. The word has existed on the lips of the people of this country for the last fifty years and like a hen it has cackled a great deal without laying a single egg. However, I will tell you that the state of this country is such that it is not possible for us to introduce the principle of competition pure and simple. The best method for the country is the one indicated by Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency in his speech, that is to say, the principle of competition tempered by selection and nomination.

One other thing I should like to point out. I was very glad to hear the honourable member for Simla. I mean his advocacy of the Untouchables in an almost apostolic tone. I welcome it though I do not know what Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya’s verdict would he in this matter (Lala Mohan Lal: It is the same as mine). Only a short time and he excommunicated one of his nearest relatives because he had given his daughter to a Brahmin of an inferior caste. (Lala Mohan Lal : He did not.) It was in the papers and Pandit Madan Mohan was called upon to publish a reply to open letters which were addressed to him and he published no contradiction. However, I welcome the change. if it is not in theory alone and I hope that through the efforts of my friend, the honourable member for Simla, untouchability will he removed in this province. In the south of India we hear

12. Lala Mohan Lal. (Ed)
that when a Brahmin is constrained to talk to an Untouchable he must talk to some wall or tree near by, and the Untouchable too has to address, in reply, the same wall or the tree since the Brahmin is too scared to be addressed by a Sudra. I shall welcome the day when such bans are entirely removed and the Hindus of this province adopt better principles of equality.

Sir, I need not say anything more with regard to the principle of competition. My friend has pointed out certain defects in the present system which he has enumerated. He refers to the success of the principle of competition in other countries. I must say that the state of things in this country is totally different to the state of things in other countries. For this reason the principles the application of which is good in other countries would not apply to this country. In this country one community is always aiming at the destruction of the other community. Therefore the power in whose hands lies the destiny of this country must adopt a line of action which is calculated equally to elevate all communities that form the population of this country. It has been argued that the present system tends to retard the progress of what my friend called nationality. Well, I do not know whether it is desirable to become a nation. It is a proposition which can be controverted but, assuming that it is so, I would suggest that it is first desirable to develop mutual trust in the communities of this country. The present state of things is such that the communities do not trust each other; they have no faith in each other. When we meet each other we talk of nationalism, we talk of philanthropy and of love of mankind. Only a few days ago a friend of mine told me that he had overheard two Hindu gentlemen talking. One of them asked the other as to what should be our policy now. The other gentleman said: Let nationalism be on your lips, but fix your gaze always on your own community.

13. Sardar Ujjal Singh (Ed)
14. Sardar Ujjal Sing (Ed)
I. Addresses and Speeches

(vi) On the Resolution regarding Unani and Ayurvedi Systems of Medicine, 22nd February, 1928. 15

Sir, the impression is gaining ground amongst the people of this country that the Government has commercial interests in view and is, for this reason, encouraging Western system of medicine on the one side and discouraging indigenous system of medicine on the other. I do not know how far this impression has basis in truth but the fact remains that the Unani and Ayurvedi systems of medicine do not find favour with the Government.

In my opinion, in spite of all that the supporters of the Western system of medicine say, the latter has yet to learn much from the Unani system of medicine. Many of the books written on the Unani system and specially those written by Najib-ud-Din Samarqandi, have not been published. There are in the libraries of Europe many works which, if published, are sure to serve as eye-openers to those who boast of superiority of the Western system of medicine. Nor can we lose sight of the fact that ours is a poor country. Its people cannot afford an expensive system of medicine, it is, therefore, essential to introduce and encourage a cheaper system. From this point of view I think our Unani and Vedic systems very much suit the people. Of course the way in which our medicines are prepared is defective and requires improvement. An institution is needed to teach pharmacy. Our own system of pharmacy, I believe, is more conducive to the health of the people than any other methods. If you excuse me, Sir, a little digression, I may mention that while I was in England an English friend of mine told me that our way of cooking food was unnatural so much so that the original flavour of the food was entirely lost in the act of

15. Debate, 1928, XI, 57-58
cooking it. He praised the Western way of cooking food. Thereupon I told him that what we did with our food, the Westerns did with their medicines. Coming back to the point I think that if the Government were to take up the question of improving the indigenous systems of medicines seriously, these systems are sure to prove much more useful to the people of this country. I will, therefore, request the Government to give a little more attention to this matter.

(vii) On the Resolution regarding Application of the Principles of Assessment of Income- Tax to the Assessment of Land Revenue, 23rd February, 1928.\(^{16}\)

Sir, I am glad to see that the Honourable Member for Revenue\(^ {17}\) did not make any attempt to justify the present system of assessment on the basis of State ownership of land. He left it very wisely for the honourable member for Simla.\(^ {18}\) I am afraid this offers a fitting occasion to the application of that humorous Punjabi proverb chor nalon pand kalhi, that is to say—the property stolen is readier to run away than the thief. (A voice. Who is the thief?) You may understand it as you like: Since the honourable member for Simla has raised this point, I think it necessary to dispose of it with a few remarks. Let me tell the honourable representative for Simla that the first European author to refute this theory was the French-man Perron in the year 1777. Later in 1830 Briggs made a very extensive inquiry as to the law and practice in India and relating to the theory of State ownership of land. He gives in his book an accurate description of the laws of Manu, of Muslim law and the practices prevailing in the various parts of India—Bengal,

17. Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain (Ed.)
18. Lala Mohan Lal. (Ed.)
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Malwa, the Punjab, etc., and arrives at the conclusion that in no period in the history of India the State ever claimed the proprietorship of land. In the time of Lord Curzon, however, this theory was put forward, but the Taxation Committee's report which was published sometime ago has come to a very clear finding that this theory has no basis at all. That is, I believe, the reason why the Honourable Revenue Member has not tried to defend the present system on the ground of that theory. (Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: Not necessarily.) Well, you did not mention it at any rate. (The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: It is irrelevant.) If you agree, Sir, the Honourable Member may argue on the basis of that theory if he likes. But in his first speech on the subject he did not try to defend the present system of assessment on the basis of that theory. (The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain I did not want to.)

And we take it that the Government does not rely upon that. However, we have to see, in the first place, how far the present system of assessment is just. Workable it is and sanctioned by a very old tradition; but we have first to see whether it has justice on its side or not. My submission is that it is not at all just. The injustice of it is perfectly clear. If a man happens to be landowner, big or small does not matter, he has to pay land revenue. But if a man earns from sources other than land less than two thousand rupees a year you don't tax him at all. That is where injustice comes in. Nobody can deny that the system is unjust. It is no argument to say that since there are insuperable difficulties in the way of the removal of this injustice, therefore it must be perpetuated. We must admit that there is injustice and we ought to seek proper remedies in order to remove the injustice in so far as it is possible. I have no hesitation in admitting that there are serious difficulties in the way of the application of the principle of income-tax to land revenue. As a matter of fact one reason why I withdrew a more or less similar resolution which I sent in last time was this, that I felt that there were serious difficulties and the matter had to he
further investigated, although the difficulties that were then in my mind have not at all been referred to by the Honourable Revenue Member; and I need not mention them until I have heard what other members have got to say. (A voice: You cannot speak again) I do not then want to tell the House the difficulties that struck me. (A voice: Is that a secret?) it is an open secret to which the Official Secrets Act does not apply.

The arguments that the learned Member for Revenue put forward are, in the main, two. In the first place, he -argues that we are constantly in need of money: the province needs money for its development, and that the Government does not practice alchemy. I think the Government need not practise alchemy so long as they have in their pocket all the tillers of the soil whose hard work turns dust into gold. But this kind of argument can be applied in defence of any kind of evil practice which brings the required amount of money. But assuming that this argument has force, I submit that the deficiency caused in the land revenue by the adoption of a different system of land revenue may be met in other ways For instance, we can reduce the expenditure on administration. We can spend less on the so-called development which is a very dignified expression for something which has not brought us anything so far. We can further meet it from the remissions made by the Government of India.

Again the Honourable Revenue Member has tried to meet the argument that the whole burden of land revenue falls on the shoulders of the cultivator by showing that the consumer indirectly shares in that burden. The argument is plausible; but personally I feel very doubtful of its validity. One must not forget the condition of things prevailing in this province. We gave up batai long ago. (Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: Not yet.) Practically, the Land Revenue Bill does not recognise batai. (The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: There is no amended Act yet.) In general practice batai is...
given up. I do not know what would be the attitude of my zamindar friends. On economic
grounds, probably the batai system, to my mind, is better. However, the prices of the
produce of the land are determined by the demand of the consumer and the prices, as the
Honourable Finance Member\textsuperscript{19} has pointed out, determine the amount of land revenue.
But the moment the land revenue is determined, then it becomes a fixed amount for a
number of years. If after the fixing of the amount prices go up, then there is a chance for
the seller to profit by the rise of prices; but if the prices fall down, then I am afraid, the
consumer has really no share in the burden of land revenue. (The Honourable Mian
Fazl-i-Husain: If prices rise?) Well it is matter of chance. They may rise or they may fall.
(The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: Then the consumer pays. )

I have a serious doubt about this. The whole situation depends upon chance. If
prices rise, it goes to his profit; if the prices fall down the argument which the
Honourable Revenue Member put forward has no application. The consumer helps in the
determination of land revenue, but after the land revenue is fixed, then the whole thing is
left to chance. We should not forget that the production is also certain especially in areas
where the land is barani. Again the Honourable Revenue Member argued that this system
should either he continued or he given up at once. There is no third alternative possible.
In this connection I beg to say that this is not the spirit of the resolution moved by the
honourable member from Rohtak.\textsuperscript{20} The spirit of the resolution is that if you recognise
that the present system is unjust, then do something to make a beginning towards the
remedying of that injustice. Definite suggestions were made by the honourable members
who preceded me in connection with this matter. I think it is easy to do so without
definitely introducing the principle of income-tax in our land revenue

\textsuperscript{19} Sir Geoffrey deMontmorency. (Ed.)
\textsuperscript{20} Rai Sahib Chaudhri (later Chaudhri Sir) Chholu Ram. (Ed.)
system. It can be done by amending section 48 of the Land Revenue Act. I have already submitted an amendment to this effect, though I am afraid the prospect for that amendment is not very bright. I, therefore, suggest that holdings, not exceeding five bighas and situated in non-irrigated areas where the produce is practically fixed, should not be liable to the payment of land revenue. This can be done without deciding the question whether the principle of income-tax should be applied to assessment of land or not? This will to a certain extent remedy the injustice in the present system. If you lay down that a holding not exceeding five bighias is revenue-free, I do not think there will be very great deficiency in the land revenue. At any rate, if there is a large deficiency, I think it can probably be met by reducing expenditure in other directions.

Lastly, as regards the argument of the Honourable Revenue Member, or rather the fear that he expressed that this resolution may mean the death of the baby, the Land Revenue Bill, and the apprehension that it will amount to infanticide—well, in these days of birth-control, I think infanticide does not matter especially when we know that the child is going to be a very wicked one. I do not think it is demanding too much if the holdings to the extent of five bighias should be declared revenue-free. I hope that Government will give serious consideration to this point. Personally I agree even if you make it less than five bighias. (The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: Five acres.) An economic holding in this province is about ten or eleven bighas. At any rate, five bighas is half the economic holding. I do not think that remission of land revenue in the case of persons holding five bighias would cause very great deficiency. (Chaudhri Afzal Haq: Only two crores.) My calculation was that it was much less than two crores. (The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain Not quite that if you let out only the two acre man.) Two and a half acres. [The Honourable Mian Sir Fazl-i-Husain: Gunah-i-be lazzat (a fruitless sin).]
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If you commit this fruitless sin, it would show that there is at least some sense of justice in you. Reference was also made by one of the honourable members to sending a kind of commission of inquiry to Russia. I am afraid several commissions have already been sent to Russia, though not from this country. My honourable friend is probably not aware of the causes that led to the Russian revolt. It is not necessary to detail those causes; a good deal of literature has sprung up since the Russian revolt concerning the things that happened and the system that has been adopted there. Books written by such men as Bertrand Russell and others who have devoted their time to economic questions have appeared. But I think my honourable friend Pandit Nanak Chand has already given an effective reply to the proposal made by Chaudhri Afzal Haq that at the present moment, the Punjab zamindar is not ready to give up the right of private ownership. In this country, there are petty landholders, there are proprietors with two bighas, two kanals. They are practically like tenants, yet are not willing to give up the right of private ownership. My submission, therefore, is that Government should give some consideration to the demand embodied in this resolution; they should give some relief to the smaller proprietor, the produce of whose land is obviously insufficient to maintain his family.

(viii) On the Budget for 1929-30, 4th March, 1929.\(^{21}\)

Sir, I am afraid the Budget which has been presented to this Council presents a financial position which, in the words of the Honourable Finance Member,\(^{22}\) even a confirmed optimist cannot regard as entirely satisfactory. And the statement with which this Budget is presented is so concise

22. Mr. A.M. Stow. (Ed.)
and so absolutely frank that its very frankness makes it extremely difficult for the reader to criticise it. However, there are certain points which must be noticed. One remarkable feature of this Budget is, and this is the first Budget that has this feature, that the contribution to the Government of India finds no place in it. But its most unfortunate feature is that after five years continuous prosperity we are, for the first time, confronting a deficit Budget. The small increase in Excise and Stamps is no source of satisfaction, because it means an increase in drunkenness and litigation which reflects credit neither on the people nor on the Government. On the expenditure side of the Budget for 1928-29 the only excess is under Irrigation and Jails. The increase under Irrigation is due to floods in August, and the increase under Jails is due to an increase in the number of prisoners and also to higher prices of food. Well, floods are a natural phenomenon and cannot be prevented, but unless we are complete fatalists, crime is a preventable affair. If appropriate methods to prevent crime are adopted, it, to a very large extent, can be prevented. The present state of affairs is such that the man who steals cattle worth Rs.10 is sent to jail for two years, and I think this is very largely responsible for the increase in the number of prisoners in the jails.

In the Budget Estimates of 1929-30 the first thing which I would like to note is Education. Graph No. 4 in the Memorandum tells us that the amount allocated to Education is 1,81. In the statement of the Honourable Finance Member on page 6 we find it is 1,67. I was not able to understand these figures, because if 12 lakhs on new expenditure are added to 1,67 the sum is 1,79 and not 1,81. (Mr. J. G. Beazley: May I explain, Sir, that that figure includes expenditure on works, repairs and stationery?) Very well, Sir. The state of things so far as Education is concerned is very disappointing. I was going to say, awful. In 1922-23, 55 new schools in all came up for grants-in-aids out of which 16 were Islamia schools. The total amount of grants made to schools
was Rs. 1,21,906, out of which a sum of Rs. 29,214 went to Muslim schools. In 1926-27, the total amount of grant to high schools was Rs. 1,22,287 and the same amount, namely, Rs. 29,214 went to Muslim schools, i.e. 23 per cent. of the total amount. In 1927-28, the total amount of grant was Rs. 10,13,154 and the share of Muslim schools was Rs. 2,04,330, that is to say, the population which is most backward in education and most indebted got only 2 lakhs out of 10. This is a state of affairs which cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Yet we are told that there are savings in the beneficent departments which Mr. Penny describes as instances of over-budgeting, I am not at all opposed to spending large sums on education nor is it the purpose of this criticism to raise any such opposition: but I should submit that the money spent on education must be spent carefully and must be distributed equally especially in places where people are backward and too poor to pay for education. However, I need not dwell on this point because I believe it will be taken up when the motions for cuts come up before the House.

I would now like to say a few words about capital expenditure. In 1928-29, the budgeted estimate for capital expenditure charged to revenue was 1,81 lakhs. It was later on raised to 1,89 and the revised estimate shows Rs. 2,12 lakhs. For 1929-30, the capital expenditure is expected to be Rs. 1,54 lakhs. Since extraordinary receipts will not amount to much it is proposed to borrow Rs. 1,40 lakhs from the Provincial Loans Fund. This is a very regrettable state of affairs. The province is already in debt. On pages 22-23 of the Budget you will find the exact position of the province. It will be seen that the loans from the public amount to 3 crores while the loans from the Government thereto amount in the aggregate to about 26 crores. Of course, this sum does not include the loans which have been sanctioned from 1st March 1929. We are now compelled to borrow another sum

23. Finance Secretary (late Financial Commissioner, Development). (Ed.)
of 1,40 lakhs in spite of what the Honourable Finance Member says at page 4 of his statement which runs as follows:

    It has been found impossible to proceed with the full programme of buildings and roads and it is contemplated that 48 lakhs less will be expended under this head in 1929-30 than is shown in the revised estimate for 1928-29. It is also contemplated to reduce transfers to the Reserve Fund to 5 lakhs only instead of the 15 lakhs budgeted for 1928-29.

    I think it was Charles Lamb who said that mankind are really divided into two classes, creditors and debtors. In so far as this province is concerned, if we drop the religious labels, Hindu and Muslim—and substitute the economic labels, lenders and borrowers, Lamb’s remark is perfectly true. But my fear is that this province, as a whole, may now be made a permanent member of debtor class. Thus the present financial position is very disappointing and it is not an easy matter to discover new sources of revenue.

    However, I venture to make a suggestion. In the first place, I should like the Government to move the Government of India to provincialise Income-tax. That would improve our position to some extent. I may in the next place suggest the imposition of death duties as they have in England. (The Honourable Revenue Member: Living duties would be more appropriate!) These would be living duties because it is the living who would have to pay them. Some limit such as those inheriting property to the value of Rs.20,000 or 30,000 may be fixed. Next we should try reduction of high salaries, and purchase of our machinery from the cheapest markets.
I. Addresses and Speeches

(ix) On the Budget for 1930-31, 7th March, 1930.\(^{24}\)

Sir, I should like to offer a few general observations on the financial position of the province as revealed in this Budget. In his very clear and lucid Memorandum Mr. Penny\(^{25}\) has given the present position in a nutshell. On page 13 he says:

> Even after these special efforts at economy revenue receipts stand at 10.95 lakhs and expenditure at 11.22 lakhs with no provision for a transfer to the Revenue Reserve Fund, and there will thus be a deficit in the year of 27 lakhs. The only consolation is that provision has been made for expenditure of 28 lakhs on special flood repairs, and if this is excluded from consideration as abnormal and non-recurring, the Budget just balances.

Now, I am afraid the consolation given by Mr. Penny does not prove of much consequence in view of what he himself says at page 16:

> A glance at the first graph prefixed to this memorandum will show that the year 1930-31 will be the third in succession to show an excess of expenditure over receipts in the revenue account. It is true that fortune has been singularly unkind in the last two years and the deficits in both are capable of convincing explanation. But the hard fact remains that if the series since 1921 is taken as a whole, good years and bad years balance, and that the financial system must be adapted to fluctuations which nature herself prescribes. If the decade has been marked by unprecedented floods in the Jumna in 1924 and in the Indus and the Jhelum in 1929, by failure of the rabi harvest in 1921, by a strange disaster to the wheat crop in 1928, and by cotton disease in 1926, there have been compensating gains in the reassessments of land revenue that

25. Finance Secretary (later Financial Commissioner, Development) (Ed.)
fortunately fell due in the last five years, in the good harvests form 1921 to 1926 and above all in the complete remission of provincial contributions to the Central Government. The continued extension of canal irrigation has made the prosperity of the province and Its revenues more and more secure, and added to the resources from progress in future must be financed. Regarded in the light of the experience of the past nine years, the Budget of the year 1930-31 has a special significance.

This is the part of the paragraph to which will draw your special attention:

The deficit in the revenue account may be attributed to the completion of flood repairs, but what is of far greater importance is the fact that even if the cost of flood repairs is excluded, the Budget has been balanced only with difficulty and by jettisoning a number of works that had already received the approval of the Legislature and, but for unforeseen delays or the need for economy, would already have been under construction.

Mr. Penny then discusses the causes of the present financial position and is driven to what he calls a somewhat melancholy conclusion that the present state of things is not a passing phase but has come to stay. He says:

The inevitable but somewhat melancholy conclusion to be drawn from an examination of the Budget for 1930-31 is that it represents not a passing phase which can be attributed to seasonal misfortunes or flood calamities but a state of things that is likely to continue.

Now, Sir, we know that the province is already in debt. The problem of unemployed is becoming more and more acute every day. Trade is at a low ebb. You can easily imagine what the financial future of the province is likely to be. I am inclined to think that the present position is due not SO much to stationary revenues as to the present system of administration which necessitates high salaries in the matter
of which the people of this province have no say. There are to my mind only three alternatives open to the people of this province—either have the present system with all its ugly daughters, such as deficit Budgets, communal bickerings, starving millions, debt and unemployment, or do away with the present system root and branch, or retain the form of the present system and secure the power to pay less for it. There is no other alternative. This system must come to an end if you want to live a comfortable life. We spend more than any other country in the world on the, present system of administration. There is no other country which spends so much on the administration. (Mr. H. Galvert: Question.) The honourable member may reply me when his turn comes. My belief is that we pay much more than our revenues justify. So far as expenditure in regard to which we have some say is concerned, I support the proposition that a retrenchment committee ought to be appointed so that we may be able to see whether any further reductions are possible.

I now proceed to offer a few remarks on Industry and Education. We spend practically nothing on industry. And as I have said before and as many other speaker-s have pointed out, industrial development alone can save us from the curse of unemployment. There is a good future for weaving industry, and for shoe-making industry, in this province and if we encourage these industries, I think we shall be able to save the province from unemployment, provided we protect these industries against Cawnpore and Ahmedabad.

Again we have spent a good deal of money on education, and with what result? The report on the progress of education in this province shows that there has been a fall of 27,000 students and about 1,000 schools. The cause of this fall as mentioned in the report is lack of propaganda work on the part of school inspectors. I do not agree that that is he real cause. The real cause of this phenomenon ought to be sought elsewhere. I have a copy before me of the facts
and figures relating to the work of the Education Minister$^{26}$ during the last three years. Unfortunately I cannot go through all these figures within the fixed time-limit; I would draw your attention only to the special grants to unaided schools during 1928-29. You will see that the total number of schools to which grants have been made is 21. Out of this there are 13 Hindu institutions, 5 Sikh institutions and 2 Muslim institutions. The grant that goes to the Hindu institutions is Rs. 16,973, to Sikh institutions Rs. 8,908 and to Muslim institutions Rs. 2,200. The cause, therefore, of this remarkable phenomenon must be sought in the way in which money on education is spent.

26. Mr. (Later Sir) Manohar Lal. (Ed.)
II. Religion and Philosophy

PART TWO

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
II. Religion and Philosophy

The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded
by Abdul Karint al-Jilana*

While European scholars have investigated ancient Hindu Philosophy with an unflagging enthusiasm, they have, as a rule, looked upon Muslim Philosophy as only an unprogressive repetition of Aristotle and Plato. Although during recent years some attention has been paid to this part of Arabic literature, yet the work achieved by reapers in this field bears no proportion to the harvest that may yet be reaped. This comparatively indifferent attitude towards Arabic philosophy was, perhaps, due, to a great extent, to the fascination that Indian speculation has exercised over the mind of Europe ever since the discovery of Sanskrit literature. We admit the superiority of the Hindu in point of philosophical acumen, yet this admission need not lead us to ignore the intellectual independence of Muslim thinkers. The post-Islamic history of the Arabs is a long series of glorious military exploits, which compelled them to adopt a mode of life leaving but little time for gentler conquests in the great field of science and philosophy. They did not, and could not, produce men like Kapila and Sankaracharya, but they zealously rebuilt The smouldering edifice of Science, and even attempted to add fresh stories to it. Their originality does not appear at once because the unscientific condition of the age led them to write in the spirit of expositors other than that of independent thinkers.

We wish here to illustrate their originality by considering

* Indian Antiquary, Bombay, September 1900, pp. 237-46 [Author’s foot-notes, omitted in the earlier editions, are added here from the text prepared by S.H. Razzaqi in his Discourses of Iqbal, Sh. Ghulam Au, Lahore, 1979, p. 117]
that portion of the Islamic philosophy which had generally been condemned under the
contemptuous name of mysticism. We believe, however, that mysticism is but
metaphysics hidden under the veil of religious phraseology and that the super-stTucture
of mysticism is impossible without a system of metaphysics serving as its foundation. It
is, in our opinion, essentially a system of verification—a spiritual method by which the
ego realises as fact what intellect has understood as theory. We know much in theory and
our belief in this kind of knowledge depends on the force and the number of arguments
advanced in its support. The detection of some logical flaw in our argument, or the force
of the arguments in favour of the opposite view, may at once induce us to abandon our
theory, but if the ego has “realised” the theory, if the theory in question ha-s been a
spiritual experience on our part, no argument, however forcible, no logical flaw, can
dispose us to abandon our position. Hence mysticism appeals to a standard higher than
intellect itself. This standard, waiving the question of its objective existence is, according
to the mystic, ____ or heart, the meaning of which will he explained later.on. I shall not
dwell here upon the scientific necessity of mysticism for the solution of human enigma¹,
but shall conted myself with a brief statement of the Islamic Metaphysical Mysticism as
represented by- Shaikh Abdul Karim al-Jilani in his famous work ,Al-Insan-al Kamil
(The Perfect Man).

This deep thinker was born at Juan in 767 A.H. as he himself says in one of his
verses, and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy-ud-Din ibn
‘Arabi², whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced his teaching. He
combined in himself poetical imagination and philosophical genius, but his poetry is no

1. Du Prel. in his Philosophy of Mysticism, shows with great force and clearness that an
examination of Mysticism is necessary for a complete solution of the human enigma.
2. Sheikh Muhiud-Din ibn ‘Arabi—the greatest of the Muhammadan Sufis was an astonishingly
voluminous writer, lie believed in the revolution of the earth round the sun, as well us the existence of a
world beyond ocean (468-548 All.).
more than a vehicle for his mystical and metaphysical doctrine. Among other works, he wrote a commentary on Sheikh Muhy-tid-Din ibn ‘Arabi’s Futuh al-Makkiyah, a commentary on Bismillah, and Al-Insan-al Kamil, which we propose to consider here.

This famous work comprises two volumes: the first may he looked upon as a treatise on his metaphysical opinions while the second attempts explanations of terms current in popular Muhammadan theology. In order to make his doctrine easy of understanding, he enters into certain preliminary explanations and declares that in speaking of the ultimate realities we must come down to popular language—a vehicle quite insufficient for the purpose. He avows that the enigma of existence is too high for common phraseology, and that his statements must necessarily he “broken lights” of the great truth. After this brief apology he goes on to relate a personal anecdote showing how he once felt intense thirst for truth and how at last he learnt it from a person endowed with “all the attributes of spiritual glory”. The introduction ends with a condensed statement of his doctrine which he puts in this way: “Divine nature soars upwards, human nature sinks downwards; hence perfect human nature must stand midway between the two; it must share both the Divine and the human attributes in one word perfect man must be the god-man.”

In the first chapter the author explains the meaning of the word _______ or Essence. Essence, pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and attributes are given, whether it is existent or non-existent like _______. The existent is for two species:

1. The Existent is Absolute or Pure Existence—Pure Being—God.

2. The existence joined with non-existence—the Creation-Nature.

The Essence of God or Pure Thought can not be
understood; no words can express it, for it is beyond all relation, and knowledge is relation. The Intellect flying through fathomless empty space pierces through the veil of names and attributes, traverses the vast sphere of time, enters the domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to be a an existence which is non existence—a sum of contradictions\(^3\). It is interesting to compare this passage with Hegel whose speculations have exercised such vast influence on the methods of modern scientific investigations. It will appear how strikingly he anticipates the conclusions of modern German philosophy without seeking the help of the Hegelian method—a fact which makes his teaching appear rather dogmatic.

After this confession of ignorance the author goes on to say that pure being has two ___ (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life in all future time. It has two _____ (qualities) God and Creation. It has two ____ (definitions) uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two _____ : God and Man. It has _____, (two faces): the manifested (this world and the unmanifested (the next world). It has ________ (two effects): necessity and possibility. It has ________ (two points of view): from the first it is non-existent for itself but existent for what it is not itself; from the second it is existent for itself, and non-existent for what is not itself. With these bits of Hegelianism the author closes the difficult speculation, and begins his second chapter on the name.

Name, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named, while the named is the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality, hut exist in name only as _____ (a fabulous bird). It is a name, the object of which does not exist in reality. Just as ____ is absolutely non-existent,

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so God is absolutely present, although it cannot be touched or seen. The _______ exists only in idea while the object of the name _____ exists in reality, and can be known like _____ only through its names and attributes. The name is mirror which reveals all the secrets of the Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees Himself.

In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three stages of development of Pure Being, enumerated by the author in his chapter on the Illumination of tJie Essence. There he propounds that the Absolute Existence or Pure Being, when it leaves its absoluteness, undergoes three stages: (1) Oneness, (2) He-ness, and (3) l-ness. In the first stage there is absence of all attributes and relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free from all manifestation, while the third stage I-ness is nothing but an external manifestation of the He-ness or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name .u (Allah); here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that the name of Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure Being, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third stage of development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the gloom of the Absolute Being.

In correspondence with these three stages of the absolute Development, the perfect man has three stages of raining, but in his case the process of development spiritual must be the reverse, because his is a process of ascent while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is scaled;
in the second stage he steps into the sphere of the Attributes and in the third stage he enters the sphere of ___ (the Essence). It is here that he becomes the God-man; his eye becomes the eye of God; his word the word of God and his life the life of God—participates in the general life of Nature, and “sees into the life of things”. It will appear at once how strikingly the author has anticipated the chief phase of the Hegelian Dialectic and how greatly he has emphasised the Doctrine of the Logos; a Doctrine which has always found favour with almost all the profound thinkers of Is(am. and in recent times readvoca ted by M. Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, probably profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muhammadans. The chapter ends with a fanciful discussion about the meanings of the different letters of the world ‘Allah’; each letter of the word, he says, marks a separate illumination.

The third chapter is a brief discussion of the nature of the Attribute. The author’s views on this interesting question are very important, because it is here that his doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines Attribute as an agency which gives us knowledge of the state of things. Elsewhere he says that this distinction of Attributes from the underlying reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested because here every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is supposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because there is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of Maya; he believes that the material world has real existence; it is the outward husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is none the less real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a

conception furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in understanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically Hegelian doctrine—identity of Thought and Being.

In the 37th chapter of the second volume of his book, he clearly says that Idea is the stuff of which the universe is made; Thought, Idea, Notion is the material of structure of nature. While laying stress on his doctrine he says, “Dost thou not look to thine own self? Where is the reality in which the so-called Divine Attributes inhere? It is but the idea.” Hence nature is nothing but the crystallised idea. He would give his hearty assent to the results of Kant’s Kritik of Pure Reason but, unlike him, he would make this very idea the essence of the Universe. Kant’s Ding an sich to him is a pure non-entity; there is nothing behind this collection of attributes, the attributes are but the real things, the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it is the other self of the Absolute—another which owes its existence to the principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature is the idea of God, a something necessary for His Knowledge of Himself. While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, our author it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be noted that the author’s phrase _______ (world of realities), which uses for the material world, is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that the distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful because it facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at all real. It will be understood that the author recognises the truth of Empirical Idealism only tentatively and does not admit the absoluteness of the distinction.

These remarks should not lead us to understand that the

author does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in itself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says that the material world is the thing in itself; it is the “other” the external expression of the thing in itself. The Ding an sich and its external expression or the production of its self-directed are really identical though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate our understanding. If they are not identical, he says, how could one express the other? In one word, he means by Ding an sich or _______ the Pure, the Absolute Being and seeks it through its manifestation or external expression. He says that a long as we do not realise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world, or the world of attributes, seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is brought home to us the veil is removed. We see ___ itself everywhere and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature then appears in her true light; all otherness is removed, and we are one with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases and the inquisitive attitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the person who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no new information, and religion with her role of supernatural authority has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.

After these profound remarks the author proceeds to classify the different Divine Names and Attributes which have received expression in Nature or the crystallised _________ —a doctrine similar to that of the Vedanta. His classification is as follows:
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Each of these names and attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the soul of the perfect man. How these illuminations take place and how they reach the soul is not explained by the author. His silence about these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his views and implies the necessity of spiritual Dictatorship.

Before considering the author’s views of particular Divine Names and Attributes, we should note that his conception of God implied in the above classification is very familiar to that of Schleiermacher. While the German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single attribute of power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God, free from all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself God is an unchangeable unity and that His attributes “are nothing more than views of Him from different human standpoints, the various appearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite intelligence according to how we look at it from different sides of the spiritual landscape.” In his absolute existence He is beyond the limitations of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself, when He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and attributes appear sealed on her very fabric.

6. The names and attributes of God as He is in himself (Allah, Tie One, The Odd, The Light. The Truth. The Pete, The living); the name of attributes of God as the source of all Glory) (The Great and High, The all-Powerful); The names and attributes of God as all-Perfection The Creator, The Benefactor, The First, The Last): The name and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, .The Painter, The Merciful, The Origin of all).

7. Matheson’s Aids to the Study of German Theology, p.43.
Let us now consider what the author teaches about particular Divine Names and Attributes. The first essential name is Allah or ____ (Divinity) which forms the subject of the fourth chapter; Divinity means the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in that sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence. Divinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference between them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its where is invisible, while the traces of the former are visible, itself is invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature is not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible and its traces in the form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author illustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice, but ice is not water. The ________ visible to the eye (another proof of our author’s Natural Realism of Absolute Idealism), although all its attributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as they are in themselves; their shadows or their effects only are known. For instance, generosity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of giving to the poor is known and seen. This is due to the attributes being incorporated in the very essence of _______. If the expression of the attributes in its real nature has been possible, its separation from the ____ would have been possible also.

After these remarks on the Divinity, the author proceeds to explain the other Essential Names of God—the Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The Absolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness of Cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the light of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow universality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that contribute to its formation. The wall is a unity—but a unity which comprehends diversity; so that ____ or Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the soul of diversity.
The third movement of the Absolute Being is ___ or Simple Oneness—a step attended with external manifestation. The absolute Oneness is free from all particular names and attributes, the Oneness Simple takes on names and attributes, but there is no distinction between them; one is the essence of the other. The ____ is similar to Simple Oneness, but its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even contradictory; as generous is contradictory to revengeful\(^8\). The third step, or, as Liege! would say, Voyage of the Being, has another appellation, ____ (Mercy). The first Mercy, the author says, is the Evolution of the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of his own self in every atom of the result of his own self-diremption. The author makes this point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah); ice or condensed water is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere the author calls water the origin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This instance leads the author to guard against the error of looking upon God as immanent in nature or living through the sphere of material existence. He says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent because He is Himself the existence. External existence is the other self of God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator of an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The difference between God and man (as one may say) is that His ideas materialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that Hegel would use the same line of

8. This would seem vety much like the idea of the Phenomena Brahaliana of the Vedanta. Personal Creator or the Prajapati of the Vedanta makes the third step of the Absolute Being or the Nauonienal Brahmana. Our author seems to admit two kinds of Brahmana—with or without qualities like the Samkara and Badarayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a lowering of the Absolute Thought which is Asat, in so far it is absolute and sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence limited. Notwithstanding the Absolute Monisnt, our author inclines to a view similar to that of Ramanuja. lie seems to admit the reality of individual soul and seems to imply, unlike Samkara, that Iswara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment of the higher knowledge—a remark which tends to-free our authors doctrine from the political and social dangers of Vendata.
argument in freeing himself from the accusations of Pantheism.

The remarks on Mercy are followed by brief notice of the word _______ (Providence). He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in need of: Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name. The natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he would speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a certain force of nature. Our author would call it a manifestation of ______, but unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate the unknowability of the force. He would say that there is nothing behind it, it is the Absolute Being itself. This brief chapter ends with some verses of his own composition, one of which is given here, though marred in the rendering:

All that is. owes its existence to you, and you owe your existence to all that is.

Another Sufi has expressed a similar thought still more boldly:

I owe to God as much as God owes to me.

We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The Arabian Prophet, says the author, was once questioned about the place of God before creation. He said that God, before creation, existed in ___ (‘Ama). It is the nature of this void or primal darkness which the author now proceeds to examine. The chapter is particularly interesting, because the word translated into modern phraseology would be “the unconsciousness”. This single word impresses upon us the foresightedness with which the author anticipates metaphysical doctrine of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the reality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any.

9.
descending movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation. It does not stand in need of any name or quality because it is beyond the sphere of relations. It is distinguished from the absolute Oneness because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of coming down towards manifestation.

This brief but very interesting chapter ends with a very important caution. He says that when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation, our words must not be understood as implying time, for there can be no duration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time, contiguity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can one piece of creation intervene between God and His creation? Hence our words before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought, should not be construed to imply time or space. The ____ or the real Being is beyond the grasp of human conceptions, no category of material existence can be applicable to it, because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena cannot be spoken as obtaining in the sphere of noumena. It is a matter of regret that the author does not touch here upon the anthropomorphic conceptions of God inculcated by positive religion, but ends his chapter with some verses which run as follows:

O Thou who art one having the effect of two. Thou hast comprehended under thyself all the beauties of perfection, but owing to their being heterogeneous to one another, they became contradictories which became one in thee.¹⁰

The 13th, 14th and 15th chapters are nothing but a jumble of metaphysical phraseology. We have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has
three stages; the first is the meditation of the name which the author calls the illumination of names. He remarks that “when God illuminates a certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the dazzling splendour of that name, and when thou calleth God, the call is responded to by the man.” The effect of this illumination would be, in because the individual goes on living and moving like the Schopenhauer’s language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it must not be confounded with physical death, spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after he has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries in the pantheistic mood:

She was I and I was she and there was no one to separate us.11

The second stage of the spiritual training is what the author calls the Illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the power of receptivity possessed by him—a fact which classifies men according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of Life and thus participate in the soul of the universe. The effect of this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the magnitude of things (as Christ often did). In this wise the perfect man receives illuminations from all the Divine attributes, crosses the sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of _____ (Essence)—Absolute Existence.

As we have already noticed, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. Each of these three
movements appear under a new Essential Name which has its own peculiarly illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is the end of our author’s spiritual ethics; man has become perfect, he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or has learnt what Hegel calls the Absolute Philosophy. “He becomes the paragon of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the universe\(^\text{12}\). He is the point where ____ (Man-ness) and ______ (God-ness) become one and result in the birth of the god-man.

Although the author devotes a separate chapter to the perfect man in the second volume of his hook, yet we will consider that chapter here in order to secure a continuous view of his doctrine. Here he unfolds his Doctrine of Self-diremption in a new dress. He says that the perfect man is the pivot round which revolves all the “heavens” of existence, and the sum of the realities of material existence corresponds to his unity. The Jt corresponds to his heart, the of ____ (the chair) to his I-ness, ______ (the lote Tree) to his spiritual position, the _____ (Pen) to his intellect; the _____ (the Preserved Tablet) to his mind; the elements to his temperament; matter to his faculty of perception, air to the space he occupies; the _____ (Heaven) to his opinion; the starry heaven to his intelligence; the seventh heaven to his will; the sixth to his imagination; the fifth to his perservance; the fourrh to his understanding; the third to his fancy, the second to his reflection, and the first to his memory. Of the above-mentioned correspondence, the author has very obscure explanations and goes on to enumerate all the phases of material existence in order to explain the truth that the perfect man is truly a microcosm and moves in every sphere of thought and being.

His doctrine implies that angels have not a separate existence of their own; all have their source in the faculties of the perfect man; in one word they are personifications of

his faculties. The _____ of the perfect man is the source of _____ (the source of life), his intellect the source of _____ (the source of revelation), that part of his nature which is subject to the illusions of fear, the source of _____ (the angel of fear), his will the source of _____ and his reflection the source of the rest of the angels. The interpretation of these phrases is very doubtful, but it seems to me that what are called angels are nothing but different phases of the activity of the different powers of his nature. How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the author does not tell us, but he says that at every stage he has a peculiar spiritual experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or agitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _____ (heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical diagram of and explains it by saying that it is the eye which sees the names, the attributes, and the Absolute Being successively. It owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind (_____) and becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the ultimate realities of existence. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel’s sense of the word ‘conscience’ would approach our author’s meaning of the word. All that the _____ or the source of what the Vedanta calls the Higher knowledge, reveals is not seen by the individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, as the Sufis of this school hold, is permanent; moments of spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold13, cannot be at our command. The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has realised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual realisation is over,

13. We can not kindle when we will
man is man and God is God. Had the experience been permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and safety overturned.

Let us now sum up the author’s Doctrine of the Trinity. We have seen the three movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of Pure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with external manifestation which is the self-diremption of the Essence into God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect man is a necessary condition for the continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand, that in the god-man, the Absolute Being, which has left its Absoluteness, returns unto itself, and but for the god-man it could not have done so, for then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which God sees Himself is due to the principle of differences in the nature of the Absolute Being itself He recognises the principle in the following verses:

If you say God is one, you are right, but if you say that
He is two, this is also true.
If you say no but He is three, you are right, for this is
the real nature of man

The perfect man, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he receives illumination from all the essential names, on the other hand all the divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:

(1) Independent life or existence.

(2) Knowledge which is a form of life, as the author proves from a verse of the Quran.
(3) Will—the principle of particularisation or the manifestation of the Being.

The author defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God according to the requirements of the Essence, hence it is a particular form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are different names for love, the last is the love in which the lover and the beloved, the knower and the known, merge into each other and become identical. This form of love, the author says, is the Absolute Essence; as Christianity teaches God is love. The author guards here against the error of looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined.

(4) Power which expresses itself in self-diremption —creation.

The author controverts Shaikh Muhy-ud-Din ibn Arabi’s position that the Universe existed before its creation in the knowledge of God, as Hamilton holds. He says this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds that the universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self of God.

(5) The Word or the reflected being.

Every possibility is the word of God; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has different names—the tangible word, the sum of the realities of man, the arrangement of the Divinity, the spread of Oneness, the expression of the Unknown, the phases of Beauty, the trace of names and attributes, and the object of God’s knowledge.


(7) The Power of seeing.

(8) Beauty—that which seems least beautiful in nature
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(the reflected beauty) is, in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has no real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity.

(9) Glory or beauty in its intensity.

(10) Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore Unlimited and Infinite.

We have now the doctrine of the perfect man completed. All through the author has maintained his argumentation by an appeal to different verses of the Quran\textsuperscript{15}, and to the several traditions of the Prophet, the authenticity of which he never doubts. Although he reproduces the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, except that his god-man is Muhammad instead of Christ, he never alludes to his having been influenced by Christian theology. He looks upon the doctrine as something common between the two forms of religion and accuses Christians of a blasphemous interpretation of the doctrine—of regarding the Personality of God as split up into three distinct personalities. Our OWfl belief, however, is that this splendid doctrine has not been well understood by the majority of Islamic and even Christian thinkers. The doctrine is but another way of stating that the Absolute Unity must have in itself a principle of difference in order to evolve diversity out of itself. Almost all the attacks of Muhammadan theologians are directed against vulgar beliefs while the truth of real Christianity has not sufficiently been recognised. I believe no Islamic thinker will object to the deep i;ieaniflg of the Trinity as explained by this author, or will hesitate in approving Kant interpretation of

15. While remarking on the Bible the author says, “The Bible begins with the name of the Father, the Son and Mother, just as the Quran begins wits the three Divine names. But the people of Christ did not understand the real meanings of the Bible and interpreted the Father, the Mother and the Son as the Spirit, the Virgin and Christ respectively. They could not understand that the Father meant the Mother the real nature of the Pure Being and the Son the Book—the Universe in itself or that which is the off shoot of the deep reality of the Essence. Although the author accuses Christians of a very serious misunderstanding yet he regards their sin as venial holding that their (the splitting Lip of the I)divine Personality, is the Essence of all (Unity).
the Doctrine of Redemption. Shaikh Muhy-ud-Din ibn ‘Arabi says that the error of Christianity does not lie in making Christ God but in making God Christ.

After these remarks on the Doctrine of the Trinity let us now review the remainder of the author’s treatise. His principal doctrine is complete before us, but he has got something more to say. He devotes a separate chapter to the He-ness, the second movement of the Absolute Being, but drops no new remark here. He then goes on to consider the I-ness, the third movement of the Absolute, and defines it as the contrast of God with what is His own manifestation and says that I and He are but the outside and the inside of the same thing. In the three succeeding chapters the author considers the words Eternity and Uncreatableness and guards against the error of understanding them as implying time. The 31st chapter goes under the heading of “The Days of God,” by which phrase the author means the different manifestations of the Absolute. The Absolute Being has two phases; in Himself He is one and Unchangeable, but in the second Phase He is the cause of all diversity—nay, is the diversity. That which appears is not unreal, it is the Absolute Being itself. It is interesting to observe that the author uses here the word ____ which exactly means Evolution implying the identity of the object under all its diverse forms. The first volume ends here with brief notices of the Quran, The Old Testament, the Book of Psalms and the Bible. The author’s remarks on the different books are very interesting, but are not directly connected with the main theory he propounds. We, therefore, proceed to estimate the value of his philosophical labour. While summing up his Doctrine of the Perfect Man, we have seen that, although he has anticipated many of the chief doctrines of modern German philosophy and particularly Hegelianism, yet he is not a systematic thinker at all. He perceives the truth, but being unequipped with the instrumentality of a sound philosophical method, he cannot advance positive proofs for his position, or rather cannot present his views in a systematic unity. He is keenly
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alive to the necessity of philosophical precision, yet his mysticism constantly leads him to drop vague, obscure remarks savouring of Platonic poetry rather than philosophy. His book is a confused jumble of metaphysics, religion, mysticism and ethics, very often excluding all likelihood of analysis. In his defence of the Islamic institutions, he implies that religion is something quite different from metaphysics, yet in his general treatment he is firmly convinced of their identity that he regards religion as applied metaphysics, and to a great extent anticipates the view of modern NeoHelegian school of England. Amidst the irregularity and general want of clearness, his chief doctrine, however, is sufficiently clear—a doctrine which makes the principal merit of our author, and brings him out as the triumphant possessor of the deep metaphysical meaning of the Trinity. In the garb of mysticism he has dropped remarks which might be developed so as to result in a philosophical system, but it is a matter for regret that this sort of Idealistic Speculation did not find much favour with later Islamic thinkers.

(2)

Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal*

There are three points of view from which a religious system can be approached: the standpoint of the teacher, that of the expounder, and that of the critical student. I do not pretend to be a teacher whose thought and action are or ought to be in perfect harmony in so far as he endeavours to work out in his own life the ideals which he places before others and thus influences his audience more by example

* This paper was read by Allama Iqbal at the anniversary celebration of the Anjuinan Hamayat-e-Islam, Lahore. It was first published in The Observer of Laliore in April 1909 and was fully reproduced in The Hundastan Review of Allahabad in its issues for July and Dcccmber 1909.
than by precept. Nor do I claim the high office of an expounder who brings to hear a subtle intellect upon his task, endeavours to explain all the various aspects of the principles he expounds and works with certain presuppositions, the truth of which he never questions. The attitude of the mind which characterises a critical student is fundamentally different from that of the teacher and the expounder. He approaches the subject of his inquiry free from all presuppositions, and tries to understand the organic structure of a religious system, just as a biologist would study a form of life or a geologist a piece of mineral. His object is to apply methods of scientific research to religion, with a view to discover how the various elements in a given structure fit in with one another, how each factor functions individually, and how their relation with one another determines the functional value of the whole. He looks at the subject from the standpoint of history and raises certain fundamental questions with regard to the origin, growth, and formation of the system he proposes to understand. What are the historical forces, the operation of which evoked, as a necessary consequence, the phenomenon of a particular system? Why should a particular religious system be produced by a particular people? What is the real significance of a religious system in the history of the people who produced it, and in the history of man-kind as a whole? Are there any geographical causes which determine the original locality of a religion? How far does it reveal the inmost soul of a people, their social, moral and political aspirations? What transformation, if any, has it worked in them? How far has it contributed towards the realisation of the ultimate purpose revealed in the history of man? These are some of the questions which the critical student of religion endeavours to answer, in order to comprehend its structure and to estimate its ultimate worth as a civilising agency among the forces of historical evolution.

I propose to look at Islam from the standpoint of the critical student. But I may state at the outset that I avoid the
use of expressions current in popular Revelation Theology; since my method is essentially scientific and consequently necessitates the use of terms which can be interpreted in the light of every-day human experience. For instance, when I say that the religion of a people is the sum total of their life experience finding a definite expression through the medium of a great personality, I am only translating the fact of revelation into the language of science. Similarly, interaction between individual and universal energy is only another expression for the feeling of prayer, which ought to be so described for purposes of scientific accuracy. It is because I want to approach my subject from a thoroughly human standpoint and not because I doubt the fact of Divine Revelation as the final basis of all religion that I prefer to employ expressions of a more scientific content. Islam is moreover the youngest of all religions, the last creation of humanity. Its founder stands out clear before us; he is truly a personage of history and lends himself freely even to the most searching criticism. Ingenious legend has weaved no screens round his figure; he is born in the broad day-light of history; we can thoroughly understand the inner spring of his actions; we can subject his mind to a keen psychological analysis. Let us then for the time being eliminate the supernatural element and try to understand the structure of Islam as we find it.

I have just indicated the way in which a critical student of religion approaches his subject. Now, it is not possible for me, in the short space at my disposal, to answer, with regard to Islam, all the questions which as a critical student of religion I ought to raise and answer in order to reveal the real meaning of this religious system. I shall not raise the question of the origin and the development of Islam. Nor shall I try to analyses the various currents of thought in the pre-Islamic Arabian society, which found a final focus in the utterances of the Prophet of Islam. I shall confine my attention to the Islamic ideal in its ethical and political aspects only.
To begin with we have to recognise that every great religious system starts with certain propositions concerning the nature of man and the universe. The psychological implication of Buddhism, for instance, is the central fact of pain as a dominating element in the Constitution of the universe. Man, regarded as an individuality, is helpless against the forces of pain, according to the teachings of Buddhism. There is an indissoluble relation between pain and the individual consciousness which, as such, is nothing but a constant possibility of pain. Freedom from pain means freedom from individuality. Starting from the fact of pain, Buddhism is quite consistent in placing before man the ideal of self-destruction. Of the two terms of this relation, pain and the sense of personality, one (i.e. pain) is ultimate; the other is a delusion from which it is possible to emancipate ourselves by ceasing to act on those lines of activity which have a tendency to intensify the sense of personality. Salvation, then, according to Buddhism, is inaction, renunciation of self and unworldliness are the principal virtues. Similarly, Christianity, as a religious system, is based on the fact of sin. The world is regarded as evil and the taint of sin is regarded as hereditary to man, who, as an individuality, is insufficient and stands in need of some supernatural personality to intervene between him and his Creator. Christianity, unlike Buddhism, regards human personality as something real but agrees with Buddhism in holding that man as a force against sin is insufficient. There is, however, a subtle difference in the agreement. We can, according to Christianity, get rid of sin by depending upon a Redeemer; we can free ourselves from pain, according to Buddhism, by letting this insufficient force dissipate or lose itself in the universal energy of nature. Both agree in the fact of insufficiency and both agree in holding that this insufficiency is an evil; but while the one makes up the deficiency by bringing in the force of a redeeming personality, the other prescribes its gradual reduction until it is annihilated altogether. Again, Zoroastrianism looks upon
nature as a scene of endless struggle between the powers of evil and the powers of good and recognises in man the power to choose any course of action he likes. The universe, according to Zoroastrianism, is partly evil, partly good; man is neither wholly good nor wholly evil, but a combination of the two principles—light and darkness continually fighting against each other for universal supremacy. We see then that the fundamental pre-suppositions, with regard to the nature of the universe and man, in Buddhism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism respectively are the following:

1. There is pain in nature and man regarded as an individual is evil (Buddhism).

2. There is sin in nature and the taint of sin is fatal to man (Christianity).

3. There is struggle in nature; man is a mixture of the struggling forces and is free to range himself on the side of the powers of good which will eventually prevail (Zoroastrianism).

The question now is, what is the Muslim view of the universe and man? What is the central ideal in Islam which determines the structure of the entire system? We know that sin, pain and sorrow are constantly mentioned in the Quran. The truth is that Islam looks upon the universe as a reality and consequently recognises as reality all that is in it. Sin, pain, sorrow, struggle are certainly real but Islam teaches that evil is not essential to the universe; the universe can be reformed; the elements of sin and evil can be gradually eliminated. All that is in the universe is God’s, and the seemingly destructive forces of nature become sources of life, if properly controlled by man, who is endowed with the power to understand and to control them.

These and other similar teachings of the Quran, combined with the Quranic recognition of the reality of sin and sorrow, indicate that the Islamic view of the universe is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Modern psychometry has
given the final answer to the psychological implications of Buddhism. Pain is not an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, and pessimism is only a product of a hostile social environment. Islam believes in the efficacy of well-directed action; hence the standpoint of Islam must be described as melioristic—the ultimate presupposition and justification of all human effort at scientific discovery and social progress. Although Islam recognises the fact of pain, — sin and struggle in nature, yet the principal fact which stands in the way of man’s ethical progress is, according to Islam, neither pain, nor sin, nor struggle. It is fear to which man is a victim owing to his ignorance of the nature of his environment and want of absolute faith in God. The highest stage of man’s ethical progress is reached when he becomes absolutely free from fear and grief.

The central proposition which regulates the structure of Islam then is that there is fear in nature, and the object of Islam is to free man from fear. This view of the universe indicates also the Islamic view of the metaphysical nature of man. If fear is the force which dominates man and counteracts his ethical progress, man must be regarded as a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. The essential nature of man, then, consists in will, not intellect or understanding.

With regard to the ethical nature of man too,. the teaching of Islam is different from those of other religious systems. And when God said to the angels “I am going to make a Viceroy on the earth,” they said: “Art Thou creating one who spills blood and disturbs the peace of the earth, and we glorify Thee and sing Thy praises?” God answered? “I know what you do not know.” This verse of the Quran, read in the light of the famous tradition that every child is born a Muslim (peaceful) indicates that, according to the tenets of Islam, man is essentially good and peaceful.—a view explained and defended, in our own, times, by
Rousseau—the great father of modern political thought. The opposite view, the doctrine of the depravity of man held by the Church of Rome, leads to the most pernicious religious and political consequences. Since if man is elementally wicked, he must not be permitted to have his own way; his entire life must be controlled by external authority. This means priesthood in religion and autocracy in politics. The Middle Ages in the history of Europe drove this dogma of Romanism to its political and religious consequences, and the result was a form of society which required terrible revolutions to destroy it and to upset the basic pre-suppositions of its structure. Luther, the enemy of despotism in religion, and Rousseau, the enemy of despotism in politics, must always be regarded as the emancipators of European humanity from the heavy fetters of Popedom and absolutism, and their religious and political thought must be understood as a virtual denial of the Church dogma of human depravity. The possibility of the elimination of sin and pain from the evolutionary process and faith in the natural goodness of man are the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilisation, which has, almost unconsciously, recognised the truth of these propositions inspite of the religious system with which it is associated. Ethically speaking, therefore, man is naturally good and peaceful. Metaphysically speaking, he is a unit of energy, which cannot bring out its dormant possibilities owing to its misconception of the nature of its environment. The ethical ideal of Islam is to disenthral man from fear, and thus to give him a sense of his personality, to make him conscious of himself as a source of power. This idea of man as an individuality of infinite power determines, according to the teachings of Islam, the worth of all human action. That which intensifies the sense of individuality in man is good, that which enfeebles it is bad. Virtue is power, force, strength; evil is weakness. Give man a keen sense of respect for his own personality, let him move fearless and free in the immensity of God’s earth, and he will respect the personalities of others and become perfectly virtuous. It is
not possible for me to show in the course of this paper how all the principal forms of vice can be reduced to fear. But we will now see the reason why certain forms of human activity, e.g. self-renunciation, poverty, slavish obedience which sometimes conceals itself under the beautiful name of humility and unworldliness—modes of activity which tend to weaken the force of human individuality—are regarded as virtues by Buddhism and Christianity, and altogether ignored by Islam. While the early Christians glorified in poverty and unworldliness, Islam looks upon poverty as a vice and says: “Do not forget thy share of the world.” The highest virtue from the standpoint of Islam is righteousness, which is defined by the Quran in the following manner:

It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces in prayers towards east and west, but righteousness is of him who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures and the Prophets, who give the money for God’s sake unto his kindred and unto orphans and the needy and to strangers and to those who ask and for the redemption of captives; of those who are constant at prayer, and of those who perform their covenant when they have covenanted and behave themselves patiently in adversity and in times of violence. (2:177)

It is, therefore, evident that Islam, so to speak, transmutes the moral values of the ancient world, and declares the preservation, intensification of the sense of human personality, to be the ultimate ground of all ethical activity. Man is a free responsible being; he is the maker of his own destiny his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man. The Quran, therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the spirit of God, strongly protests against the Christian doctrine of redemption, as well as the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the Church—doctrines which proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality and tend to create in man a sense of
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dependence, which is regarded by Islam as a force obstructing the ethical progress of man. The law of Islam is almost unwilling to recognise illegitimacy, since the stigma of illegitimacy is a great blow to the healthy development of independence in man. Similarly, in order to give man an early sense of individuality the law of Islam has laid down that a child is an absolutely free human being at the age of fifteen.

To this view of Muslim ethics, however, there can be one objection. If the development of human individuality is the principal concern of Islam, why should it tolerate the institution of slavery? The idea of free labour was foreign to the economic consciousness of the ancient world. Aristotle looks upon it as a necessary factor in human society. The Prophet of Islam, being a link between the ancient and the modern world, declared the principle of equality and though, like every wise reformer, he slightly conceded to the social conditions around him in retaining the name slavery, he quietly took away the whole spirit of this institution. That slaves had equal opportunity with other Muhammadans is evidenced by the fact that some of the greatest Muslim warriors, kings, premiers, scholars and jurists were slaves. During the days of the early Caliphs slavery by purchase was quite unknown; part of public revenue was set apart for purposes of manumission, and prisoners of war were either freely dismissed or freed on the payment of ransom. Slaves were also set at liberty as a penalty for culpable homicide and in expiation of a false oath taken by mistake. The Prophet’s own treatment of slaves was extraordinarily liberal. The proud aristocratic Arab could not tolerate the social elevation of a slave even when he was manumitted. The democratic ideal of perfect equality, which had found the most uncompromising expression in the Prophet’s life, could only be brought home to an extremely aristocratic people by a very cautious handling of the situation. He brought about a marriage between an emancipated slave and a free Qureish woman, a relative of his own. This marriage
was a blow to the aristocratic pride of this free Arab woman; she could not get on with her husband and the result was a divorce, which made her the more helpless, since no respectable Arab would marry the divorced wife of a slave. The ever-watchful Prophet availed himself of this situation and turned it to account in his efforts at social reform. He married the woman himself, indicating thereby that not only a slave could marry a free woman, but also a woman divorced by him could become the wife of a man no less than the greatest Prophet of God. The significance of this marriage in the history of social reform in Arabia is, indeed, great. Whether prejudice, ignorance or want of insight has blinded European critics of Islam to the real meaning of this union, it is difficult to guess.

In order to show the treatment of slaves by modern Muhammadans, I quote a passage from the English translation of the autobiography of the late Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan:

For instance [says the Amir], Framurz Khan, a Chitrali slave is my most trusted Commander-in-Chief at Herat, Nazir Muhammad Safar Khan, another Chitrali slave, is the most trusted official of my Court; he keeps my seal in his hand to put to any document and to my food and diet; in short he has the full confidence of my life, as well as my kingdom is in his hands. Parwana Khan, the late Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Jan Muhammad Khan, the late Lord of Treasury, two of the highest officials of the kingdom in their lifetime, were both of them my slaves.

The truth is that the institution of slavery is a mere name in Islam, and the idea of individuality reveals itself as a guiding principle in the entire system of Muhammadan law and ethics.

Briefly speaking, then, a strong will in a strong body is the ethical ideal of Islam. But let me stop here for a moment and see whether we, Indian Musalmans, are true to this
ideal. Does the Indian Muslim possess a strong will in a strong body? Has he got the will to live? Has he got sufficient strength of character to oppose those forces which tend to disintegrate the social organism to which he belongs? I regret to answer my questions in the negative. The reader will understand that in the great struggle for existence it is not principally number which makes a social organism survive. Character is the ultimate equipment of man, not only in his efforts against a hostile natural environment but also in his contest with kindred competitors after a fuller, richer, ampler life. The life-force of the Indian Muhammadan, however, has become woefully enfeebled. The decay of the religious spirit, combined with other causes of a political nature over which he had no control, has developed in him a habit of self-dwarfing, a sense of dependence and, above all, that laziness of spirit which an enervated people call by the dignified name of 'contentment' in order to conceal their own enfeeblement. Owing to his indifferent commercial morality he fails in economic enterprise, for want of a true conception of national interest and a right appreciation of the present situation of his community among the communities of this country, he is working, in his private as well as public capacity, on lines which, I am afraid, must lead him to ruin. How often do we see that he shrinks from advocating a cause, the significance of which is truly national, simply because his standing aloof pleases an influential Hindu, through whose agency he hopes to secure a personal distinction? I unhesitatingly declare that I have greater respect for an illiterate shopkeeper, who earns his honest bread and has sufficient force in his arms to defend his wife and children in times of trouble than the brainy graduate of high culture, whose low timid voice betokens the dearth of soul in his body, who takes pride in his submissiveness, eats sparingly, complains of sleepless nights and produces unhealthy children for his community, if he does produce any at all. I hope I shall not be offending the reader when I say that I have a certain amount of admiration for the devil. By refusing to prostrate himself
before Adam whom he honestly believed to be his inferior, he revealed a high sense of self-respect, a trait of character which in my opinion ought to redeem him from his spiritual deformity, just as the beautiful eyes of the toad redeem him from his physical repulsiveness. And I believe God punished him not because he refused to make himself low before the progenitor of an enfeebled humanity, but because he declined to give absolute obedience to the will of the Almighty Ruler of the Universe. The ideal of our educated young men is mostly service, and service begets, specially in a country like India, that sense of dependence which undermines the force of human individuality. The poor among us have, of course, no capital; the middle class people cannot undertake joint economic enterprise owing to mutual mistrust; and the rich look upon trade as an occupation beneath their dignity. Truly economic dependence is the prolific mother of all the various forms of vice. Even the vices of the Indian Muhammadan indicate the weakness of life-force in him. Physically too he has undergone dreadful deterioration. If one sees the pale, faded faces of Muhammadan boys in schools and colleges, one will find the painful verification of my statement. Power, energy, force, strength, yes physical strength, is the law of life. A strong man may rob others when he has got nothing in his own pocket; but a feeble person, he must die the death of a mean thing in the world’s awful scene of continual warfare. But how [to] improve this undesirable state of things? Education, we are told, will work the required transformation. I may say at once that I do not put much faith in education as a means of ethical training—I mean education as understood in this country. The ethical training of humanity is really the work of great personalities, who appear time to time during the course of human history. Unfortunately our present social environment is not favourable to the birth and growth of such personalities of ethical magnetism. An attempt to discover the reason of this dearth of personalities among us will necessitate a subtle analysis of all the visible and invisible forces which are now determining the course of our
social evolution—an enquiry which I cannot undertake in this paper. But all unbiased persons will easily admit that such personalities are now rare among us. This being the case, education is the only thing to fall back upon. But what sort of education? There is no absolute truth in education, as there is none in philosophy or science. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is a maxim of fools. Do we ever find a person rolling in his mind the undulatory theory of light simply because it is a fact of science? Education, like other things, ought to be determined by the needs of the learner. A form of education which has no direct bearing on the particular type of character which you want to develop is absolutely worthless. I grant that the present system of education in India gives us bread and butter. We manufacture a number of graduates and then we have to send titled mendicants to Government to beg appointments for them. Well, if we succeed in securing a few appointments in the higher branches of service, what then? It is the masses who constitute the backbone of the nation; they ought to be better fed, better housed and properly educated. Life is not bread and butter alone; it is something more; it is a healthy character reflecting the national ideal in all its aspects. And for a truly national character, you ought to have a truly national education. Can you expect free Muslim character in a young boy who is brought up in an aided school and in complete ignorance of his social and historical tradition? You administer to him doses of Cromwell’s history; it is idle to expect that he will turn out a truly Muslim character. The knowledge of Cromwell’s history will certainly create in him a great deal of admiration for the Puritan revolutionary; but it cannot create that healthy pride in his soul which is the very lifeblood of a truly national character. Our educated young man knows all about Wellington and Gladstone, Voltaire and Luther. He will tell you that Lord Roberts worked in the South African War like a common soldier at the age of eighty; but how many of us know that Muhammad II conquered Constantinople at the age of twenty-two? How many of us have even the faintest notion of the influence of
our Muslim civilisation over the civilisation of modern Europe? How many of us are familiar with the wonderful historical productions of Ibn Khaldun or the extraordinarily noble character of the great Mir Abdul Qadir of Algeria? A living nation is living because it never forgets its dead. I venture to say that the present system of education in this country is not at all suited to us as a people. It is not true to our genius as a nation, it tends to produce an un-Muslim type of character, it is not determined by our national requirements, it breaks entirely with our past and appears to proceed on the false assumption that the idea of education is the training of human intellect rather than human will. Nor is this superficial system true to the genius of the Hindus. Among them it appears to have produced a number of political idealists, whose false reading of history drives them to the upsetting of all conditions of political order and social peace. We spend an immense amount of money every year on the education of our children. Well, thanks to the King-Emperor, India is a free country; everybody is free to entertain any opinion he likes—I look upon it as a waste. In order to be truly ourselves, we ought to have our own schools, our own colleges, and our own universities, keeping alive our social and historical tradition, making us good and peaceful citizens and creating in us that free but law-abiding spirit which evolves out of itself the noblest types of political virtue. I am quite sensible of the difficulties that lie in our way, all that I can say is that if we cannot get over our difficulties, the world will soon get rid of us.

Having discussed in the last issue of this Review the ethical ideals of Islam I now proceed to say a few words on the political aspect of the Islamic ideal. Before, however, I come to the subject I wish to meet an objection against Islam so often brought forward by our European critics. It has been said that Islam is a religion which implies a state of war and can thrive only in a state of war. Now there can be no denying that war is an expression of the energy of a nation; a nation which cannot fight cannot hold its own in the strain.
and stress of selective competition which constitutes an indispensable condition of all
human progress. Defensive war is certainly permitted by the Quran; but the doctrine of
aggressive war against unbelievers is wholly unauthorised by the Holy Book of Islam.
Here are the words of the Quran:

Summon them to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly warning, dispute
them in the kindest manner. Say to those who have been given the book and to the
ignorant: Do you accept Islam? Then, if they accept Islam they are guided aright; but if
they turn away then thy duty is only preaching; and God’s eye is on His servants.

All the wars undertaken during the lifetime of the Prophet were defensive. His war
against the Roman Empire in 628 A.D. began by a fatal breach of international law on the
part of the Government at Constantinople who killed the innocent Arab envoy sent to
their Court. Even in defensive wars he forbids wanton cruelty to the vanquished. I quote
here the touching words which he addresses to his followers when they were starting for
a fight:

In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us, disturb not the harmless votaries of
domestic seclusion, spare the weakness of the female sex, injure not the infant at the
breast, or those who are ill in bed. Abstain from demolishing the dwellings of the
unresisting inhabitants, destroy not the means of their subsistence, nor their fruit trees,
and touch not the palm.

The history of Islam tells us that the expansion of Islam as a religion is in no way
related to the political power of its followers. The greatest spiritual conquests of Islam
were made during the days of our political decrepitude. When the rude barbarians of
Mongolia drowned in blood the civiisation of Baghdad in 1258 A.D., when the Muslim
power fell in Spain and the followers of Islam were mercilessly killed or driven out of
Cordova by Ferdinand in 1236, Islam had just secured a footing in Sumatra and was
about to work the peaceful conversion of the Malay
Archipelago.

In the hours of its political degradation [says Professor Arnold], Islam has achieved some of its most brilliant conquests. On two great historical occasions, infīdel barbarians have set their foot on the necks of the followers of the Prophet, the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh and the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and in each case the conquerors have accepted the religion of the conquered.

We undoubtedly find [says the same learned scholar elsewhere] that Islam gained its greatest and most lasting missionary triumph in times and places in which its political power has been weakest, as in South India and Eastern Bengal.

The truth is that Islam is essentially a religion of peace. All forms of political and social disturbance are condemned by the Quran in the most uncompromising terms. I quote a few verses from the Quran:

Eat and drink from what God has given you and run not on face of the earth in the matter of rebels.

And disturb not the peace of the earth after it has been reformed; this is good for you if you are believers.

And do good to others as God has done good to thee, and seek not the violation of peace in the earth, for God does not love those who break the peace.

That is the home in the next world which We build for those who do not mean rebellion and disturbance in the earth, and the end is for those who fear God.

Those who rebelled in cities and enhanced disorder in them, God visited them with His whip of punishment.

One sees from these verses how severely all forms of political and social disorder are denounced by the Quran. But the Quran is not satisfied with mere denunciation of the evil of fesad. It goes to the very root of this evil. We know
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that both in ancient and modern times, secret meetings have been a constant source of political and social unrest. Here is what the Quran says about such conferences: “O believers, if you converse secretly—that is to say, hold secret conference, converse not for purpose of sin and rebellion.” The ideal of Islam is to secure social peace at any cost. All methods of violent change in society are condemned in the most unmistakable language. Tartushi—a Muslim lawyer of Spain—is quite true to the spirit of Islam when he says: “Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy.” “Listen to him and obey him,” says the Prophet of God in a tradition mentioned by Bukharee, “even if a negro slave is appointed to rule over you.” Muslim mentioned another important tradition of the Prophet on the authority of Arfaja, who says: “I heard the Prophet of God say, when you have agreed to follow one man then if another man comes forward intending to break your stick (weaken your strength) or to make you disperse in disunion, kill him.”

Those among us who make it their business to differ from the general body of Mussalmans in political views ought to read this tradition carefully, and if they have any respect for the words of the Prophet, it is their duty to dissuade themselves from this mean traffic in political opinion which, though perhaps it brings a little personal gain to them, is exceedingly harmful to the interests of the community. My object, in citing these verses and traditions, is to educate political opinion on strictly Islamic lines. In this country we are living under a Christian Government. We must always keep before our eyes the example of those early Muhammadans who, persecuted by their own countrymen, had to leave their home and to settle in the Christian State of Abyssinia. How they behaved in that land must be our guiding principle in this country where an overdose of Western ideas has taught people to criticise the existing Government with a dangerous lack of historical perspective. And our relations with the Christians are determined for us by the Quran, which says:
And thou wilt find nearer to the friendship of the believers those men who call themselves Christians. This is because among them there are learned men and hermits, and they are never vain.

Having thus established that Islam is a religion of peace, I now proceed to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic ideal—the ideal of Islam as entertained by a corporate individuality. Given a settled society, what does Islam expect from its followers regarded as a community? What principles ought to guide them in the management of communal affairs? What must be their ultimate object and how is it to be achieved? We know that Islam is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation. The membership of Islam as a community is not determined by birth, locality or naturalisation; it consists in the identity of belief. The expression Indian Muhammadan, however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms: since Islam in its essence is above all conditions of time and space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has no geographical basis. But inasmuch as the average man demands a material centre of nationality, the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Mecca, so that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the real and the ideal, the concrete and the abstract. When, therefore, it is said that the interests of Islam are superior to those of the Muslim, it is meant that the interests of the individual as a unit are subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual, who is otherwise absolutely free. The best form of Government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other Muslims he is subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and is disposed by them if he goes contrary to the law. An ancestor of the present Sultan of Turkey was sued in an ordinary law court by a mason, who succeeded in getting him
fined by the town Qazee. Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam regarded as a political ideal. It must however be confessed that the Muslims, with their ideal of individual freedom, could do nothing for the political improvement of Asia. Their democracy lasted only thirty years and disappeared with their political expansion. Though the principle of election was not quite original in Asia (since the ancient Parthian Government was based on the same principle), yet somehow or other it was not suited to the nations of Asia in the early days of Islam. It was, however, reserved for a Western nation politically to vitalise the countries of Asia. Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times and English statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been, for centuries, groaning under the most atrocious forms of despotism. The British Empire is a vast political organism, the vitality of which consists in the gradual working out of this principle. The permanence of the British Empire as a civilising factor in the political evolution of mankind is one of our greatest interests. This vast Empire has our fullest sympathy and respect since it is one aspect of our political ideal that is being slowly worked out in it. England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which unfavourable circumstances did not permit us to perform. It is not the number of Muhammadans which it protects, but the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world.

To return now to the political constitution of the Muslim society. Just as there are two haste propositions underlying Muslim ethics, so there are two propositions underlying Muslim political constitution:

(1) The law of God is absolutely supreme. Authority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no place in the social structure of Islam. We regard it as inimical to the unfoldment of human individuality. The Shi’ias, of course, differ from the Sunnis in this respect. They hold that
Caliph or Imam is appointed by God and his interpretation of the Law is final; he is infallible and his authority, therefore, is absolutely supreme. There is certainly a grain of truth in this view; since the principle of absolute authority has functioned usefully in the course of the history of mankind. But it must be admitted that the idea works well in the case of primitive societies and reveals its deficiency when applied to higher stages of civilisation. Peoples grow out of it, as recent events have revealed in Persia, which is a Shi’a country, yet demand a fundamental structural change in her Government in the introduction of the principle of election.

(2) The absolute equality of all the members of the community. There is no aristocracy in Islam. “The noblest among you,” says the Prophet, “are those who fear God most.” There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. Islam is a unity in which there is no distinction, and this unity is secured by making men believe in the two simple propositions—the unity of God and the mission of the Prophet—propositions which are certainly of a supernatural character but which, based as they are on the general religious experience of mankind, are intensely true to the average human nature. Now, this principle of the equality of all believers made early Mussalmans the greatest political power in the world. Islam worked as a levelling force; it gave the individual a sense of his inward power; it elevated those who were socially low. The elevation of the down-trodden was the chief secret of the Muslim political power in India. The result of the British rule in this country has been exactly the same; and if England continues true to this principle it will ever remain a source of strength to her as it was to her predecessors.

But are we Indian Mussalmans true to this principle in our social economy? is the organic unity of Islam intact in this land? Religious adventurers set up different sects and fraternities, ever quarrelling with one another; and then
there are castes and sub-castes like the Hindus’. Surely we 2 have out-Hindued the Hindu himself; we are suffering from a double caste system—the religious caste system, sectarianism, and the social caste system, which we have either learned or inherited from the Hindus. This is one of the quiet ways in which conquered nations revenge themselves on their conquerors. I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism; I condemn it in the name of God, in the name of humanity, in the name of Moses, in the name of Jesus Christ, and in the name of him—a thrill of emotion passes through the very fibre of my soul when I think of that exalted name—yes, in the name of him who brought the final message of freedom and equality to mankind. Islam is one and indivisible; it brooks no distinctions in it. There are no Wahabies, Sh’ias, Mirzais or Sunnies in Islam. Fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in danger. It is foolish to complain of stumbling when you walk in the darkness of night. Let all come forward and contribute their respective shares in the great toll of the nation. Let the idols of class distinctions and sectarianism be smashed for ever; let the Mussalmans of the country be once more united into a great vital whole. How can we, in the presence of violent internal dispute, expect to succeed in persuading others to our way of thinking? The work of freeing humanity from superstition—the ultimate ideal of Islam as a community, for the realisation of which we have done so little in this great land of myth and superstition.will ever remain undone if the emancipators themselves are becoming gradually enchained in the very fetters from which it is their mission to set others free.
In the epic sweep of human history, there is nothing more awe-inspiring, nothing more destructive of human ambition than the ruins of bygone nations, empires and civilisations appearing and disappearing, during the painful course of human evolution, like the scenes of a rapidly vanishing dream. The forces of Nature appear to respect neither individuals nor nations; her inexorable laws continue to work as if she has a far-off purpose of her own, in no sense related to what may be the immediate interest or the ultimate destiny of man. But man is a peculiar creature. Amidst the most discouraging circumstances, his imagination, working under the control of his understanding, gives him a more perfect vision of himself and impells him to discover the means which would transform his brilliant dream of an idealised self into a living actuality. An animal of inferior physical strength, unequipped with natural weapons of defence, lacking the power of nocturnal vision, keen scent or fleetness of foot, man has, in search of a freer, ampler life, always directed his indefatigable energy to discover the ways of nature, understand their working, and thus gradually to become a determining factor in his own evolution. By the great discovery of the law of Natural Selection he has succeeded in reaching a rational conception of his own history which, before long, appeared to him to be nothing more than an inscrutable series of events dropping out, one by one, from the mysterious womb of time, without

* This lecture was delivered in the ‘Strachi Hall’ of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh in the winter of 1910. Most of the scholars believe that the title of the lecture delivered in Aligarh College was — ‘Islam, as a Social and Political ideal’, which is not true and the fact is that the lecture in question was delivered under the above mentioned Caption. The present text has been prepared from Rafiud-Din Hashmi’s, Tasanif-Iqbal, IAP., Lahore 1977, p. 4-49. Extracts from this lecture also appeared in the Report on the Census in India. 1911, Lahore, Vol. XIV, Punjab, Part 1, 1912. pp. 162-64.
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any inherent order or purpose. A still deeper insight into the meaning of this law, and the
discovery by post-Darwinian thinkers, of other equally important facts of collective life
are calculated to work a complete revolution in man’s notions of group-life in its social,
economic and political aspects. It has been brought to light by recent biological research
that the individual as such is a mere abstraction, a convenient expression for facility of
social reference, passing moment in the life of the group to which he happens to belong.
His thoughts, his aspirations, his ways of life, his entire mental and physical outfit, the
very number of days which he lives, are all determined by the needs of the community of
whose collective life he is only a partial expression. The interests of society as a whole
are fundamentally different and even antagonistic to the interests of the individual whose
activity is nothing more than an unconscious performance of a particular function which
social economy has allotted to him. Society has a distinct life of its own, irrespective of
the life of its component units taken individually. And just as an individual organism, in a
state of disorder, sometimes unconsciously sets up within itself forces which tend to its
health, so a social organism, under the corroding influence of destructive forces, may
sometimes call into being counteracting forces — such as the appearance of an inspiring
personality, the birth of a new ideal, or a universal religious reform — which tend to
restore its original vitality, and finally save the organism from structural collapse by
making the inward communal self to bring into subjection all the insubordinate forces,
and to throw off all that is inimical to the health of its organic unity. Society has or rather
tends to have a consciousness, a will, and an intellect of its own, though the stream of its
mentality has no other channel through which to flow than individual minds. The
expressions “Public opinion”, “National genius”, or what the Germans happily phrase of
Zeitgeist are by vague recognitions of this exceedingly important fact of social
psychology. The crowd, the mass meeting, the corporation,
the sect, and finally the deliberative assembly are the various means by which the body-
social organises itself in order to secure the unity of self consciousness. It is not necessary
that the social mind should be conscious of all the various ideas that are, at a particular
moment, working in the individual minds. The individual mind is never completely aware
of its own states of consciousness. In the case of the collective mind too many feelings,
states and ideas remain below the threshold of social sensibility, only a portion of the
universal mental life crossing the border, and getting into the clear daylight of social
consciousness. This economical arrangement saves from unnecessary expenditure, a great
quantity of the energy of the central organs which would otherwise be fruitlessly spent on
details. It is, therefore, clear that society has a life-stream of its own. The idea that it is
merely the sum of its existing individuals is essentially wrong, and consequently all
projects of social and political reform which proceed on this assumption must undergo
careful re-examination. Society is much more than its existing individuals; it is in its
nature infinite; it includes within its contents the innumerable unborn generations which,
though they ever lie beyond the limits of immediate social vision, must be considered as
the most important portion of a living community. Recent biological research has
revealed that in the successful group-life it is the future which must always control the
present; to the species taken as a whole, its unborn members are perhaps more real than
its existing members whose immediate interests are subordinated and even sacrificed to
the future interests of that unborn infinity which slowly discloses itself from generation to
generation. To this remarkable revelation of biological truth the social and political
reformer cannot afford to remain indifferent. Now it is from this standpoint—from the
standpoint of the future that I wish to test the worth of our present social activity. There
is, strictly speaking, only one all important problem before a community—call it what
ever you like, Social, Economic or Political—and that is the problem of a continuous
national
life. Extinction is as ahoherent to a race as to an individual. The worth of all the various activities of a community intellectual or otherwise—ought always to be determined in reference to this ultimate purpose. We must criticise our values, perhaps transvaluate them; and if necessary, create new worths; since the immortality of a people, as Nietsche has so happily put, depends upon the incessant creation of worths. Things certainly bear the stamp of divine manufacture, but their meaning is through and through human. Before, however, I proceed to this examination I wish to consider a few preliminary points, the consideration of which, to my mind, is essential to arriving at any definite conclusion concerning the Muslim Community. These points are;

(1) The general structure of the Muslim Community.
(2) The uniformity of Muslim Culture.
(3) The type of character essential to a continuous National life of the Muslim community.

I shall take these points in order.

(1) The essential difference between the Muslim Community and other Communities of the world consists in our peculiar conception of nationality. It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interest that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the universe, and participate in the same historical tradition that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea, objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life-principle on the character and genuins of a particular people, in its essence it is nontemporal. non-spatial.

The Arab Race, the original creation of Islam, was
certainly a great factor in its political expansion, but the enormous wealth of literature and thought—manifestations of the higher life of the spirit has been the work of chiefly non-Arabian races. It seems as if the birth of Islam was only a momentary flash of divine consciousness in the life-history of the Arab race; the working of its spiritual potentialities was due to the genius of people other than the Arabs. The essence of Islam, then, being purely ideal, it could not accept any objective principle—such as country—as a principle of nationality. The territorial conception of nationality, which has been so much exaggerated in modern times hears within itself the germs of its own destruction. The idea of modern nationalism has certainly functioned usefully in forming smaller political units, and creating a healthy rivalry among them which has contributed so much to the variety of modern civilisation. But the idea is apt to be exaggerated, it has created a great deal of misunderstanding of international motives; it has opened up a vast field for diplomatic intrigue, and tends to ignore the broad human element in art and literature by emphasising the peculiar traits and characteristics of particular peoples. To my mind the feeling of patriotism which the national idea evokes is a kind of deification of a material object, diametrically opposed to the essence of Islam which appeared as a protest against all the subtle and coarse forms of idolatry. I do not, however, mean to condemn the feeling of Partiotism. Peoples whose solidarity depends on a territorial basis are perfectly justified in that feeling. ‘But I certainly do mean to attack the conduct of those who, while they recognised the great value of patriotic feeling in the formation of a peoples’ character yet condemn our ‘Asabiyyat which they miscall fanaticism. We are as much justified in our ‘Asabiyyat as they are in their patriotism. For, what is ‘Asabiyyat? Nothing but the principle of individuation working in the case of a group. All forms of life are more or less fanatical and ought to be so, if they care for their individual or collecth’e life. And as a matter of fact all nations are fanatical. Criticise a Frenchman’s religion; you do not very much rouse his
feelings; since your criticism does not touch the life-principle of his nationality. But criticise his civilisation, his country, or the corporate behaviour of his nation in any sphere of political activity and you will bring out his innate fanaticism. The reason is that his nationality does not depend on his religious belief; it has a geographical basis — his county. His ‘Asabyyat is then justly roused when you criticise the locality—which he has idealised as the essential principle of his nationality. Our position, however, is essentially different. With us nationality is a pure idea; it has no objective basis. Our only rallying-point, as a people, is a kind of purely subjective agreement in a certain view of the world. If then our ‘Asabiyyat is roused when our religion is criticised, I think we are as much justified in it as a French man is when his country is denounced. The feeling in each case is the same though associated with different objects. ‘Asabiyyat is patriotism for religion; Patriotism, ‘Asabiyyat for country. ‘Asabiyyat simply means a strong feeling for one’s own nationality and does not necessarily imply any feeling of hatred against other nationalities. During my stay in England I found that whenever I described any peculiarly Eastern custom or mode of thought to an English lady or gentlemen, I, almost invariably, invoked the remark—“how funny” as if any non-English mode of thought was absolutely inconceivable. I have the highest admiration for his attitude; it does not indicate any want of imagination; the country of Shakespeare, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson and Swinhurne cannot be wholly unimaginative; on the other hand, it indicates how deeply England’s mode of thought and life, her institutions, her manners and customs are rooted in the mind of her people.

The religious idea, then, without any theological centralisation which would unnecessarily limit the liberty of the individual, determines the ultimate structure of the Muslim Community. In the case of no (?) community the words of Augustus Comet are so completely true as in the case of our own. “Since Religion”, says he, “embraces all our
existence, its history must be an epitome of the whole history of our development.” It may, however, be asked that, if mere belief in certain prepositions of Metaphysical import is the only thing that ultimately determines the structure of the Muslim Community, is it not an extremely unsafe basis especially before the advance of modern knowledge, with its habits of Rationalism and criticism? This is what the French Orientalist Renan thought; and entertained a vieled hope that Islam would one day “lose the high intellectual and moral direction of an important part of the universe.” Nations, the basic principle of whose collective life is territorial, need not be afraid of Rationalism, to us it is a dangerous foe, since it aims at the very principle which gives us a communal life, and alone makes our collective existence intelligible. Rationalism is essentially analysis and consequently threatens to disintegrate the communal synthesis achieved by the force of the religious idea. it is undoubtedly true that we can meet Rationalism on its own ground. But the point which I wish to impress on you is that the dogma i.e. the point of universal agreement on which our communal solidarity depends, has essentially a national rather than intellectual significance for us. To try to convert religion into a system of speculative knowledge is, in my opinion, absolutely useless, and even absurd, since the object of religion is not thinking about life, its main purpose is to build up a coherent social whole for the gradual elevation of life. Religion is itself a Metaphysics, in so far as it calls up into being a new universe with a view to suggest a new type of character tending to universalise itself in proportion to the force of the personality in which it orginally embodies itself. The point that I have tried to bring out in the above remarks is that Islam has a far deeper significance for us than merely religious, it has a particularly national meaning, so that our communal life is unthinkable without a firm grasp of the Islamic Principle. The idea of Islam is, so to speak, our eternal home or country wherein we live, move and have our being. To us it is above everything else, as England is above all to the Englishman and Deutschland uher
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The moment our grasp of the Islamic Principle is loosened that solidarity of our community is gone.

(2) Coming now to the second point. The uniformity of Muslim Culture. The unity of religious belief on which our communal life depends, is supplemented by the uniformity of Muslim Culture. Mere belief in the Islamic principle, though exceedingly important, is not sufficient. In order to participate in the life of the communal self the individual mind must undergo a complete transformation, and this transformation is secured, externally by the institutions of Islam, and internally by that uniform culture which the intellectual energy of our forefathers has produced. The more you reflect on the history of the Muslim Community the more wonderful does it appear from the day of its foundation up to the beginning of the 16th Century, almost a thousand years this energetic race was busy in the all-absorbing occupation of political expansion. Yet in this storm of continuous activity the Muslim world found time to unearth the treasures of ancient science, to make material additions to them, to build a literature of unique character, and above all to develop a comprehensive system of law. Probably the most valuable legacy that Muslim civilization has left us. Just as the Muslim Community does not recognise any ethological differences, and aims at the subsumption of all races under the universal idea of humanity, so our culture is relatively universal, and is not indebted, for its life and growth to the genius of one particular people. Persia is perhaps the principal factor in the making of this culture. if you ask me what is the most important event in the history of Islam, I shall immediately answer—the conquest of Persia. The battle of Nehwand gave to the Arabs not only a beautiful country, but also an ancient people who could construct a new civilisation out of the Samitic and the Aryan material. Our Muslim civilization is a product of the cross-fertilisation of the Samitic and the Aryan ideas. It inherits the softness and refinement of its
Aryan mother and the sterling character of it Samitic father. The conquest of Persia gave to the Mussalnzans what the Conquest of Greece gave to the Romans, but for Persia our culture would have been absolutely one-sided. And the people whose gontact transformed the Arabs and the Mughals are noi intellectually dead. Persia, whose existence as an independent Political unit is threatened by the aggressive ambition of Russia, is still a real centre of Muslim culture; and I can only hope that she still continues to occupy the position that she had always occupied in the Muslim world. To the Royal family of Persia, the loss of Persia’s political independence would mean only a territorial loss, to the Muslim culture such an event would he a blow much more serious than the Tartar invasion of the 10th Century. But perhaps I am drifting into politics which is not my present object to discuss, all that I mean to establish is that in order to become a living member of the Muslim Community the individual besides an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly assimilate the culture of Islam. The object of this assimilation is to create a uniform mental outlook, a peculiar way of looking at the world, a definite standpoint from which to judge the value of things which sharply defines our community, and transforms it into a corporate individual, giving it a definite purpose and ideal of its own.

(3) The third point need not detain us long. The above remarks indicate the principal features of an essentially Muslim type of character. The various types of character, however, that become popular in a community do not appear haphazard by Modern. Sociology teaches us that the moral experience of nations obeys certain definite laws. In primitive societies where the struggle for existence is extremely keen and draws more upon man’s physical rather than intellectual qualities; it is the valiant man who becomes an object of universal admiration and imitation. When, however, the struggle relaxes and the peril is over, the valourous type is displaced, though not all-together, by what
Giddings calls the convivial type, which takes a due share in all the pleasures of life, and combines in itself the virtues of liberality, generosity and good fellowship. But these two types of character have a tendency to become reckless, and by way of reaction against them appears the third great type which holds up the ideal of self-control, and is dominated by a more serious view of life. In so far as the evolution of the Muslim Community in India is concerned, Temur represented the first type. Babar combined the first and the second, Jahangir embodied pre-eminently the second while the third type was foreshadowed in Alamgir whose life and activity forms, in my opinion, the starting point in the growth of Muslim Nationality in India. To those whose knowledge of Alamgir is derived from the western interpreters of Indian History, the name of Alamgir is associated with all sorts of cruelty, intolerance, treachery and political intrigue. I shall be drifting away from the main point of this lecture if I undertake to show, by a right interpretation of contemporary history, the legitimacy of motives that guided Alamgir’s political life. A critical study of his life and times has convinced me that the charges brought against him are based on a misinterpretation of contemporary facts, and a complete misunderstanding of the nature of social and political forces which were then working in the Muslim State. To me the ideal of character, foreshadowed by Alamgir is essentially the Muslim type of character, and it must be the object of all our education to develop that type. If it is our aim to secure a continuous life of the community we must produce a type of character which, at all costs, holds fast to its own, and while it readily assimilates all that is good in other types, it carefully excludes from its life all that is hostile to its cherished traditions and institutions. A careful observation of the Muslim Community in India reveals the point on which the various lines of moral experience of the community are now tending to converge. In the Punjab the essentially Muslim type of character has found a powerful
expression in the so-called Qadiani-sect\(^1\); while in the United Provinces, owing to a slightly different intellectual environment, the need of such a type of character is loudly proclaimed by a great poetic voice. In his lighthearted humour Maulana Akhar of Allahabad, aptly called the tongue of the times, conceals a keen perception of the nature of the forces that are at present working in the Muslim Community. Do not be misled by the half-serious tone of his utterances; he keeps his tears veiled in youthful laughter, and will not admit you into his workshop until you come with a keener glance to examine his wares. So deeply related are the current of thought and emotion in a homogeneous community that if one portion reveals a certain organic craving the material to satisfy that craving is almost simultaneously produced by the other.

Let me now proceed a step further. In the foregoing

1. The remarks about Qadianis created misunderstanding, so Iqbal, later on, explained this issue by adding this note to his lecture. “This lecture was delivered at Aligarh in 1911. The remark about the Qadianis in this lecture must be revised in the light of revelation of the spirit of the movement since 1911. The Qadianis still appear to be Muslims in externals. Indeed, they are very particular in the matter of externals but the spirit of the movement as revealed after is wholly inimical to Islam. Outwardly they look Muslims and anxious to look so, but inwardly their whole mentality is anion. It is probable that eventually the movement will end in Ilahaism from which it originally appears to have received inspiration”.

The date on the above note has been mentioned as 21.10.1935. Afterwards Iqbal wrote an article under the title - “Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims” - in which he discussed the issue in detail and contradicted the remark mentioned in his lecture earlier. The weekly “Light” took the notice of this article of Iqbal and alleged him to be “inconsistent in views”, on which Iqbal reviewed as such.- “As far as I remember, the lecture was delivered in 1911, or perhaps earlier, I have no hesitation in admitting that about a quarter of a century ago, I had hopes of good results following from this movement. But the real content and spirit of religious movement does not reveal itself in a day. It takes decades to unfold itself. The internal quarrels between the two sections of the movement is evidence of the fact that even those, who were in personal contact with the founder, were not quite aware of how movement would evolve itself. Personally, I became suspicious of the movement when the claim of a new prophethood superior even to the prophethood of the founder of Islam, was definitely put forward, and the Muslim world was declared ‘Kafir’. Later my suspicions developed into a positive revolt when I heard with my own ears an adherent of the movement mentioning the Holy Prophet of Islam in a most disparaging language. Not by their roots but by their fruits will you know them. I my present attitude is self-contradictory, then, well only having and thinking man has the privilege of contradicting himself. Only stones do not contradict themselves, as Emerson says ‘--

For details - (Thoughts & Reflections of Iqbal pp. 297-98).
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discussion I have tried to establish three propositions:

1. That the religious idea constitutes the life principle of the Muslim Community. in order to maintain the health and vigour of such a community, the development of all dissenting forces in it must be carefully watched and a rapid influx of foreign elements must be checked or permitted to enter into the social fabric very slowly, so that it may not bring on a collapse by making too great a demand on the assimilation power of the social organism.

2. Secondly; the mental outfit of the individual belonging to the Muslim community must be mainly formed out of the material which the intellectual energy of his forefathers has produced, so that he may be made to feel the continuity of the present with the past and the future.

3. Thirdly; that he must possess a particular type of character which I have described as the Muslim type.

It is my object now to examine the value of the work that we have done in the various spheres of activity. Now a thoroughgoing criticism of the work of the Muslim world in the sphere of Politics, Religion, Literature and Thought, Education, Journalism, Industry, Trade and Commerce will require several volumes. The events which are now happening in the Muslim World are extremely significant and a searching examination of them would be exceedingly instructive, but the task is enormous, and I confess it is beyond my power to undertake it, I shall, therefore, have to confine my observations to the work that we have done in India, and here too I do not pretend to give you any exhaustive treatment of the various problems now confronting us. I shall consider only two points—Education and the Improvement of the general condition of the masses.

During the last fifty years or so, the work of Education has absorbed almost all our energies. It is not improper to ask whether we have been following any definite educational ideal, or only working for immediate ends without giving a
thought to the future. What kind of men have we turned out? And is the quality of the output calculated to secure a continuous life of such a peculiarly constructed community as our own? The answer to these questions has been already indicated. The students of Psychology among you know very well that the personal identity of the individual mind depends upon the orderly succession of its mental states. When the continuity of the stream of individual consciousness is disturbed there results psychical ill health which may, in course of time, lead on to a final dissolution of vital forces. The same is the case with the life of the social mind whose continuity is dependent on the orderly transmission of its continuity experience from generation to generation. The object of education is to secure this orderly transmission and thus to give a unity of self-consciousness of personal identity to the social mind. It is a deliberate effort to bring about an organic relation between the individual and the body-politic to which he belongs. The various portions of the collective tradition so transmitted by education, permeate the entire social mind, and become objects of clear consciousness in the minds of a few individuals only whose life and thought become specialised for the various purposes of the community. The legal, historical and literary traditions of a community for instance, are definitely present to the consciousness of its lawyers, historians and literary writers, though the community as a whole is only vaguely conscious of them. Now I wish you to look at and judge the value of our educational achievement from this standpoint. In the modern Muslim youngipan we have produced a specimen of character whose intellectual life has absolutely no background of Muslim culture without which, in my opinion, he is only half a Muslim or even less than that provided his purely secular education has left his religious belief unshaken. He has been allowed, I am afraid, to assimilate western habits of thought to an alarming extent a constant study of western literature, to the entire neglect of the collective experience of his own community, has, I must
frankly say, thoroughly demuslimised his mental life. No community, I say without any fear of contradiction, has produced so very noble types of character as our own; yet our youngman who is deplorably ignorant of the life-history of his own community has to go to the great personalities of western history for admiration and guidance. Intellectually he is a slave to the west, and consequently his soul is lacking in that healthy egoism which comes from a study of one's own history and classics. In our educational enterprise we have hardly realised the truth, which experience is now forcing upon us, that an undivided devotion to an alien culture is a kind of imperceptible conversion to that culture, a conversion which may involve much more serious consequences than conversion to a new religion. No Muslim writer has expressed this truth more pointedly than the poet Akbar who, after surveying the present intellectual life of the Muslim Youngman, cries out in despair:

We now see that the fears of the ____ the representative of the essentially Muslim culture, who waged a bitter controversy with the late Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan on the question of Western Education..were not quite groundless. Need I say that our educational product is a standing testimony to the grain of truth contained in the Sheikh Marhum's contentipn. Gentlemen, I hope you will excuse me for these straightforward remarks. Having been in close touch with the student-life of to-day for the last ten or twelve years, and teaching a subject closely related to religion, I think I have got some claim to be heard on this point. It has been my painful experience that the Muslim Student, ignorant of the social, ethical and political ideals that have dominated the mind of his community, is spiritually dead;- and that if the present state of affairs is
permitted to continue for another twenty years the Muslim spirit which is now kept alive by a few representatives of the old Muslim culture, will entirely disappear from the life of our community. Those who laid it down as a fundamental Principle that the education of the Muslim child must begin with the study of the Quran—no matter whether he understands it or not—were certainly much more sensible of the nature of our community than we claim to he. Economic considerations alone ought not to determine our activity as a people, the preservation of the unity of the community, the continuous national life is a far higher ideal than the service of merely immediate ends. To me a Muslim of scanty means who possesses a really Muslim character is a much more valuable national asset than a high-salaried, free thinking graduate with whom Islam, far from being a working principle of life, is merely a convenient policy in order to secure a greater share in the leaves and fishes of the country. These ieniarke need not lead you to think that I mean to condemn western culture. Let student of Muslim history must recognise that it was the west which originally shaped the course of our intellectual activity. In the sphere of pure thought we are still perhaps more Greek than Arab or Persian. Yet nobody can deny that we possess a unique culture of our own, which no modern Muslim system of education can afford to ignore without running the risk of denationalising those whose good it aims at securing. It is indeed a happy sign that the idea of a Muslim University has dawned upon us. Considering the nature of our community the necessity of such an institution cannot be doubted, provided it is conducted on strictly Islamic lines. No community can afford to break entirely with its past and it is more emphatically true in the case of our community whose collective tradition alone constitutes the principle of its vitality. The Muslim, must of course, keep pace with the progress of modern ideas:— but his culture must, in the main, remain Muslim in character and it is clear that such a thing cannot be attained without a teaching university of our own. If you produce youngmen, the ground work of whose culture
is not Muslim, you will not be bringing up a Muslim community, you will be creating a
totally new community which having no strong principle of cohesion may, at anytime,
lose its individuality in the individuality of any of the surrounding communities that may
happen to possess a greater vitality than itself. But there is perhaps, a still more important
reason for the necessity of a Muslim University in India. You know that the ethical
training of the masses of our community is principally in the hands of a very inefficient
class of Moulvies or public preachers the range of whose knowledge of Muslim History
and Literature is extremely limited. A modern public teacher of morality and religion
must be familiar with the great truths of History, Economics and Sociology besides being
thoroughly conversant with the literature and thought of his own community. Such public
teachers are the great need of the time. The Nadva, the Aligarh College, the theological
Seminary of Dewband, and other institutions of a similar type, working independently of
one another, cannot meet this pressing demand. All these scattered educational forces
should be organised into a central institution of a large purpose which may afford
opportunities not only for the development of special abilities, but may also create the
necessary type of culture for the modern Indian Muslim. A purely western ideal of
education will be dangerous to the life of our community if it is to continue in an
essentially Muslim community. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to construct a fresh
educational ideal in which the elements of Muslim culture must find a prominent place,
and past and the present coming in a happy union. The construction of such an ideal is
not an easy task; it requires a large imagination, a keen perception of the tendencies of
modern times, and a complete grasp of the meaning of Muslim History and religion.

Before leaving this point I think I ought to say a few words on the education of the
Muslim woman. This is not a place to discuss the ideal of womanhood in Islam. I must,
however, frankly admit that I am not an advocate of absolute equality between man and woman. It appears that Nature has allotted different functions to them, and a right performance of these functions is equally indispensable for the health and prosperity of the human family. The so called “emancipation of the western woman” necessitated by western individualism and the peculiar economic situation produced by an unhealthy competition, is an experiment, in my opinion, likely to fail, not without doing incalculable harm, and creating extremely intricate social problems. Nor is the higher education of women likely to lead to any desirable consequences, in so far, at least, as the birth rate of a community is concerned. Experience has already shown that the economic emancipation of women in the west has not, as was expected, materially extended the production of wealth. On the other hand it has a tendency to break up the Physical life of Society. Now I am ready to recognise that the evolution of a society by resident forces alone is an impossibility in modern times. The almost total annihilation of space and time has produced a close contact among the various communities of the world, a contact which is likely to affect the natural orbit of some and to prove disastrous to others. What the larger economic, social and political forces that are now working in the world will bring about, nobody can foretell; but we must remember that while it is advisable, and even necessary for a healthy social change, to assimilate the elements of an alien culture, a hasty injudicious jump to alien institutions may lead to most abrupt structural disturbances in the body-social. There is an element of universality in the culture of a people; their social and political institutions on the other hand, are more individual. They are determined by their peculiar tradition and life history, and cannot be easily adopted by a community having a different tradition and life-history. Considering, then the peculiar nature of our community, the teachings of Islam and the revelation of Physiology and Biology on the subject, it is clear that the Muslim women should continue to occupy the position in society which Islam has allotted to her. And
the position which has been allotted to her must determine the nature of her education. I have tried to show above that the solidarity of our community rests on our hold on the religion and culture of Islam. The woman is the principal depository of the religious idea. In the interests of a continuous national life, therefore, it is extremely necessary to give her, in the first place, a sound religious education. That must, however, be supplemented by a general knowledge of Muslim History, Domestic economy, and Hygiene. This will enable her to give a degree of intellectual companionship to her husband, and successfully to do the duties of motherhood which, in my opinion, is the principal function of a woman. All subjects which have a tendency to de-womanise and to demuslimise her must be carefully excluded from her education. But our educationists are still groping in the dark. They have not yet been able to prescribe a definite course of study for our girls; and some of them are, unfortunately, too much dazzled by the glamour of western ideals to realise the difference between Islam which constructs nationality out of a purely abstract idea, i.e. religion, and westernism which builds nationality on an objective basis i.e. country.

I shall now proceed to offer a few remarks on the improvement of the general condition of the masses of our community. And in this connection the first point of importance is the economic condition of the average Muslim. I am sure nobody will deny that the economic condition of the average Muslim is extremely deplorable. His small wage, dirty house, and under-fed children are a matter of common observation in the towns where the population is mostly Muslim. Pass through a Muslim street in Lahore; what do you find? An old silent gloomy street whose mournful quiet is relieved by the shrieks of ill-clad bony children, or by the subdued entreaties of an old woman in Pardah spreading out her skinny hand for alms. This is not all. Inside these unhappy dwelling there are hundreds of men and women whose fathers have seen better days, but
who are now compelled to starve without ever opening their lips for appeals (for) charity. It is really this poverty of the lower strata of our community and not the Pardah system, as our young protagonists of social reform sometimes contend, that is re-acting on the general physique of our community. Besides this class there is the absolutely incapable who brings into the world children as incapable as himself and by surrendering himself to laziness and crime spreads the contagion of these vices to others. Have we ever given a thought to these aspects of the social problem? Have we ever realised that the duty of our Anjumans and Leagues is to work for the elevation of the masses and not to push up the individuals? The most important problem before the Muslim public worker is how to improve the economic conditions of his community. It is his duty to make a careful study of the general economic situation in India and the causes which have brought it about. How much of this situation is due to the larger economic forces that are working in the modern world, how much to the historical antecedents, customs, prejudices and ethical shortcomings of the people of this land, how much, if at all, to the policy of the Government, these are the questions which, in preference to other questions, must occupy his brains. The problem will, of course, have to be approached in a broad impartial non-sectarian spirit; since the economic forces affect all communities alike. The ever-increasing land-revenue, the importation of foreign drink into country, the rise of prices, whether it is due to a wrong currency policy or the establishment of free-trade between an agricultural country and a manufacturing country, or to any other cause—these things affect the economic condition of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Parsees all alike, and loudly proclaim that the public workers of all the various communities can, at least, meet on the common ground of economic discussion. The Muslim public worker, however, has hitherto concentrated almost all his energies on the point of securing our due share in Government Service. The
effort is certainly laudable, and he must continue to work until we have achieved our object. But he must remember that Government-service, as a field for the production of wealth, is extremely limited. It offers prospects of economic elevation only to a few individuals; the general health of a community depends largely on its economic independence. There is no doubt that a few individuals in the higher branches of Government service give a tone of honour and self-respect to the whole community; but it is equally true that there are other spheres of economic activity which are equally important and more profitable. The process of change and adjustment to an economic ideal is certainly painful to a people whose traditions have been in the main, military, yet in view of the change that is coming over the communities of Asia, principally through the economic energy of western nations, the ordeal must be gone through besides working for the removal of economic disabilities, if any, we must have system of technical education which is, in my opinion, even more important, than higher education. The former touches the general economic condition of the masses which form the backbone of a community, the latter only a few individuals who happen to possess more than average intellectual energy. The charity of the wealthier classes among us must be so organised as to afford opportunities of a cheap technical education to the children of the community. But industrial and commercial training alone is not sufficient. In economic competition the ethical factor plays an equally important part. The virtues of thrift, mutual trust, honesty, punctuality and co-operation are as much valuable economic assets as professional skill. How many economic undertakings have failed in India through want of mutual trust and a proper spirit of co-operation. If we want to turn out good working men, good shopkeepers, good artisans, and above all good citizens, we must first make them good Muslims.
Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into various tribes, continually at war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognised, to a certain extent, their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad and the cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shattered the aristocratic ideals of individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever-expanding nationality. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to notice, at the outset, the features of the Arabian system of tribal succession, and the procedure followed by the members of the tribe on the death of their chief.

When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met together and sitting in a circle discussed the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could how the chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families. The idea of hereditary monarchy, as Von Kremer has pointed out, was quite foreign to the Arab mind, though the principle of seniority which, since Ahmad I, has received legal recognition in the constitution of modern Turkey, did certainly influence the election. When the tribe was equally divided between two leaders, the rival sections separated from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claim; otherwise the sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be deposed by the tribe if his conduct

* In the early phase of his literary career Allama Iqbal wrote several articles on the political, social and moral philosophy of Islam. The first article in this series dealing with the idea of Caliphate in Islam, was published in 1908 in the Sociological Review, London, and reproduced by the Hindustan Review of Allahabad in its issues for December, 1910 pp. 527-33) and January, 1911, (pp. 22-26) under the title “Political Thought in Islam”.
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necessitated deposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed into a Political Theory carefully constructed, as we shall see, by the constitutional lawyers of Islam through reflective criticism on the revelations of political experience.

True to this custom, the Prophet of Arabia left no instruction with regard to the matter of his succession. There is a tradition that the old Amir, son of Tufail, came to the Prophet and said, “If I emhrw!e Islam what would my rank be? Wilst thou give me the command after thee?” “It does not belong to me,” said the Prophet, “to dispose of the command after me.” Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s father-in-law and one of his chief companions........therefore, in consequence of the danger of internal disruption, was rather hurriedly and irregularly elected. He then rose and addressed the people thus:

O people! Now I am ruler over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me; if ill, then set me right. Follow the true wherein is faithfulness, eschew the false wherein is treachery. The weaker amongst you shall be as the stronger with me, until that I shall have redressed his wrong; and the stronger shall be as the weaker until-, if the Lord will, I shall have taken from him that which he hath wrested. Leave not off to fight in the ways of the Lord; whosoever leaveth off, him verily shall the ‘Lord abase. Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, wherein I disobey, obey me not.

Omar, however, afterwards held that the hurrieçi election of Abu Bakr, though very happy in its consequences and justified by the need of the time, should not form precedent in Islam; for as he is reported to have said (Dozy, I, p. 121) an election which is only a partial expression of the people’s will is null and void. It was, therefore, early understood that Political Sovereignty de facto resides in the people; and that the electoratç by their free act of unanimous choice embody
it in a determinate personality in which the collective will is, so to speak, individualised, without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it is an expression. The idea of universal agreement is in fact the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory. “What the Muslim community considers good,” says the Prophet, “God also considers good.” It is probably on the authority of this saying of the Prophet that al-Ash’ari developed his political dogma—“That error is impossible in the united deliberations of the whole community.” After the death of Abu Bakr, Omar, who acted as Chief Judge during his predecessor’s Caliphate, was universally elected by the people. In 644 A.D. he was mortally wounded by a Persian slave, and committed his trust, before he died; to seven electors—one of them being his own son—to nominate his successor, with the condition that their choice must be unanimous, and that none of them must stand as a candidate for the Caliphate. It will be seen from Omar’s exclusion of his own son from the candidature, how remote was the idea of hereditary monarchy from the Arabian political consciousness. The choice of this council, however, fell upon one of the councillors, Uthman, who was consequently nominated, and the nomination afterwards confirmed by the people. The Caliphate of Uthman is really the source of the three great religio-political parties with their respective political theories which each party, finding itself in power, attempted to realise in one or other of the provinces of the Arab Empire. Before however, I proceed to describe these theories, I want to draw attention to the following two points:

(1) That the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. In his later days the Prophet once ascended the pulpit and said to the people: “Muslims! If I have struck any one of you, here is my back that he may strike me. If anyone has been wronged
by me, let him return injury of injury. If I have taken anybody’s goods, all that I have is at his disposal.” A man arose and claimed a debt of three dirhams (about three shillings). “I would much rather,” said the Prophet, “have the shame in this world than in the next.” And he paid him on the spot.

The law of Islam does not recognise the apparently natural differences of race, nor the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality with Islam is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of “like-mindedness” as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth, marriage, domicile, or naturalisation. It would be determined by a public declaration of “like-mindedness” and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory of such a nation would be the whole earth. The Arabs, like the Greeks and the Romans, endeavoured to create such a nation for the world-state by conquest, but failed to actualise their ideal. The realisation of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already exist in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to a great extent, in common institutions, Law and Government; and the various sociological circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another. Further, it is not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States, since its structure will be determined not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common ideal.

(2) That according to the law of Islam there is no
distinction between the Church and the State. The State with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unity in which no such distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily the high-priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men and is subject like every Muslim to the impersonal authority of the same law. The Prophet himself is not regarded as absolutely infallible by many Muhammadan theologians (e.g. Abu Ishaq, Tabari). In fact, the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Prophet of Arabia succeeded in commanding the absolute submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more than he. “I am,” he says, “a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of God.” Once in a moment of spiritual exaltation, he is reported to have said to one of his companions, “Go and tell the people—he who says—there is only one God—will enter the paradise,” studiously omitting the second half of the Muslim creed—“and Muhammad is his Prophet.” The ethical importance of this attitude is great. The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the ideal of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individuality is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A Muslim is free to do anything he likes, provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed; the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to say that the entire fabric of Islamic law, actually administered, is really judge-made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arises which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.

I shall now describe the three great political theories to
which I have alluded above. I shall first take up the Sunni view.

**I. ELECTIVE MONARCHY**

*(A) The Caliph and the People*

During the days of the early Caliphate things were extremely simple. The Caliphs were like private individuals, sometimes doing the work of an ordinary constable. In obedience to the Quranic verse—"and consult them in all matters"—they always consulted the more influential companions of the Prophet in judicial and executive matters, but no formal ministers existed to assist the Caliph in his administrative work. It was not until the time of the House of ‘Abbas that the Caliphate became the subject of scientific treatment. In my description of the Sunni view I shall mainly follow al-Mawardy—the earliest Muslim constitutional lawyer who flourished during the reign of the Ahbasi Caliph al-Qadir. Al-Mawardy divides the whole Muslim community into two classes: (1) the electors, (2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary for a candidate are thus enumerated by him:

(1) Spotless character.

(2) Freedom from physical and mental infirmity. The predecessor of the present Sultan of Turkey was deposed under this condition.

(3) Necessary legal and theological knowledge in order to be able to decide various cases. This is true in theory; in practice the power of the Caliph, especially in later times, was divided.

(4) Insight necessary for a ruler.

(5) Relationship with the family of Quraish. This
qualification is not regarded as indispensable by modern Sunni lawyers on the ground that the Prophet never nominated any person as his successor.

(7) Full Age (al-Ghazali). It was on this ground that the chief judge refused to elect al-Muqtadir.

(8) Male sex (al-Baidawi). This is denied by the Khawarij who hold that a woman can be elected as Caliph.

If the candidate satisfies these conditions, the representatives of all influential families, doctors of law, high officials of the State, and commanders of the Army meet together and nominate him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeds to the mosque where the nomination is duly confirmed by the people. In distant places representatives of the elected Caliph are permitted to receive homage on behalf of the Caliph. In the matter of election the people of the capital, however, have no precedence over other people—though, in practice, they have a certain amount of precedence, since they are naturally the first to hear of the Caliph’s death. After the election, the Caliph usually makes a speech, promising to rule according to the law of Islam. Most of these speeches are preserved. It will be seen that the principles of representation is, to a certain extent, permitted in practical politics; in the law of property, however, it is expressly denied. For instance, if B dies in the lifetime of his father A and his brother C, leaving issues, the whole property of A goes to C. The children of B have no claim; they cannot represent their father, or “stand in his shoes”.

From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly sued in any ordinary law court. The second Caliph was once accused of appropriating a large share in the spoils of war, and he had to clear his conduct before the people, by production of evidence according to the law of Islam. In his judicial
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capacity he is open to the criticism of every Muslim. Omar I was severely reprimanded by an old woman who pointed out to him that his interpretation of a certain Quranic verse was absolutely wrong. The Caliph listened to her argument, and decided the case according to her views.

The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son; but the nomination is invalid until confirmed by the people. Out of the fourteen Caliphs of the House of Umayya only four succeeded in securing their sons as successors. The Caliph cannot secure the election of his successor during his own lifetime. Ibn Athir tells us that Abdul Malik—the Umayya Caliph endeavoured to do so but Ibn Musayyib, the great Mekkan lawyer, strongly protested against the Caliph’s behaviour. The Abbasi Caliph Hadi, however, succeeded in securing the election of his son Ja’far but after his death the majority declared for Harun. In such a case, when the people declare for another Caliph, the one previously elected must, on penalty of death, immediately renounce his right in public.

If the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate is forfeited. Usually one influential Muhammadan stands up in the mosque after the prayer and speaks to the congregation giving reasons for the proposed deposition. He declares deposition to be in the interest of Islam and ends his speech by throwing away his finger-ring with the remarks: “I reject the valiph as I throw away this ring.” The people then signify their assent in various ways and the deposition is complete.

The question whether two or more rival Caliphates can exist simultaneously is discussed by Muslim lawyers. Ibn Jama holds that only one Caliphate is possible. Ibn Khaldun holds that there is nothing illegal in the co-existence of two or more Caliphates, provided they are in different countries. Ibn Khaldun’s view is certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth is governed by an impersonal authority, i.e. law, his position seems to me
to be quite a tenable one. Moreover, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in Islam for a long time and still exist.

Just as a candidate for the Caliphate must have certain qualifications, so, according to al-Mawardy, the elector also must be qualified. He must possess: (1) Good reputation as an honest man. (2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs. (3) Necessary insight and judgment.

In theory all Muslims, men and women, possess the right of election. There is no property qualification. In practice, however, women and slaves did not exercise this right. Some of the early lawyers seem to have recognised the danger of mass-elections as they endeavour to show that the right of election resides only in the tribe of the Prophet. Whether the seclusion of women grew up in order to make women incapable of exercising a right which in theory could not be denied to them, I cannot say.

The elector has the right to demand the deposition of the Caliph, or the dismissal of his officials if he can show that Their conduct is not in accordance with the law of Islam. He can, on the subject, address the Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer. The mosque, it must be remembered, is the Muslim Forum, and the institution of daily prayer is closely connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant criticism of the State. If, however, the elector does not intend to address the congregation, he can issue a judicial inquiry concerning the conduct of any State official, or any other matter which affects the community as a whole. The judicial inquiry as a rule does not mention the name of any individual. I quote an illustration in order to give an idea of this procedure:

In the name of God, most merciful and clement. What is the opinion of the doctors of law, the guides of the people, on
the encouragement of the Zimmis, and on the assistance we can demand from them, whether as clerks to the Amirs entrusted with the administration of the country, or as collectors of taxes?... Explain the above by solid proofs, establish the orthodox belief by sound arguments, and give your reasons. God will reward you.

Such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails. Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn Jama, an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of political unrest. This opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though undoubtedly it is based on historical facts. Tartushi, a Spanish lawyer, would probably hold the same view, for he says: “Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy.”

Let us now consider the relation between the elected and the elector. Al-Mawardy defines this relation as “Aqd” binding together, contract. The State, therefore, is a contractual organism, and implies rights and duties. He does not mean, like Rousseau, to explain the origin of society by an original social contract; he holds that the actual fact of election is contract in consequence of which the Caliph has to do certain duties, e.g. to define the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Islam, to pay annual salaries and properly to direct the State treasury. If he fulfils these conditions, the people have mainly two duties in relation to him, viz, to obey him and to assist him in his work. Apart from this contract, however, Muslim lawyers have also enumerated certain cases in which obedience to the Caliph is not necessary.

The origin of the State then, according to al-Mawardy, is not forced but free consent of individuals who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. Government with him is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the
sense that the law of Islam—believed to have been revealed—demands peace and security.

(B) Ministers and Other Officials

The Caliph, after his election, appoints the principal officials of the State, or confirms those previously in office. The following are the principal State officials with their duties defined by the law:

1. The Wazir — The Prime Minister—either with limited or unlimited powers. The Wazir with unlimited powers must possess the same qualifications as the Caliph, except that, according to al-Mawardy, he need not necessarily belong to the Quraish tribe. He must be thoroughly educated, especially in Mathematics, History and the Art of Speaking. He can, without previous sanction of the Caliph, appoint officers of the various departments of the State. The Wazir with limited powers cannot do so. The dismissal of the Wazir with unlimited powers means the dismissal of all officials appointed by him; while the dismissal of the Wazir with limited powers does not lead to dismissal of the officials appointed by him. More than one Wazir with unlimited powers cannot be appointed. The Governors of various provinces can appoint their own Wazirs. A non-Muhammadan may be appointed Wazir with limited powers. The Shi’a dynasty of the Obaidias appointed a Jew to this position. An Egyptian poet expresses their sentiments as follows: “The Jews of our time have reached the goal of their ambition. Theirs is all honour, theirs is all gold. O people of Egypt, I advise you to become Jews; God himself has become a Jew.”

2. The Governors — Next to the Wazir the most important executive officers of the State were governors of various provinces. They were appointed by the Caliph with limited or unlimited powers. The governor with unlimited powers could appoint sub-governors to adjoining smaller
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provinces. For instance, the sub-governor of Sicily was appointed by the Governor of Spain and that of Sind by the Governor of Basra. This was really an attempt to create selfgoverning Muslim colonies. The officer in charge was, so to speak, a miniature caliph of his province; he appointed his own Wazir, Chief Judge and other State officers. Where special commander of the provincial army was not appointed, the Governor, ex-officio, acted as the commander. This, however, was an error, since the governors became gradually powerful and frequently asserted their independence. But in his capacity of the commander the governor had no right to raise the salaries of his soldiers except in very special circumstances. It was his duty to send all the money to the central treasury after defraying the necessary State expenses. If the provincial income fell short of the expenses, he could claim a contribution from the central treasury. If he is appointed by the Caliph, the death of the latter is not followed by his dismissal; but if he is appointed by the Wazir, the death of the Wazir means the dismissal of all governors appointed by him, provided they are not newly confirmed in their respective posts.

The governor with limited powers was a purely executive officer. He had nothing to do with judicial matters and in criminal matters too his authority was very much limited.

Muslim lawyers, however, recognise a third kind of governorship, i.e. by usurpation. But the usurper must fulfil certain conditions before his claim is legally justified.

(3) Commander of Armies — Here too the distinction of limited and unlimited powers is made, and the duties of commanders, subordinate officers, and soldiers are clearly defined.

(4) The Chief Judge — The Chief Judge could be appointed by the Caliph or the Wazir. According to Abu Hanifa, in some cases, and according to Ibn Jarir Tabary, a
non-Muslim can be appointed to administer the law of his co-religionists. The Chief Judge, as representative of the law of Islam, can depose the Caliph—he can kill his own creator. His death means the dismissal of his staff; but the death of the sovereign is not followed by the dismissal of the judges appointed by him. During an interregnum a judge can be elected by the people of a town, but not during the sovereign’s lifetime.

(5) President — of the Highest Court of Appeal and General Control. The object of this institution was to hear appeals and to exercise a general supervision over all the departments of the State. Abdul Malik—the Ummaya Caliph and the founder of this court personally acted as the president, though more difficult cases he transferred to Qazi Abu Idris. In later times the president was appointed by the Caliph. During the reign of the ‘Abbasi Caliph al-Muqtadar, his mother was appointed President, and she used to hear appeals on Fridays, surrounded by Judges, priests and other notables. In one respect, the President of this Court differed from the Chief Judge. He was not bound by the letter of law like the Qazi; his decisions were based on general principles of natural justice, so that the President was something like the keeper of the Caliph’s conscience. He was assisted by a council of judges and lawyers whose duty was to discuss every aspect of the case before the President announced his decision. The importance of this institution may be judged from the fact that it was among the few Muslim institutions which the Normans retained after their conquest of Sicily in the eleventh century.

II. THE SHI’AH VIEW

According to the Shi’ah view the State is of divine origin, and the Caliph, or as they call, Imam, governs by divine right. The view arose among an obscure Arabian sect known as Saba’ites, whose founder Abdullah ibn Saba was a Jew of
Sana in Yemen. In the time of Uthman he became a convert to Islam, and finally settled in Egypt where he preached his doctrine. This doctrine harmonised with the pre-Islamic habits of political thought in Persia, and soon found a permanent home in that country. The Imam, according to the Persians, is not elected (the Shi’ahs of Oman, however, adopted the elective principle and held that the Imam might be deposed) but appointed by God. He is the reincarnation of Universal Reason, he is endowed with all perfections, his wisdom is superhuman and his decisions are absolute and final. The first Imam, All, was appointed by Muhammad; Ali’s direct descendants are his divinely ordained successors. The world is never without a living Imam whether visible or invisible. The twelfth Imam, according to the Shi’ahs, suddenly disappeared near Kufa, but he will come again and fill the world with peace and prosperity. In the meantime, he communicates his will, from time to time, through certain favoured individuals—called Gates—who hold mysterious intercourse with him. Now this doctrine of the absence of the Imam has a very important political aspect which few students of Islam have fully appreciated. Whether the Imam really disappeared or not, I do not know; but it is obvious that the dogma is a clever way of separating the Church and the State. The absent Imam, as I have pointed out above, is absolute authority in all matters; the present executive authorities are, therefore, only guardians of the estate which really belongs to the Imam who, as such, inherits the property of deceased intestates in case they leave no heirs. It will, therefore, be seen that the authority of the Shah of Persia is limited by the authority of the Mullahs—the representatives of the absent Imam. As a mere guardian of the estate he is subject to the religious authority of the Mullahs though as the chief executive authority he is free to adopt any measure for the good of the estate. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Mullahs took an active part in the recent constitutional reforms in Persia.
III. THE KHAWARIJ REPUBLICANISM

I shall be very brief in my account of the Khawarij, since the history of their opinions is yet to be worked out. The first Muslims who were so called were the notorious 12,000 who revolted against ‘Ali after they had fought under him at the battle of Siffin. They were offended at his submitting the decision of the right to the Caliphate to the arbitration of men when, in their opinion, it ought to have been submitted to the law of God—the Quran. “The nation,” they said to ‘Ali, “calls us to the book of God; you call us to the sword.” Shahristani divides them into twenty-four sects, differing slightly from one another in legal and constitutional opinion, e.g. that the ignorance of the law is a valid excuse; that the adulterer should not be stoned, for the Quran nowhere mentions this punishment; that the hiding of one’s religious opinions is illegal; that the Caliph should not be called the commander of the faithful; that there is nothing illegal in having two or more Caliphs in one and the same time. In East Africa and Mazab—South Algeria—they still maintain the simplicity of their republican ideal. Broadly speaking, the Khawarij can be divided into three classes:

(1) Those who hold that there must be an elected Caliph, but it is not necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even a slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she is a good Muslim ruler. Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from among the socially lowest members of their community.

(2) Those who hold that there is no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation can govern themselves.

(3) Those who do not believe in Government at all—the anarchists of Islam. To them Caliph Ali is reported to have said; “You do not believe in my Government, but there must be some Government, good or bad.”
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Such are, briefly, the main lines of Political Thought in Islam. It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Quran is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be determined by other considerations. Unfortunately, however, the idea of election did not develop on strictly democratic lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to vitalise the people at large. It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political activity in Muslim countries.

(1) In the first place the idea of election was not at all suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mongols—the two principal races which accepted Islam as their religion. Dozy tells us that the Persians were even determined to worship the Caliph as a divinity, and on being told that worship belonged to God alone, they attempted to rebel against the Caliph who would not be the centre of religious emotion.

(2) The life of early Muslims was a life of conquest. Their whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate political power in fewer hands; and thus serves as an unconscious handmaid of despotism. Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—a lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart.

In modern times—thanks to the influence of Western political ideas—Muslim countries have exhibited signs of political life. England has vitalised Egypt; Persia has received a constitution from the Shah, and the Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, scheming, and plotting to achieve their object. But it is absolutely necessary for these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, and not to shock the naturally suspicious conservatism of their people by
appearing as prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of Islam, and is, as such, the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.

(5)
Islam and Mysticism*

The present-day Moslem prefers to roam about aimlessly in the dusky valleys of Hellenic-Persian Mysticism, which teaches us to shut our eyes to the hard Reality around, and to fix our gaze on what it describes as “Illuminations”—blue, red and yellow Reality springing up from the cells of an overworked brain. To me this self-mystification, this Nihilism, i.e., seeking Reality in quarters where it does not exist, is a physiological symptom which gives me a clue to the decadence of the Muslim world. The intellectual history of the ancient world will reveal to you this most significant fact that the decadent in all ages have tried to seek shelter behind self-mystification and Nihilism. Having lost the vitality to grapple with the temporal, these prophets of decay apply themselves to the quest of a supposed eternal; and gradually complete the spiritual impoverishment and physical degeneration of their society by evolving a seemingly charming ideal of life which seduces even the healthy and powerful to death! To such a peculiarly constructed society as Islam the work of these sentimental obscurantists has done immense harm. Our birth as a society, repudiating the ideas of race and language as principles of social reconstruction, was due only to our subjecting ourselves to a system of Law believed to be Divine in origin; yet the old Mystic frankly held and secretly preached it to be merely Phenomenal; nothing more than an outer husk of the Real which is to be attained by means

other than the Law of God. In most cases the observance of the Law, even though held to be Phenomenal, was retained to avoid social odium; but no student of Moslem thought and literature can deny that the tendency to ignore tile Law—the only force holding together Moslem society—was the direct consequence of a false Mysticism horn of the heart and brain of Persia. Thus Moslem Democracy was gradually displaced and enslaved by a sort of spiritual Aristocracy pretending to claim knowledge and power not open to the average Moslem. The danger of this Persianisation of Islam was clearly seen by the great Moslem saint, Sheikh Ahmad Rifa’i (peace be on him). Writing to Abdul Sami Hashimi, the Sheikh says:

Elsewhere the great saint strikes at the very root of Persian Mysticism (i.e. the distinction of inner and outer, Phenomenal and Real, to which I have alluded before) and declares:

The Moslems of Spain, with their Aristotelian spirit, and away from the enervating influences of the thought of Western and Central Asia, were comparatively much closer to the spirit of Islam than the Moslem races of Asia, who let Arabian Islam pass through all the solvents of ‘Ajam and finally divested it of its original character. The conquest of Persia meant not the conversion of Persia to Islam, but the conversion of Islam to Persianism. Read the intellectual history of the Moslems of Western and Central Asia from
the 10th century downwards, and you will find therein verified every word that I have written above.

Such are the charms of decadence! We drink the poison and kiss the hand of those who administer it!

Remember that Islam was born in the broad day-light of history. The great democratic Prophet live4 and worked among intelligent men who have transmitted to posterity every word that dropped from his sacred lips. There is absolutely nothing esoteric in his teachings. Every word of the Quran is brimful of light and joy of existence. Far from justifying any gloomy, pessimistic Mysticism, it is an open assault on those religious teachings which have for centuries mystified mankind. Accept, then, the reality of the world cheerfully and grapple with it for the glorification of God and His Prophet. Do not listen to him who says there is a secret doctrine in Islam which cannot be revealed to the uninitiated. Herein lies the power of this pretender and your thraldom. See how in the spirit of Roman Christianity he builds fortifications round himself with a view to save his realms of darkness against the possible invasions of the historian. He enslaves you by exploiting your ignorance of the history of Islam; but seeing clearly that the light of history may sometime dispel the mist of his teaching from your intellectual atmosphere, he teaches you to regard sense perception as “the greatest veil” Thus this enemy of sense reality blunts your sense for fact, and undermines the very foundations of the science of history.

Moslem youngmen! Beware of the mystifier. His noose has now been too long round your neck. The regeneration of the Moslem world lies in the strong uncompromising, ethical Monotheism which was preached to the Arabs thirteen hundred years ago. Come, then, out of the fogs of Persianism and walk into the brilliant desert sunshine of Arabia.
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(6) 
Muslim Democracy *

The Democracy of Europe—overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European societies. Nietzsche, however, abhors this “rule of the herd” and, hopeless of the plebeian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of Supermen. But is the plebeian so absolutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?

(7) 
Our Prophet’s Criticism of Contemporary Arabian Poetry **

History has preserved some of the criticisms of our Prophet on contemporary Arabian poetry. But two of these criticisms are most profitable to Indian Muslims whose literature has been chiefly the work of the period of their national decadence and who are now in search of a new literary ideal. One of these criticisms indicates to us what poetry should not be, and the other what it should be:

1. Of the poet Imra-ul-Qais who flourished about 40 years before Islam, our Prophet is reported to have said:

Now what do we find in the poetry of Imra-ul-Qais? Sparkling wine, enervating sentiments and situations of love, heart-rending moans over the ruins of habitations long swept away by stormy winds, superb pictures of the inspiring scenery of silent deserts—and all this is the choicest expression of old Arabia. Imra-ul-Qais appeals more to imagination than to will, and on the whole acts as a narcotic on the mind of the reader. The Prophet’s criticism reveals this most important art-principle—that the good in art is not necessarily identical with the good in life; it is possible for a poet to write fine poetry, and yet lead his society to Hell. The poet is essentially a seducer; woe to the people, if instead of making the trials of life look beautiful and attractive, heembellishes decadence with all the glories of health and power, and seduces his people to extinction. Out of the richness of his nature he ought to lavish on others something of the super-abundance of life and power in him, and not steal away, thief-like, the little they already happen to possess.

2. Again the following verse of ‘Antra of the tribe of Abs was read to our Prophet:

[“Verily I pass though whole nights of toil to merit a livelihood worthy of an honourable man.”]

The Prophet whose mission was to glorify life and to beautify all its trials was immensely pleased and said to his companions: “The praise of an Arabian has never kindled in me a desire to see him, but I tell you I do wish to meet the author of this verse.”

Imagine the man, single look at whose face was a source of infinite bliss to the looker, desiring to meet an infidel Arab
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for his verse! What is the secret of this unusual honour which the Prophet wished to give to the Poet? It is because the verse is so healthful and vitalising, it is because the poet idealises the pain of honourable labour. The Prophet’s appreciation of this verse indicates to us another art-principle of great value—That art is subordinate to life, not superior to it. The ultimate end of all human activity is Life—glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinate to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force, and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around-on the mastery of which alone life depends—is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.

Thus the Prophet’s appreciation of ‘Antra’s verse gives us the ultimate principle for the proper evolution of all Art.

(8)

Touch of Hegelianism in Lisanul ‘Asr Akbar*

To the great German Idealist Hegel creation means the Absolute Reason leaving its absoluteness and returning to itself by visualising or objectifying itself in the form of Universe which, in its essence, is no more than the unity of the Absolute Reason powdered up in a visible, perceptible plurality. Whether this process of return is temporal or non-temporal (for on this point Hegelians differ) it is clear that according to the Master its motive-force is the necessarily

* The New Era, Lucknow, 18 August 1917, p. 300.
self-contradictory categories through which the Absolute Reason has to pass synthetically to regain its primeval Absoluteness. At the beginning of the process, since we are distant from the original Absoluteness, the contradictions are sharp and mutually exclusive, but when we approach the end of the process their sharpness begins to disappear until we reach the Absolute Idea in which all contradictions embrace each other, and are transformed into a single unity. Thus the central idea of Hegel’s Philosophy can be summed up in a few words—Infinite becoming Finite and regaining itself through a synthesis of self-evolved oppositions. The life of the universe, then, is necessarily constituted by a perpetual conflict of opposing forces. The brief sketch of Hegel’s Idea, I am afraid, is not quite luminous but I venture to hope it will assist you in realising the depth of Akbar’s apparently simple verse:

The endless conflict of Nature’s creative forces is too palpable to escape the observation of poets and thinkers. Tennyson has perhaps given it a fuller and more pathetic expression; and our own Urfī has seized it in a majestic verse:

The special feature of Akbar, however, is that in a few simple and well-chosen words he reveals to you not only the conflict but also the cause (i.e. Limitation of the Limitless) which has generated it. And in the words ___ and ___ further suggests that the conflict is not limited to the material plane ___ only but extends itself to the mental plane as well. In Alexander’s well-known book Moral Order and
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Progress you will find how our ideas, ideals, beliefs and modes of life are constantly engaged in a quiet bloodless fight, and how they displace, kill and absorb one another.

(9)

Nietzsche and Jalal-ud-Din Rumi*

Comparisons, they say, are odious. I want, however, to draw your attention to a literary comparison which is exceedingly instructive and cannot be regarded as odious. Nietzsche and Maulana Jalal-ud-Din Rumi stand at the opposite poles of thought; but in the history of thought it is the points of contact and departure which constitute centres of special interest. In spite of the enormous intellectual distance that lies between them these two great poet-philosophers seem to be in perfect agreement with regard to the practical bearing of their thought on life. Nietzsche saw the decadence of the human type around him, disclosed the subtle forces that have been working for it, and finally attempts to adumbrate the type of life adequate to the task of our planet, “Not how man is preserved, but how man is surpassed,” was the keynote of Nietzsche’s thought. The superb Rumi—born to the Moslem world at a time when enervating modes of life and thought, and an outwardly beautiful but inwardly devitalising literature had almost completely sucked up the blood of Moslem Asia and paved the way for an easy victory for the Tartar—was not less keenly alive than Nietzsche to the poverty of life, incompetence, inadequacy and decay of the body social, of which he formed a part and parcel. See with what unerring insight he describes the corroding disease of his society and suggests the ideal type of Moslem manhood:

The spirit of Ancient India aimed at the discovery of God and found Him. Fortified by this valuable possession Modern India ought to focus on the discovery of man as a personality as an independent “whole” in all-embracing synthesis of life if she wants to secure a permanent foundation of her New Nationalism. But does our education today tend to awaken in us such a sense of inner wholeness? My answer is no. Our education does not recognise man as a problem, it impresses on us the visible fact of multiplicity without giving us an insight into the inner unity of life, and thus tends to make us more and more immersed in our physical environment. The soul of man is left untouched and the result is a superficial knowledge with a mere illusion of culture and freedom. Amidst this predominantly intellectual culture which must accentuate separate centres with the “whole” the duty of higher minds in India is to reveal the inner synthesis of life.

Divine Right to Rule *

The theory of the divine right of kings is as old as the institution of kingship itself. In the East as well as the West the king, according to this principle, has been regarded as deriving his authority from God direct. It appears to have been a creed of Eastern origin, imported to the West with the advent of Christianity. As logical corollaries from this follow two other most important principles. Firstly, the king, being a representative of God on earth, is free from all responsibility to his people. His word is law and he may do whatever his sweet will may dictate without being called to account for it. The English saying “The king can do no wrong” seems to be a relic of the same divine sanctity attached to the king’s person. Secondly, kingship must descend into the same family which is considered sacred.

It was in keeping with this sacrosanct conception of kingship that in the middle ages in Christendom, kings were duly anointed by the Church at the time of coronation. Shakespeare puts the following words in the mouth of Richard II, “Not all the water in the rough rude sea can wash the balm off from the anointed king.” Students of history what amount of bloodshed was caused during the Civil in the 17th century in England in consequence of political controversies due to this principle. The royalists held that all Christian kings, princes and governors derived their authority from God. The parliamentarians contended that ultimate power lay in the people. The execution of Charles I was the victory of this latter principle. The sentiment of the divine right of kings was finally smashed by the French Revolution, though among a small section of royalists in every Western country it still persists.

The question to consider, however, is how tir had such a

* Light, Lahore, 30 August 1928
claim on the part of kings or belief on the part of people been justified, and what were their credentials to such a title? On the face of it there was nothing divine about them. They employed the common human ways and means to maintain their authority. They had their military force with which to keep the people in subjection. They had their police and their jails to gag the voice of freedom. They had their fabulous riches with which to purchase friends and supporters.

It was with these and similar material means that they managed to rule over men; and any man, given all these advantages, can do the same. Where does divinity come in? Any man without the least vestige of divinity in him, with just a bit of common sense can make as good a king as any that was ever encircled by credulity with a halo of sanctity, provided he has an army, a treasury and the rest of the regal paraphernalia. It was, in fact, not by right divine but by the right of might that they ruled over their fellowmen.

Over and above these material means, these kings also resorted to psychological methods to keep the people in awe. For instance, like God, of Whom they posed to be vicars, they made themselves as scarce as possible. They made it a point to keep out of the gaze of the populace. The Moghal kings would only show their faces through small openings in the palace to let the people have a look at them. This had a great psychological effect. Even today some kings do not mix freely with the people but make their appearance from the balcony. This is an attempt in the same direction, viz, to clothe themselves with a superman halo to inspire people with a certain amount of awe and veneration, they employ the common psychological method of keeping them at a respectful distance. Where is the divinity in this? Any knave who may get the opportunity and the means may do the same and perhaps much better. These are hut artificial human methods, open to all, without any reference to Divine agency.
Divine right to rule must be above all such material or psychological props. It must want neither gold nor bayonets to uphold it. Nor must it fall back on such psychological tricks as to infuse a superstitious awe in others. It must be a rule without any army, without a treasury, without a jail and without a police. Such a ruler alone can justly claim to be a ruler by divine right. A reference to history would show that the Prophet of Islam was undoubtedly a ruler who had the divine right to rule over men.

The Prophet of Islam had no standing army to win over the populace to his cause. He was but an orphan boy and arose single handed to combat the forces of corruption let loose on all sides. Rather than have any army of his own to subjugate people, he had an army drawn up against him. A whole nation was up in arms against him bent on his extirpation. And yet these very people be ultimately brought under his rule. That indeed was divine right to rule over men. Nor had the Prophet of Islam any treasury with which to attract people to his fold. He was but a poor man who had at times gone even without food for days together. Even as the ruler of Arabia he slept on a stiff matting till the palm leaves imprinted their stripes on his back. From a persecuted and exiled man, he rose to be the King of the peninsula and yet he knew no such things as a jail or police. This indeed was the ruler who can rightly be called to have ruled by a right superhuman, for the obvious reason that he employed not one method used by the communality of kings to maintain this authority...no standing army to protect his kingdom, no bodyguard, no treasury, no police, no jail, nothing of the sort.

Rather than make any attempt to hypnotise people into superstitious adoration of himself, the Prophet did everything in his power to dispel any possible doubt on that point. In the midst of a people who bowed even before a rough unhewn piece of stone and clothed it with divinity, it would have been the easiest thing on earth to pass even for
God Himself. But the Prophet Muhammad was far above such tactics. “I am but a man like unto you,” he proclaimed to his people who would have fain taken him for a god. Unlike earthly kings who left no stone unturned to hoodwink their people into the belief as to their superhuman status, the Prophet tried every method to impress upon his people that he was just human, and no more than human. He purposely made it a part and parcel of the Kalima that “Muhammad is an Apostle of God” as a safeguard for all times to come, lest in their enthusiasm his followers, in times to come, might raise him to the Divine pedestal as did Christians in the case of Jesus. He plainly disillusioned the people of every possible shadow of a doubt as to his own powers and personiility. “I do not tell you,” he told them, “that I possess any treasures or any knowledge of the future.” When at the death of his son there happened to be a solar eclipse, and people interpreted it as Divine mourning, the Prophet at once removed the superstitious tendency by telling them that these phenomena of nature had nothing to do with the life or death of man. The Quran is replete with verses how the Prophet took great pains to drive the point home to the people that there was nothing superhuman about him. When an old man came to him, and he (the Prophet) showed some indifference to him, there came the Divine rebuke. Rather than conceal it, he perpetuated it for all time to come by incorporating it in the Quran. No earthly potentate would thus advertise such a thing against himself, however insignificant it might be.

The Prophet mixed as freely with the people as any one of them. There was nothing about his person to give him an air of superiority, so much so that when a stranger would call at an assembly of Muslims at the Mosque, he had to ask, “Which of you is Muhammad?” So thoroughly had he merged himself into his people. He did not consider it as anything beneath his dignity as king to stitch his own clothes, patch up his own shoes, milk his own goats, clean his own house, and even help his household in domestic work. On
one occasion a party of Muslims, including the Prophet, was out on a journey and when at meal times everyone took some part in the cooking, the Prophet began to collect fuel as his part of the work. When his followers implored that he need not trouble himself, he simply replied that he must do his own work.

Such was this most mighty monarch the world has ever seen—the monarch who ruled not only the bodies, but also the hearts of his people, the monarch without an army, without a palace, without a treasury, without any of the numerous instruments with which earthly monarchs keep their people in due subjection. He was as free with the people as any one of them and did everything to divest his personality of all possible halo that superstition might envelop it with. And yet he was the monarch who was loved by his people as never was a monarch loved. One of his followers, when he heard of the incident to the Prophet’s teeth at a battle, knocked all of his own teeth out. When, after a battle, a woman of Medina enquired about the Prophet’s safety, she was informed that her husband had fallen on the field. Without heeding that great calamity she repeated the question whether the Prophet was safe. The reply was that her son was also slain in the battle. She repeated her question again to get an answer that her brother had also been killed: “What about the Prophet?” she insisted and when she was told that all was well with him, she uttered a sigh of relief and said, “Then all griefs are cut light.”

History knows but one monarch whose rule over men may justly he called a rule by divine right and that one man was the Prophet of Islam. And yet, though the ruler of men by right divine, he never claimed to be a ruler! “I am but a man like unto you,” was the grand message of this greatest of kings to an adoring humanity.
Sometime ago various questions arose in my mind regarding the culture of Islam as embodying the world-feeling of a specific group of mankind. Is Modern Science purely Western in origin? Why did the Muslims devote themselves to architecture as a mode of self-expression, and why did they comparatively ignore music and painting? What light, if any, do their mathematics and their decorative art throw on their intellectual and emotional attitude towards the concepts of space and time? Are there any psychological conditions which determined the rise and final acceptance, as an orthodox religious dogma, of a boldly conceived Atomic theory wholly unlike the Greek theory? What is the psychological meaning of mi’raj in the cultural history of Islam? Professor Macdonald has recently tried to prove the existence of Buddhistic influence on the rise and growth of Atomism in Islam. But the cultural problem which I have ventured to raise is far more important than the purely historical question answered by Professor Macdonald. Similarly Professor Bevan has given us valuable historical discussion of the story of the mi’raj. To my mind, however, what is, culturally speaking, more important is the intense appeal that the story has always made to the average Muslim, and the manner in which Muslim thought and imagination have worked on it. It must be something more than a mere religious dogma, for it appealed to the great mind of Dante, and, through Muhyiuddin ibn-ul-Arabi, furnished a model for the sublimest part of the Divine Comedy which symbolises the culture of mediaeval Europe. The historian may rest satisfied with the conclusion that the Muslim belief in the Prophet’s Ascension finds no

* Islamic Culture, liyderabad-Deccan, April 1929. pp. 201-09.
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justification in the Quran; yet the psychologist who aims at a deeper view of Islamic culture cannot ignore the fact that the outlook given by the Quran to its followers does demand the story as a formative element in the world-picture of Islam. The truth is that it is absolutely necessary to answer all such questions, and mutually to adjust their answers into a systematic whole of thought and emotion. Without this it is impossible to discover the ruling concepts of a given culture, and to appreciate the spirit that permeates it. However, a comprehensive view of the culture of Islam, as an expression of the spiritual life of its followers, is easy of achievement.

The culture of Islam is the youngest of all Asiatic cultures. For us moderns it is far more easy to grasp the spirit of this culture than to imagine the world-picture of those ancient cultures whose intellectual and emotional attitude is extremely difficult to express in a modern language. The difficulty of the historian of Muslim culture is mainly due to the almost total lack of Arabic scholars trained in special sciences. European scholars have done good work in the domain of Muslim history, philology, religion and literature. Muslim philosophy too has had share of their attention; but I am afraid the work done in philosophy is, on the whole, of a superficial kind, and often betrays ignorance of both Muslim and European thought. It is in Art as well as in the concepts of special sciences and philosophy that the true spirit of a culture is revealed. But, for the reason mentioned above, the student of Muslim culture is yet very far from understanding the spirit of that culture. Briffault in his Making of Humanity, a hook which every student of the history of culture ought to read, tells us that “neither Roger Bacon nor his later namesake has any title to he credited with having introduced the experimental method.” And further that “the experimental method of the Arabs was by Bacon’s time widespread and eagerly cultivated throughout Europe.” No, I have reasons to believe that the origin of Descartes’ Method and Bacon’s Novum Organum goes back to Muslim critics of Greek logic, e.g. Ibn Taimiya, Ghazzali,
Razi, and Shahabuddin Surhrawardi Maqtul. But it is obvious that the existing material which would prove this thesis can be handled only by those Arabic scholars who have made a special study of Greek, Muslim and European logic.

Again, our ignorance of the concepts of Muslim science sometimes leads to erroneous views of modern culture. An instance of this I find in Spengler’s extremely learned work Untergang des Abendlandes, in which he has developed a new theory of the birth and growth of cultures. While discussing the concept of number in the classical, Arabian and modern cultures and contrasting the Greek notion of magnitude with the Arabian indeterminateness of number, he says:

Number as pure magnitude inherent in the material presentness of things is paralleled by number as pure relation, and if we may characterise the classical “world”, the cosmos, as being based on a deep need of visible limits and composed accordingly as a sum of material things, so we may say that our world-picture is an actualising of an infinite space in which things visible appear very nearly as realities of a lower order, limited in the presence of the illimitable. The symbol of the West is an idea of which no other culture gives even a hint, the idea of Function. The function is anything rather than an expansion of, it is complete emancipation from any preexistent idea of number. With the function, not only the Euclidean Geometry but also the Archimedean arithmetic ceased to have any value for the really significant mathematics of Western Europe.

The last three sentences in this passage are in fact the foundation-stone on which the superstructure of Splengler’s theory largely rests. Unfortunately, the thesis that no other culture gives even a hint of the idea of Function is incorrect. I had a vague recollection of the idea of Function in al-Beruni, and, not being a mathematician, I sought the help of Dr. Zia-ud-Din of Aligarh who very kindly gave me an English translation of al-Beruni’s passage and wrote to me.
an interesting letter from which I quote the following:

I-Beuni in his book, Qanun-i-Masudi, used Newton’s formula of Interpolation for valuing the various intermediary angles of Trigonometry functions from his tables which were calculated for every increase of fifteen minutes. He gave Geometrical proof of Interpolation formula. In the end he wrote a paragraph saying that this proof can be applied to any function whatsoever whether it may be increasing or diminishing with the increase of arguments. He did not use the word function, but he expressed the idea of function in generalising the formula of Interpolation from Trigonometrical function to any function whatsoever. I may add here that I drew the attention of Prof. Schwartzchild Professor of Astronomy in the Gottingen University—to this passage and he was so much surprised that he took Prof. Andrews with him to the library and got the whole passage translated three times before he began to believe it.

It is not possible for me here to discuss Spengler’s theory and to show how materially his oversight affects his view of history. Suffice it to say that a genetic view of the cultures associated with the two great Semitic religions reveals their spiritual relationship which tends to falsify Spengler’s thesis that cultures, as organic structures, are completely alien to one another. But this brief reference to one of the most important concepts of modern mathematics reminds me of ______ [The extent of possibility in the science of space--.Ed. I.C.) of ‘Iraqi. During my correspondence with Maulvi Syed Anwar Shah, one of the most learned traditionists in the Muslim world of today, regarding the meaning of the word “Dahr’ (Time) occurring in the well-known tradition .__________ [“deal not in invective against Time (with Time’s vicissitudes), Lo, Time (with Time’s vicissitudes) is Allah.”—Ed. I.C.]. The Maulvi Sahib referred to this manuscript; and later, at my request, very kindly sent me a copy of it. I consider it necessary to give you an account of the contents of this valuable
document, partly because it will furnish additional reason for dissatisfaction with Spengler’s theory, but mainly because I mean thereby to impress upon you the need of Oriental research in the concepts of special sciences as developed in the world of Islam. Moreover, it is likely that this small manuscript of great value may lead to the opening up of a fresh field of inquiry about the origins of our concepts of space and time, the importance of which has only recently been realised by modern physics.

Theie is, however, some doubt about the authorship of the booklet. Haji Khalifah attributes it to one Sh. Mahmud whom I have not been able to trace. About the middle of the text the following sentence occurs:

Personally I am inclined to think that in this manuscript we are in a more intimate touch with the Persian Sufi Iraqi whose freedom of thought and action brought on him the odium of the orthodox both in Egypt and India. However, the reason why he was led to reduce his thoughts to writing is thus explained:

1. “When this invisible virgin (idea) through the attiring exposition of this humble self, becomes manifest to the later generations, it is hoped that those thirsty for the drop of reality in later ages will see the beauty of limpid water at the hands of this Iraqi cup-bearer.” Translation not in the original. (Ed.)
Assuming, then, that the writer is Fakhr-ud-Din ‘Iraqi, it is significant to note that he was a contemporary of Nastr-ud-Din Tusi. Tusi’s work on Euclid was printed in Rome in 1594, and John Willis introduced it to the University of Oxford about the middle of the 17th century. It is Tusi’s effort to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid that is believed to have furnished a basis in Europe for the problem of space which eventually led to the theories of Gauss and Reimana. ‘Iraqi, however, was not a mathematician, though his view of space and time appears to me to be several centuries ahead of Tusi. This necessitates a very careful

2. “It was proper that I should have kept these precious secrets deposited at the bottom of the soul and in the dark recesses of the heart, not owing to my miserliness, but due to their preciousness and exquisiteness. But the reason for disclosing this virgin idea is that once, during the course of conversation, I uttered with much fervour of the heart the word space and there can be no denying the fact that this word has been used in the traditions. The meaning of space should, however, be understood so that there remains no ambiguity about the word anthropomorphism. On hearing this word and on the ground of its use, some unfortunate blind-hearted persons, due to their prejudice, envy, contumacy and denial of the truth, girt up their loins to annoy me. Ihey accused me of having faith in anthropomorphism and issued a religious injunction on my infidelity. Hence, necessarily, for the exoneration of my heart from the blemish of this anthropomorphism, I thought it proper to exhibit this virgin maid as one of the beings of the inhabitants of the world of nature, to show its beauty to these blind men, for the eradication of this allegation. Although I know that there is no remedy for the malady of prejudice-and envy, yet I believe that matter has life and the dead is destined to destruction. Lo! those for whom the word of thy Lord is effect will not believe though every token conies unto them, till they see the painful doom.” Translation not in the original. (Ed.)
inquiry into the progress of mathematical thought in Islam with a view to discover whether ‘Iraqi’s conclusions were ever reached through a purely mathematical channel.

I will now proceed to summarise the substance of ‘Iraqi’s discussion of time and space in his own words. The secret of time and space is the greatest of secrets. To know it is to know the secret of the Being and attributes of God. The existence of some kind of space in relation to God is clear from the following verses of the Quran:

Dost thou not see the God knoweth all that is in the Heavens and all that is in Earth? Three persons speak not privately together, but He is their fourth; nor five, but He is their sixth, no fewer nor more, but wherever they be He is with them. (58:8)

Ye shall not be employed in affajas, nor shall ye read a text out of the Quran, nor shall ye work any work, but We will be witness over you when you are engaged therein; and the weight of an atom on Earth or in Heaven escapeth not thy Lord; nor is there weight that is less than this or greater but it is in the Perspicuous book. (10:62)

“We created man; and We know what his soul whispereth to him, and We are closer to him than his neck-vein.” (50:15)

But we must not forget that the words proximity, contact and mutual separation, which apply to material bodies do not apply to God. Divine life is in touch with the whole Universe on the analogy of the soul’s contact with the body. The soul is neither inside nor outside the body; neither proximate to nor separate from it. Yet its contact with every atom of the body is real, and it is impossible to conceive this contact except by positing some kind of space which befits the subtleness of the soul. The existence of space in relation to the life of God, therefore, cannot be denied; only we should carefully define the kind of space which may be predicated of the Absoluteness of God. Now there are three kinds of space—..the space of material bodies, the space of
immaterial beings, and the space of God. The space of material bodies is further divided into three kinds. First, the space of gross bodies of which we predicate roominess. In this space movement takes time, bodies occupy their respective places and resist displacement. Secondly, the space of subtle bodies, e.g. air and sound. In this space two bodies resist each other and their movement is measurable in terms of time which, however, appears to be different to the time of gross bodies. The air in a tube must be displaced before the air can enter into it; and the time of sound-wave is practically nothing compared to the time of gross bodies. Thirdly, we have the space of light. The light of the Sun instantly reaches the farthest limits of the Earth. Thus in the velocity of light and sound time is reduced almost to zero. It is, therefore, clear that the space of light is different to the space of air and sound. There is, however, a more effective argument than this. The light of a candle spreads in all directions in a room without displacing the air in the room; and this shows that the space of light is more subtle than the space of air which has no entry into the space of light. In view of the close proximity of spaces, however, it is not possible to distinguish the one from the other except by purely intellectual analysis and spiritual experience. Again, in the hot water the two opposites—fire and water—which appear to interpenetrate each other cannot, in view of their respective nature, exist in the same space. The fact cannot be explained except on the supposition that the spaces of the two substances, though closely proximate to each other are nevertheless distinct. But while the element of distance is not entirely absent there is no possibility of mutual resistance in the space of light. The light of a candle reaches up to a certain point only and the lights of a hundred candles intermingle in the same room without displacing one another.

Having thus described the spaces of physical bodies, possessing various degrees of subtleness, ‘Iraqi proceeds briefly to describe the main varieties of space Operated upon
by the various classes of immaterial beings, e.g. angels. The element of distance is not entirely absent from these spaces; for immaterial beings, while they can easily pass through stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion which, according to ‘Iraqi, is evidence of imperfection in spirituality. The highest point in the scale of spatial freedom is reached by the human soul which, in its unique essence, is neither at rest nor in motion.

Thus passing through the infinite varieties of space we reach the Divine space which is absolutely free from all dimensions, and constitutes the meeting point of all infinites.

In a similar manner ‘Iraqi deals with time. There are infinite varieties of time relative to the varying grades of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies which arises from the revolutions of the heavens is divisible into past, present and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character; but its passage is such that whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of immaterial beings. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach the notion of Divine Time which is absolutely free from the quality of “passage” and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end. The “eye” of God sees all the ‘Visibles and His “ear” hears all the audibles in one indivisible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to the priority of time; on the other hand the priority of time is due to God’s priority. Thus Divine Time is what the Quran describes as the “Mother of Books” in which the whole of history freed from the net of casual sequence is gathered up in a single super-eternal “now”.

From this summary of ‘Iraqi’s view you will see how a cultured Muslim Sufi intellectually interpreted his spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had no idea of
the theories and concepts of modern mathematics and physics. In fact, his theory of a plural space may be taken as a primitive stage in the modern hyperspace movement which originated in Nasir-ud-Din Tusi’s efforts to improve the parallel postulate of Euclid. In modern times it was Kant who first definitely suggested the idea of different spaces as you will see from the following passage which I quote from his Prolegomena:

That complete space (which is itself no longer the boundary of another space) has three dimensions; and that space in general cannot have more, is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point....That we can require a line to be drawn to infinity, a series of changes to be continued (for example, space passed through by motion) in indefinitum, presupposes a representation of space and time which can only attach to intuition.

But Kant was not a mathematician. It was left for professional mathematicians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries finally to reach the concept of space as a dynamic appearance, and, as such, with the concept of space as an infinite continuum; yet he was unable to see the full implications of his thought, partly because he was not a mathematician and partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed Universe, if he had been able to raise the question whether dimensionality is a property of the world or a property of our knowledge of the world, he would have felt the necessity of searching examination of his own consciousness, and this would have opened up to him a line of thought much more in keeping with his Sufistic standpoint. Again the interpenetration of the super-spatial “here” and the super-eternal “now” in the Ultimate Reality suggests the modern notion of space-time which Prof. Alexander, in his lecture on “Space, Time and deity,” regards as the matrix of all things. A keener insight into the nature of time would have led
‘Iraqi to see that time is the more fundamental of the two; and that it is not a mere metaphor to say, as Prof. Alexander does say, that time is the mind of space. ‘Iraqi conceives God’s relation to the Universe on the analogy of the relation of the human soul to the body; but, instead of philosophically reaching this position through a criticism of the spatial and temporal aspects of experience, he simply postulates it on the basis of his spiritual experience. It is not sufficient merely to reduce space and time to a vanishing point-instant. The philosophical path that leads to God as an Omni-psyche of the universe lies through the discovery of Living Thought as the ultimate principle of space-time. ‘Iraqi’s mind, no doubt, moved in the right direction; but his Aristotelian prejudice coupled with a lack of psychological analyses blocked his progress. With his view that Divine Time is utterly devoid of change—a view based on an inadequate analysis of conscious experience—it was not possible for him to discover the relation between Divine Time and serial time and to reach, through this discovery, the essentially Islamic idea of continuous creation which means a growing universe.

(13)
McTaggart’s Philosophy*

I was reading the other day Mr. Dickinson’s ‘Memoir of the late and lamented Dr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on Kant and Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advanced student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a century ago. I should like to note for the readers of the Journal of the Indian Society a few points which occurred to me while reading this interesting book, whose value is very much enhanced by the personal

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reminiscences of those who had the good fortune of coming into contact with that great thinker.

“As we have pointed out more than once,” says Mr. Dickinson, “the origin of McTaggart’s philosophy was not in his intellect but in his emotions.” This is true—perhaps more or less true of all thinkers...if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn asunder from the general current of British thought. In order to understand the true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that current.

Agnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought. It comes and goes. The British mind tried to escape from it in two ways. One is the total elimination of what is called the ultimate Reality. The “Unknown and Unknowable” of Herbert Spencer simply does not exist. Why, then, look for it? The universe is nothing but perishable phenomena without any eternal reality behind. The other way is that an eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perishable E and is approachable by a purely speculative phenomena, and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In opposition to British Phenomenalism, Green affirmed the existence of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process, according to Green, is unthinkable without a non-temporal consciousness; for consciousness of change cannot be identified with the process of change. But the Eternal Consciousness, so regarded, is nothing more than a kind of Newtonian space holding together the world ? eternally inter-related appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations. Bradley’s philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction. Applying this test, the world of appearance, change, movement, multiplicity turns out to be a mere illusion. The ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu doctrine of “Maya” and the Greek Parmenides again. But how did this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley,
however, admits, in spite of the contradiction involved in the notion of self, that human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is it real? He does not explain. McTaggart reaches the absolute by means of dialectic method; but he does not stop at the Absolute. The Absolute, according to him, further differentiates itself into concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion; it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. As he wrote to me in December 1919:

I agree what you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that.

In this aspect of his teaching McTaggart is much more genuinely British than either Bradley or Green or Bosanquet. Indeed he was to Hegel as Leibniz was to Spinoza. Thus the character of McTaggart’s philosophy was determined, not so much by his private emotions as by the intellectual difficulties, as well as the un-British character of Neo-Hegelian thought in England. It was also determined by what he called the needs of his country. I quote from another letter of 1920 which he appears to have written after he had read Nicholson’s English translation of my Secrets of the Self:

I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together you were much more of a Pantheistic and mystic.

For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true good my position is, as it was, that that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather than action.

Perhaps, however, the difference is largely a question of emphasis—we each lay most weight on what our own country
needs. I dare say you are right when you say that India is too contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not contemplative enough. That is a lesson that we sought to learn from you—and no doubt we have something to teach in return.

The point of interest in McTaggart’s philosophy, however, is that in his system, mystical intuition, as a source of knowledge, is much more marked than in the system of Bradley. The need of such a direct revelation is the natural outcome of the failure of a purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart’s philosophy as mystical degeneration of English Neo-Hegelianism. Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world have felt the need of a direct contact with the ultimate Reality, and have indeed, in some cases, achieved such contact. Plotinus, Ghazali, Schelling, and Bergson are instances in point. In his spiritual evolution Kant himself reached that stage; but unlike Ghazali and others he was led to conceive the ultimate Reality as a regulative idea only. The result of his critical philosophy is that God cannot be proved to exist, but that we should act as if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real founder of modern Pragmatism. Will, then, the Italian writer referred to above describe Kant’s philosophy as a pragmatic degeneration of German thought?

It must, however, be remembered in the case of McTaggart that the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the philosophy of Bergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started with a firm conviction in the power of human reason, and that Conviction remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I think, as an accidental confirmation of what he had reached through pure reason. That is why he had such an unshakable faith in his philosophy. This is clear from the last words which he said to his wife: “I am grieved that we must part, but you know I am not afraid of death.”
Such a triumphant faith is the result of a direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do with what our psychology calls emotion; it is, as Mrs McTaggart insists, “an actual perception of the senses”. Like a true mystic McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially individual and incommunicable. It is because of its essentially private character that mystics see no use in talking about it except to experts, and that, too, for the purposes of verification only. In the history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in which some mystics have been reported to have travelled thousands of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is technically known as “Tasdiq,” i.e. verification by an appeal to another man’s experience. Knowledge and direct revelation are not mutually opposed; they are complementary to each other. The philosophical theologian simply tries, for the sake of less fortunate persons, to socialise, through reason, what in essentially individual. When the mystic Sultan Abu Sa’id met the philosopher Abu ‘Au ibn Sina, he is reported to have said: “I see what he knows.” McTaggart both knew and saw; but his vision, I believe, did not precede his system. It did not initially inspire his thought, though it did bring to him the warmth of conviction. This, to my mind, indicates a far more powerful intellect than that of Plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of McTaggart, in view of its static character, is not free from the unhealthy influences of his Hegelian inspiration. But perhaps we possess no criterion to decide whether the universe in its ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.

II

Another point on which I would like to say a few words is McTaggart’s view of the self. Hegel’s indifference to personal immortality has more or less affected all those who
received inspiration from him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in
the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the
Absolute. And this self-hood, according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the
Absolute. This account of the self disregards even the elementary conditions of self-hood
as known to living experience. The self, as known to experience, is much more than a
mere predicate of the Absolute; it is a dynamic centre of experience. By this criticism of
the common Neo-Hegelian view of the self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart’s view.
All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Neo-
Hegelianism. To McTaggart the self is a real substance. He reached the Absolute through
the method of Hegel. But with him the absolute has further determinations, i.e. the egos of
actual experience which participate in the elemental eternity of the Absolute. This
amounts to a total dismissal of the Hegelian Absolute. But the result of this dismissal is
not a return to Empiricism. It gives us not a world of inter-related appearances, but a
living world of inter-related egoc. Mr. Dickinson thinks that it cuts out science at one
stroke. It does nothing of the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Leibniz. But
while I agree that the self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, I cannot agree
with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that
the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute, it by no means follows that,
even in its finitude, the human self retains the character, which belongs to its source
alone. To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality
and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not
something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a
ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego. I venture here to translate for the
English reader one or two passages from my poem called The New Garden of Mystety:
If you say that the “I” is a mere illusion—
An appearance among other appearances—
Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion?
Look within and discover.
The world is visible,
Yet its existence needs proof!
Not even the intellect of an-angel can comprehend it!
The ‘I’ is invisible and needs no proof!
Think awhile and see thine own secret!
The “I” is Truth; it is no illusion.
When it ripens, it becomes eternal!
Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved, live in blissful union!
It is possible to give wings to a mere spark,
And to make it flutter for ever and for ever!
The Eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of his action!
That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wits for herself by love’s frenzy.
Why fear the death which comes from without?
For when the “I” ripens into a self
It has no danger of dissolution.
There is a more subtle inner death which makes me tremble!
This death is falling down from love’s frenzy.
Saving one’s spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps of chaff.
Cutting one’s shroud with one’s own hands,
Seeing one’s death with one’s own eyes!
This death lies in ambush for thee!
Fear it, for that is really our death.

But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality, I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasised personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe, and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be
compared to the great Muslim mystic Hallaj, whose undying phrase—"I am the creative truth—was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never ceased to utter what he had personally seen to be the Truth until the Mulas of Islam prevailed upon the State to imprison him and finally to crucify him. He met his death with perfect calm.

III

There is one more point which I would like briefly to consider here—I mean his atheism. I used to meet him almost every day in his rooms in Trinity and very often our talk turned on the question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me but he never succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his Memoir, that he had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal Consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him? In a letter already quoted he wrote to me:

As far as the life of the individual remains the same in the course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think (for an European, you know, can also be a mystic) that the solution tests in loving the same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it did when we first knew one another, that the solution of all problems is found in Love.

Indeed his description of love as the essence of Reality indicates that, in spite of his thorough-going intellectualism, his soul revolted against the inert Absolute of Neo Hegelianism. Yet in a letter from which I have quoted above he seems to oppose love to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is not passivity. It is active and creative.
Indeed on the material plane, it is the only force which circumvents death; for when death carries away one generation love creates another. He tells us that this love, which he regarded as the essence of Reality, is just the love of one person for another; and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now it is because of its character as an active cause that, in spite of variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the entire universe. But the crucial point is whether this central unity is an all-inclusive self. This was McTaggart’s real difficulty. The self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves? The mystic poet Rumi felt the same difficulty. “Between the individual egos and their Sustainer,” he says, “obtains a contact which can neither be imagined nor intellectually conceived.” In his Ideal of God, Professor Pringle Pattison also regards this relation as inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual ego himself a colony of egos?

Shall I point out the way to the eternal secret?
Open thine eye on thyself!
Thou art visible, and invisible, many and one!

Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, as I have pointed out before, that McTaggart’s Flegelian inspiration marred the vision which has vouchsafed him. A more serious thing happened to poor Nietzsche, whose peculiar intellectual environment led him to think that his vision of the ultimate ego could be realised in the world of space and time. What grows only out of the inner depths of the heart of man he proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment. He was taken as a mad man, and was
placed in the hands of those who administer drugs and mixtures. As I said of him in my Jawid Nama:

A Hallaj! A stranger in his own land!
Safe from the Mulla’s hit, killed by the Physician’s hand!

The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself, i.e. the act of worship. The orders of Muslim mystics who have invented various rules and practices by which to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. The truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection, nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls “grace”. The philosophy of McTaggart has in fact raised the great problem of the nature of Love. How will it be solved in Europe, if at all? Surely analytic psychology will never be able to solve it. Its secret lies in the pangs of separation, detachment or, as McTaggart would say, differentiation.

If the ultimate Reality, i.e. Love has any significance for the life of its own ego-differentiations, it must itself be an all-inclusive ego which sustains, responds, loves, and is capable of being loved. In McTaggart’s view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death, and rebirth will be endless. On the other hand, he himself suggests in his Some Dogmas of Religion that “it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change.” In this eventuality we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart’s system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging into a perfection transcending time and change must be-counter-acted, however remote it may be. And this can he done only by taking immortality as a hope, an
inspiration, a duty and not as an eternal fact:

My heart burns on the loneliness of God!
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego-Society
I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood,
And keep a constant vigil over my “I”.

(New Garden of Mystery)

(14)
Corporeal Resurrection*

I was reading the other day a book called The Emergence of Life. The author has tried to apply mathematical method to philosophical research. His method is based in Booli’s system of logic, which he further develops in the light of modern mathematical investigation. After having discussed his views of time, space and life, as seen in the light of modern relativity, the author refers in his chapter on “Non-Spatial Reality” to corporeal resurrection. I am sure this passage will interest the readers of the Muslim Revival.

The noteworthy point in this passage is how modern

* Muslim Revival, Lahore, Sept. 1932. Also reproduced by Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 21st April, 1952.
II. Religion and Philosophy

science and philosophy, becoming more exact, is furnishing rational foundations for certain religious beliefs, which the 18th and 19th centuries science rejected as absurd and incredible. Further the Muslim reader will see that the argument in support of corporeal resurrection advanced in this passage is practically the same as put forward in the Quran over 1300 years ago. The passage is as follows:

Whether indeed such an apparently fantastic notion, at any rate, to the scientific mind, as to the resurrection of the body, the most wonderful and I should say, almost incredible mystery of theological teaching, one of the most outstanding tenets of the Christian faith insisted upon by St. Paul and firmly held even to this day by some of the most earnest and devout scholars of our time, would ever admit of a scientific explanation, seems to me in the light of this consideration to be not altogether eliminated from the class of possible and rational reliefs. Absurd as it may seem to take an extreme case, as that the atoms that compose the body of a person who had been shattered to smithereens by an explosion in the trenches, would by any possibility ever recombine, except what would truly be called a miracle, there is nothing in the light of these reflections, to hinder the muwahids from adopting the right “time and tune” that would enable it once more to respond to one and all of the muwahids that had served as the chamber of its material environment.

It must be remembered that the Christian belief in resurrection is based upon the supposed fact of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, i.e. it is based on a historical event which is believed to have happened 2,000 years ago. In the Quran, resurrection is taken as a universal property of living organisms. The Quranic argument is summed up in the following verses:

And they used to say: What! When we die and become dust and bones, shall we be raised again and our forefathers too? Say: Those who have gone before and after—all will be brought together at the appointed moment (50, 47-48).
We have made death among you and We are not helpless that We should bring the like of you and create you in a form which you know not. And you know your first creation. Why then do you not ponder? (56, 60-62).

Do they not see how God created the first time; then He will create again; surely it is easy-for Him. Say: Go about the earth and see how He caused first creation; so will God bring about the other creation (29, 19-20).

Does man think that We will not bring together his bones? Yea. We are powerful that We should complete all his limbs. (75, 3-4).

And they say: What! When we become bones and dust, shall we be raised in a fresh form? Say: Be ye-stones or iron or any thing else which seems harder to you. Then they say: Who will bring us to life again? Say: He who made you the first time (17, 49-51).

And man says: What! When I have died, shall I be raised to life again? Does not man consider that We created him before while he was nothing? (19, 66-67)

As may be seen from the italicised lines, the Quran bases its arguments in support of resurrection, not on any events in history, but on the personal experience of every individual. This is exactly the argument which the modern scientific research as quoted above had advanced, viz, the same “time and tune” which brought the monads together the first time and caused his creation, may once more summon together after death the same monads and cause the second creation of man.

It may, however, be noted here that this return to life after death is nothing in the sense of the cycles of births and rebirths as commonly understood. The Quran supports the scientific view that life is a forward movement. There is no coming hack. Mark the following verses on the point.

When death overtakes any one of them, he says, my Lord!
Send me back (to the world) so that I may do good in what I have left behind. Never! In front of him there is a barrier till the day of resurrection (23, 99-101).

By the moon when it becomes full! Of a certainty you will go from stage to stage (84, 19-20).

Just as the moon goes through various stages, from the crescent to the full moon, even so is man to advance from a lower to a higher form of life.

Another passage which will interest the Muslim readers of the Muslim Revival, I came across in a book entitled Emotion as the Basis of Civilization. This passage refers to the sense of unity in Islam as created by the institutions of congregational prayer and pilgrimage. It is as follows:

The vast difficulty of creating any sense of unity or solidarity in such a group (i.e. composed of different nations with different traditions and outlooks) is apparent. All historians declare that the amazing success of Islam in dominating the world is the astounding coherence or sense of unity in the group, but they do not explain how this miracle was worked. There can be little doubt that the most effective means was prayer. The five daily prayers, when all the faithful, wherever they were, alone in the grim solitude of the desert or in the vast assemblies in a crowded city, knelt and prostrated themselves towards Mecca, uttering the same words of adoration for the one true God and of loyalty to His Prophet, produced an overwhelming effect even on the spectator and the psychological effect of thus fusing the minds of the worshippers in a common adoration and expression of loyalty is certainly stupendous. Muhammad was the first one to see the tremendous power of public prayer as a unification culture and there can be little doubt that the power of Islam is due in a large measure to the obedience of the faithful to this inviolable rule of the five prayers.

The giving of alms to the poor was also a means of developing the sense of brotherhood. So, likewise, was the
pilgrimage to Mecca, the pilgrimage proved in the end a great aid in unification, for the men of every tribe and race met at Mecca with a common purpose and in a common worship and a feeling of brotherhood would not but be engendered in the process.

(15)

Position of Women in the East *

I wish to clear up a few points regarding the position of our women in the East, and how they compare with the women of the West. In London streets I see a lot which Londoners do not notice. They are too familiar with the sights to notice subtleties. But those who see a country after a long absence come with a fresh vision.

What strikes me most is that the courtesy towards the female sex, for which Europeans were one time famous, is becoming atavistic. In the underground men do not surrender their seats to ladies, or do so very seldom. In getting out of the car they have no thought of letting the ladies out first. I do not want to blame them. The women themselves have brought it about. They wanted emancipation, equal rights with the male sex. The change that has come was inevitable.

Perhaps I may here try and eradicate the totally erroneous notions which are held in Europe, about the Eastern, and first of all, Muslim women, their life and the treatment they receive from men. European woman, according to her own wish, has descended from the pedestal on which she stood, but the Eastern the Muslim, woman has remained the recipient of the same honour as before.

In Europe the belief is still there that the Turkish woman plays an inferior role in Turkish life. They misunderstand many of our customs, especially the psychology of the veil. The origin of the veil is not men’s jealousy but the feeling that woman is sacred, so much so that a stranger’s eye should not fall on her. The meaning of the word “haram” in Arabic is “sacred ground,” into which no stranger can enter.

There are other reasons for the practice of the veil. These are biological in nature; it is not possible to discuss them here. I can only indicate what lies at the back of this institution. The woman is predominantly the creative element in life, and all creative forces in nature are hidden.

The source and symbol of the greater respect which Eastern women enjoy is in that very veil. Nothing has happened to diminish the respect in which they were held for centuries, and the principle of protecting them from approaches of strangers and from all humiliations has been safely maintained. According to the Holy Book of Islam there are several rules relating to the segregation of women. The veil is only one of them. Another rule is that when men and women meet each other, they should not stare into the eyes of each other. If this were the universal practice, the ordinary veil would be unnecessary.

Many women of India and of other countries of Islam wear no veil. The veil is really the name of a specific attitude of the mind. In order to reinforce this attitude of mind, certain concrete forms are needed, which forms depend on the circumstances of each people, age, and country.

The harem is also maligned. It should be remarked, first of all, that only the kings had harems. When I am speaking of women and the respect that we show to them, you will think of polygamy. Polygamy is certainly permitted according to Muhammadan Law. It is only a method of evading a social evil, i.e. public prostitution. Monogamy is our ideal as well as your but the main defect of monogamy is
that it has no outlet for surplus women.

The Middle Ages in Europe furnished the convent and the monastery for the absorption of surplus women. But you in Europe cannot follow this method today. The so-called industrial revolution—the parent of the so-called women emancipation movement—has given both man and woman the kind of mentality which is apparently opposed to polygamy; but I am afraid the social evil is there. I am not suggesting that polygamy is the only cure, but I do mean to say that the state of affairs which drives women to her own livelihood is awful, and is likely eventually to deprive the woman of the best in her—that is to say the woman in her.

However, the institution of polygamy in Islam is not an eternal institution. According to the law of Islam, all legal permissions can be revoked by the State, if they lead to social corruption. According to Muhammadan Law, a woman has the right to the custody of her children even after divorce. She can trade, contract and litigate in her own name. According to some lawyers, she can even be elected as the Caliph of Islam! She is entitled to maintenance from her husband besides the fixed dowry, to secure which she can hold the whole property of her husband.

The laws of divorce in Islam are also of great interest. The Muslim woman has equality of divorce with her husband. This, however, is secured in Muhammadan Law by the wife calling upon her husband at the time of marriage to delegate his right of divorce to her, to her father, brother or any stranger. This is technically known as “tafviz”—that is to say, handing over or transfer. The reason why this roundabout way of security is adopted I leave to the lawyers of Europe to understand.
The issue created by the controversy between the Qadianis and the orthodox Muslims is extremely important. The Indian Muslims have only recently begun to realise its importance. I intended to address an open letter to the British people explaining the social and political implications of the issue but unfortunately my health prevented me from doing so. I am, however, glad to say a few words for the present on a matter which, to my mind, affects the entire collective life of the Indian Muslims. It must, however, be pointed out at the outset that I have no intention to enter into any theological argument. Nor do I mean to undertake a psychological analysis of the mind of the founder of the Qadiani movement; the former will not interest those for whom this statement is meant and the time for the latter has not yet arrived in India. My point of view is that of a student of general history and comparative religion.

India is a land of many religious communities; and Islam is a religious community in a much deeper sense than those communities whose structure is determined partly by the religious and partly by the race idea. Islam repudiates the race idea altogether and founds itself on the religious idea alone. Since Islam bases itself on the religious idea alone, a basis which is wholly spiritual and consequently far more ethereal than blood relationship, Muslim society is naturally much more sensitive to forces which it considers harmful to its integrity. Any religious society, historically arising from the bosom of Islam, which claims a new prophethood for its basis, and declares all Muslims who do not recognise the

The Statesman, Calcutta, 14th May, 1935.
truth of its alleged revelations as Kaflrs, must, therefore, be regarded by every Muslim as a serious danger to the solidarity of Islam. This must necessarily be so, since the integerity of Muslim society is secured by the ideas of the Finality of Prophethood alone.

This idea of Finality is perhaps the most original idea in the cultural history of mankind; its true significance can be understood by only those who carefully study the history of pre-Islamic Magian culture in Western and Middle Asia. The concept of Magian culture, according to modern research, includes cultures associated with Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Jewish Christianity, Chaldean and Sabean religions. To these creed-communities the idea of the continuity of prophethood was essential, and consequently they lived in a state of constant expectation. It is probable that the Magian man psychologically enjoyed this state of expectation. The modern man is spiritually far more emancipated than the Magian man. The result of the Magian attitude was the disintegration of old communities and the constant formation of new ones by all sorts of religious adventures. In the modern world of Islam, ambitious and ignorant mullasim, taking advantage of the modern Press, has shamelessly attempted to hurl the old pre-Islamic Magian outlook in the face of the twentieth century. It is obvious that Islam which claims to weld all the various communities of the world into one single community cannot reconcile itself to a movement which threatens its solidarity and holds the promise of further rifts in human society.

Of the two forms which the modern revival of pre-Islamic Magianism has assumed, Bahaism appears to me to be far more honest than Qadianism; for the former openly departs from Islam, whereas the latter apparently retains some of the more important externals of Islam with an inwardness wholly inimical to the spirit and aspirations of Islam. Its idea of a jealous God with an inexhaustible store of earthquakes
and plagues for its opponents; its conception of the prophet as a soothsayer; its idea of the
continuity of the spirit of Messiah, are so absolutely Jewish that the movement can easily
be regarded as a return to early Judaism. The idea of the continuity of the spirit of
Messiah belongs more to Jewish mysticism than to positive Judaism. Professor Buber
who has given an account of the movement initiated by the Polish Messiah Baalshem
tells us that “It was thought that the spirit of the Messiah descended upon the earth
through the prophets and even through a long line of holy men stretching into the present
time. “the Zaddiks” (Sadiqs). Heretical movements in Muslim Persia under the pressure
of pre-Islamic Magian ideas invented the words “buruz”, “hulul”, “zill” to cover this idea
of perpetual reincarnation. It was necessary to invent new expressions for a Magian idea
in order to make it less shocking to Muslim conscience. Even the phrase “promised
Messiah” is not a product of Muslim religious consciousness. It is a bastard expression
and has its origin in the pre-Islamic Magian outlook. We don’t find it in early Islamic
religious and historical literature. This remarkable fact is revealed by Prof. Wensinck’s
Concordance of the Traditions of the Holy Prophet which covers no less than 11
collections of the tr-aditions and three of the earliest historical documents of Islam. One
can very well understand the reason why early Muslims never used this expression. The
expression did not appeal to them probatly because they thought that it implied a false
conception of the historical process. The Magian mind regarded Time as a circular
movement; the glory of elucidating the true nature of the historical process as a
perpetually creative movement was reserved for the great Muslim thinker and historian,
Thn Khaldun.

The intensity of feeling which the Indian Muslims have manifested in opposition
to the Qadiani movement is, therefore, perfectly intelligible to the student of modern
sociology. The average Muslim, who was the other day described as nzulla-ridden by a
writer in The Civil and
Militaty Gazette, is inspired in his opposition to the movement more by his instinct of self-preservation than by a fuller grasp of the meaning of the ideal of Finality in his faith. The so-called “enlightened” Muslim has seldom made an attempt to understand the real cultural significance of the idea of Finality in Islam, and a process of slow and imperceptible Westernisation has further deprived him even of the instinct of self-preservation. Some of these so-called enlightened Muslims have gone to the extent of preaching “tolerance” to their brethren-in-faith. I can easily excuse Sir Herbert Emerson\(^1\) for preaching toleration to Muslims; for a modern European who is born and brought up in an entirely different culture does not, and perhaps cannot, develop the insight which makes it possible for one to understand an issue vital to the very structure of a community with an entirely different cultural outlook.

In India circumstances are much more peculiar. This country of religious communities, where the future of each community rests entirely upon its solidarity, is ruled by a Western people who cannot but adopt a policy of non-interference in religion. This liberal and indispensable policy in a country like India has led to most unfortunate results. In so far as Islam is concerned, it is no exaggeration to say that the solidarity of the Muslim community in India under the British is far less safe than the solidarity of the Jewish community in the days of Jesus under the Romans. Any religious adventurer in India can set up any claim and carve out a new community for his own exploitation. This liberal State of ours does not care a fig for the integrity of a parent community, provided the adventurer assures it of his loyalty and his followers are regular in the payment of taxes due to the State. The meaning of this policy for Islam was quite accurately seen by our great poet Akbar who in his usual humorous strain says:

\(^1\) Governor of the Punjab. (Ed.)
“O friends! pray for the glory of the Briton’s name, 
Say ‘I am God’ sans chain, sans cross, sans shame.”

I very much appreciate the orthodox Hindus demand for protection against religious reformers in the new constitution. Indeed, the demand ought to have been first made by the Muslims who, unlike the Hindus, entirely eliminate the race idea from their social structure. The Government must seriously consider the present situation and try, if possible, to understand the mentality of the average Muslim in regard to this issue which he regards as absolutely vital to the integrity of his community. After all, if the integrity of a community is threatened, the only course open to that community is to defend itself against the forces of disintegration.

And what are the ways of self-defence?

Controversial writings and refutations of the claims of the man who is regarded by the parent community as a religious adventurer. Is it then fair to preach toleration to the parent community whose integrity is threatened and to allow the rebellious group to carry on its propaganda with impunity, even when the propaganda is highly abusive?

If a group, rebellious from the point of view of the parent community, happens to be of some special service to Government, the latter are at liberty to reward their services as best they can. Other communities will not grudge it. But it is too much to expect that the community should calmly ignore the forces which tend seriously to affect its collective life. Collective life is as sensitive to the danger of dissolution as individual life, it is hardly necessary to add in this connection that the mutual theological bickerings of Muslim sects do not affect vital principles on which all these sects agree with all their differences in spite of their mutual accusations of heresy.
There is one further point which demands Government’s special consideration. The encouragement in India of religious adventurers on the ground of modern liberalism tends to make people more and more indifferent to religion and will eventually completely eliminate the important factor of religion from the life of Indian communities. The Indian mind will then seek some other substitute of religion, which is likely to be nothing less than the form of atheistic materialism which has appeared in Russia.

But the religious issue is not the only issue which is at present agitating the minds of the Punjab Muslims. There are other quarrels of a political nature to which, according to my reading, Sir Herbert Emerson hinted in his speech at the Anjuman’s anniversary. These are, no doubt, of a purely political nature, but they affect the unity of the Punjab Muslims as seriously as the religious issue. While thanking the Government for their anxiety to see the Punjab Muslims united, I venture to suggest a little self-examination to the Government themselves. Who is responsible, I ask, for the distinction of rural and urban Muslims—a distinction which has cut the Muslim community into two groups and the rural group into several sub-groups constantly at war with one another?

Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of proper leadership among the Punjab Muslims. But I wish Sir Herbert Emerson realised that the rural-urban distinction created by the Government and maintained by them through ambitious political adventures whose eyes are fixed on their own personal interests and not on the unity of Islam in the Punjab has already made the community incapable of producing a real leader. It appears to me that this device probably originated in a desire rather to make it impossible for real leadership to grow. Sir Herbert Emerson deplores the lack of leadership in Muslims; I deplore the continuation

2. Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam, Lahore. (Ed.)
by the Government of a system which has crushed out all hope of a real leader appearing
in the province.

Postscript

I understand that this statement has caused some misunderstanding in some
quarters. It is thought that I have made a subtle suggestion to the Government to suppress
the Qadiani movement by force. Nothing of the kind. I have made it clear that the policy
of non-interference in religion is the only policy which can be adopted by the rulers of
India. No other policy is possible. I confess, however, that to my mind this policy is
harmful to the interests of religious communities; but there is no escape from it and those
who suffer will have to safeguard their interests by suitable means. The best course for
the rulers of India is, in my opinion, to declare the Qadianis a separate community. This
will be perfectly consistent with the policy of the Qadianis themselves and the Indian
Muslim will tolerate them just as he tolerates the other religions.

(2)
Rejoinder to The Light, etc.

Criticising the foregoing statement, The Light (a Qadiani weekly) remarked: “Like
some other great thinkers, he (Dr. Iqhal) does not believe in the communion of man with
God through the instrumentality of what is known as verbal revelation.” Interviewed by a
Press representative about this accusation, Dr. Iqhal said: The Light bases its accusation
on an Urdu verse of mine.
This is plain Urdu and only means that there is a higher stage in the spiritual life of man than verbal communion. But the verse has nothing to do with the doctrine of verbal revelation as a theological doctrine for which I must refer The Light to my Reconstruction in which I wrote on page 21:

The organic relation of feeling and idea throws light on the old theological controversy about verbal revelation which once gave so much trouble to Muslim religious thinkers. Inarticulate feeling seeks to fulfil its destiny in idea which, in its turn, tends to develop out of itself its own visible garment. It is no mere metaphor to say that idea and word both simultaneously emerge out of the womb of feeling, though logical understanding cannot but take them in a temporal order and then create its own difficulty by regarding them as mutually isolated. There is a sense in which the word is also revealed.

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Questioned about the tradition quoted by The Light that inujaddids appear at the head of every century, Dr. Iqbal replied:

The editor of The Light quotes a tradition which gives a mathematically exact picture of the historical process. While I do believe in man’s spiritual capacity and the possibility of the birth of spiritual men, I am not sure that the historical process is so mathematical as The Light thinks. We can easily confess that it is beyond our intellectual capacity to understand the nature of the historical process. All that I can negatively say is that it does not appear to me to be as fixed and mathematically exact as The Light thinks. I am rather inclined to Ibn Khaldun’s view which regards the historical process as a free creative movement and not a process which

3. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. (Ed.)
III. Islam and Qadianism

has already been worked out with definite landmarks. This view has been put forward in modern times by Bergson with much greater wealth of illustration and scientific accuracy than by Ibn Khaldun. The tradition quoted by The Light was probably popularised by Jalal-ud-Din Suyuti in his own interest and much importance cannot be attached to it. It is not mentioned in Bukhari and Muslim, the two books which are believed to be most reliable, it may embody a vision of the nature of the historical process by some spiritual men, but this personal vision of the individuals can form no basis for logical argument. This is the rule which expert traditionists have always observed.

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Questioned whether he had seen a letter published in The Sunrise (another Qadiani weekly) in which the writer had referred to a lecture of Dr. Iqbal and accused him of inconsistency, the Doctor replied:

Yes: I am sorry I have no copy of the lecture in question either in the original English or in the Urdu translation which was made by Maulana Zafat Ali Khan. As far as I remember, the lecture was delivered in 1911, or perhaps earlier. I have no hesitation in admitting that about a quarter of a century ago I had hopes of good results following from this movement. Earlier still, even that eminent Muslim, the late Maulvi Chiragh Ali, the author of several English books on Islam, co-operated with the founder of the movement and, I understand, made valuable contributions to the book called Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya. But the real content and spirit of a religious movement does not reveal itself in a day. It takes decades to unfold itself. The internal quarrels between the two sections of the movement is evidence of the fact that even those who were in personal contact with the founder were not quite aware of how the
movement would evolve itself. Personally, I became suspicious of the movement when the claim of a new prophethood, superior even to the Prophethood of the Founder of Islam, was definitely put forward, and the Muslim world was declared Kafir. Later my suspicions developed into a positive revolt when I heard with my own ears an adherent of the movement mentioning the Holy Prophet of Islam in a most disparaging language. Not by their roots but by their fruits will you know them. If my present attitude is self-contradictory, then, well, only a living and thinking man has the privilege of contradicting himself. Only stones do not contradict themselves, as Emerson says.

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Questioned about the possibility of divine inspiration and the advent of inspired reformers after the Holy Prophet, Dr. Iqbal replied:

I had better answer this question by referring you to my Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, in which I wrote on pp. 120-21:

The idea of finality... should not be taken to suggest that the ultimate fate of life is complete displacement of emotion by reason. Such a thing is neither possible nor desirable. The intellectual value of the idea is that it tends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating the belief that all personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin, has come to an end in the history of man. This kind of belief is a psychological force which inhibits the growth of such authority. The function of the idea is to open up fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man’s inner experience. Just as the first half of the formula of Islam has created and fostered the spirit of critical observation of man’s outer experience by divesting the forces of Nature of that divine character with which earlier cultures had clothed them.
Mystic experience, then, however unusual and abnormal, must now be regarded by the Muslim as a perfectly natural experience, open to critical scrutiny like other aspects of human experience. This is clear from the Prophet’s own attitude towards Ibn-i-Sayyad’s psychic experience. The function of Sufism in Islam has been to systematize mystic experience; though it must be admitted that Ibn-i-Khaldun was the only Muslim who approached it in a thoroughly scientific spirit.

The opening sentence clearly shows that saints in the psychological sense of the word or men of saintly character will always appear. Whether Mirza Sahib belonged to this category or not is a separate question. Indeed as long as the spiritual capacity of mankind endures, they will rise among all nations and countries in order to show better ideals of life to man. To hold otherwise would be to fly in the face of human experience. The only difference is that the modern man has the right to critical examination of their mystic experiences. The Finality of the Prophethood means, among other things, that all personal authority in religious life, denial of which involves damnation, has come to an end.

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Questioned about a letter published in The Statesman from Mr Dinshaw, a Parsi gentleman, Dr. Iqbal said:

I have got nothing to say about it, except that I fully agree with his main thesis that to the Persian element belongs a very rich role in the external as well as the internal history of Islam. This Persia-n influence is so extensive that Spengler has been misled by Magian overlaying of Islam and has practically taken Islam for a Magian religion. In my Reconstruction I have made an attempt to divest Islam of its Magian encrustations and I hope to be able to do further work in this direction in my Introduction to the Study of the
Magian thought and religious experience very much permeate Muslim theology, philosophy and Sufism. Indeed there is evidence to show that certain schools of Sufism now known as Islamic have only repeated the Magian type of religious experience. I regard Magian culture as one form among other forms of human culture and did not use the term as a sort of stigma. It had its ruling concepts, its philosophical discussions, its truths and its errors. But when a culture begins to show signs of decay, its philosophical discussions, its concepts and its forms of religious experience become fixed and immobile. It was at that time in the history of Magian culture that Islam appeared and, according to my reading of cultural history, entered a strong protest against that culture. There is definite evidence in the Quran itself to show that Islam aimed at opening up new channels not only of thought but of religious experience as well. Our Magian inheritance, however, has stifled the life of Islam and never allowed the development of its real spirit and aspirations.

(3)

A Letter to The Statesman *

[The Statesman published Dr. Iqbal’s statement on “Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims” along with a criticism of it in the first leader. The following letter was in reply addressed to The Statesman and was published on 10 June 1935.]

I am very thankful to you for your critical leader on my statement which was published in your issue of the 14th May. The question which you have raised in your leader is a very important one, and I am really very glad that you have raised it. I did not raise it in my statement because I felt

4. So far as-is known this Introduction was never written. (Ed.)

* More than two-thirds of this letter was reproduced in Islam, Lahore, 22 June 1935.
that, considering the separatist policy of the Qadianis, which they have consistently pursued in religious and social matters ever since the birth of the idea of building a new community on the foundations of a rival prophethood and the intensity of the Muslim feeling against this move, it was rather the duty of the Government to take administrative cognizance of such a fundamental difference between the Qadianis and the Muslims without waiting for a formal representation on behalf of the Muslim community of India. I was encouraged in this feeling by the Government’s attitude in the matter of the Sikh community which till 1919 was not administratively regarded as a separate political unit but which was later treated as such without any formal representation on the part of the Sikhs, in spite of the Lahore High Court’s finding that the Sikhs were Hindus.

However, now that you have raised this question I should like to offer a few observations on a matter which I regard as of the highest importance both from the British and the Muslim points of view. You want me ‘to make it perfectly clear whether, when or where I can tolerate official cognizance of any one community’s religious differences. Let me point out:

First, that Islam is essentially a religious community with perfectly defined boundaries belief in the Unity of God, belief in all the Prophets and belief in the finality of Muhammad’s Prophethood. The last mentioned belief is really the factor which accurately draws the line of demarcation between Muslims and non-Muslims and enables one to decide whether a certain individual or group is a part of community or not. For example, the Brahmos believe in God, they also regard Muhammad (on whom be peace) as one of the Prophets of God, yet they cannot be regarded as part and parcel of Islam because they, like the Qadian is, believe in the theory of perpetual revelation through prophets and do not believe in the Finality of Prophethood in Muhammad. No Islamic sect, as far as I
know, has ever ventured to cross this line of demarcation. The Bahais in Persia have openly rejected the principle of Finality but have at the same time frankly admitted that they are a new community and not Muslims in the technical sense of the word. According to our belief, Islam as a religion was revealed by God, but the existence of Islam as a society or nation depends entirely on the personality of the Holy Prophet. In my opinion, only two courses are open to the Qadianis, either frankly to follow the Bahais or to eschew their interpretations of the idea of Finality in Islam and to accept the idea with all its implications. Their diplomatic interpretations are dictated merely by a desire to remain within the fold of Islam for obvious political advantages.

Secondly, we must not forget the Qadianis’ own policy and their attitude towards the world of Islam. The founder of the movement described the parent community as “rotten milk” and his own followers as “fresh milk”, warning the latter against mixing with the former. Further, their denial of fundamentals, their giving themselves a new name (Ahmadis) as a community, their non-participation in congregational prayers of Islam, their social boycott of Muslims in the matter of matrimony, etc., and above all their declaration that the entire world of Islam is Kafir—all these things constitute an unmistakable declaration of separation by the Qadianis themselves. Indeed the facts’ mentioned above clearly show that they are far more distant from Islam than the Sikhs from Hinduisim, for the Sikhs at least intermarry with the Hindus, even though they do not worship in the Hindu temples.

Thirdly, it does not require any special intelligence to see why the Qadianis, while pursuing a policy of separation in religious and social matters, are anxious to remain politically within the fold of Islam. Apart from the political advantages in the sphere of Government service which accrue to them by remaining within the fold of Islam, it is obvious that in view of their present population, which, according to the last
census, is fifty-six thousand only, they are not entitled even to a single seat in any legislature of the country and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a political minority in the sense in which you seem to be using the expression. The fact that the Qadianis have not so far asked for separation as a distinct political unit shows that in their present position they do not find themselves entitled to any representation in legislative bodies. The new constitution is not without provisions for the protection of such minorities. To my mind, it is clear that in the matter of approaching the Government for separation the Qadianis will never take the initiative. The Muslim community is perfectly justified in demanding their immediate separation from the parent community. If the Government does not immediately agree to this demand, the Indian Muslims will be driven to the suspicion that the British Government is keeping the new religion in store, as it were, and delaying the separation because in view of the small number of it adherents, it is, for the present, incapable of functioning as a fourth community in the province which may effectively damage the already marginal majority of Punjab Muslims in the local legislature. The Government did not wait for a formal representation for separation by the Sikhs in 1919: why should they wait for a formal representation by the Qadianis?

(4)

Jewish Integrity under Roman Rule *

[The special representative of the fortnightly Islam asked Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal whether his views had been correctly stated by Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud of Qadian in the following passage of his recent Friday sermon reported in the Qadiani paper Sunrise:

* Islam, 22 June 1935, p.3.
He has a grievance against the Government when he says that the British have not been even as wise as were the Romans in the days of Jesus, for the Romans after all crucified Jesus. This is nothing but approving the action of the Romans when they capitulated their own authority and made over Jesus to the Jews, having been influenced by the fanatical clamour of the latter.

“I draw your special attention to the words ‘approving the action of the Romans’ in the above passage,” said our special representative, “with a view to discover whether such a sentence does occur in your statement on the Finality of the Holy Prophet of Islam published sometime back in the Indian and Anglo-Indian press.” Sir Muhammad Iqbal said:

This is a typical instance of the Qadiani art of misrepresentation. Mirza Mahmud reads in my statement a sentence which he does not quote and which I have not been able to find in that statement. The fact of the matter seems to be that he imagines certain thoughts of his own to be a specific sentence. It is obvious that since he has got nothing to say against the main point of my statement he means only to hoodwink his poor followers and perhaps also the Government into the belief that since I think the Jews better protected under the Romans than the Indian Muslims under the British, it follows, therefore, that I regard the Roman Governor’s approval of the decision of the Jewish Synod as a virtuous act. No greater misrepresentation can be imagined. It was not my intention to pass a moral judgment on the Romans. My statement viewed the situation from a purely political and not from a moral point of view. The whole point is that the Romans considered themselves to be constitutionally bound to approve the decision of the Jewish Synod in matters which the Jews, rightly or wrongly, regarded as dangerous to the integrity of their society. In the particular instance of the trial of Jesus (may the peace of Allah be on him) it was unfortunate that the Romans, as a
State, had to accept the Synod’s demand in connection with a man who, according to our belief, happened to be a genuine prophet. Had it been a case of a religious adventurer, nobody would have morally blamed the Romans for their approval of the Synod’s decision or the Jews for their demand for the trial. Personally I cannot deny the value of the constitutional protection given by the Romans to the Jews even though I take a different view of the moral valuation of that protection. It is probable that one day the Qadianis themselves may seek protection against their own rebel prophets for whom the Qadiani vulgarisation of Islamic religious ideas has made it possible to grow and prosper. Any one of them may, at any time, gather sufficient strength and following to threaten the present organisation of that community. To me it is a matter of surprise that a community which has, for its birth and growth, depended entirely upon the liberalism of a modern State should resent my demand for the protection of Islam against religious adventurers.

The Qadiani logic, again, sees in my statement the suggestion that the British Government ought to have suppressed the Qadiani movement by force. I have made it perfectly clear in my statement that the policy of noninterference in religion is “indispensable” in India which is pre-eminently a country of religious communities. I am no admirer of liberalism and regard it as a set of ideas which tend to make man what he ought not to be; yet I cannot deny it as a powerful force in the modern world. It seems that Mirza Mahmud either does not understand the meaning of the word “indispensable” or conveniently ignores it altogether.

The Romans might have recognised Jesus and his followers as a new religious community, but this method of protecting the Jewish society was not open to them as at the time when Jesus was brought before Pilate he had practically no followers. It is, however, open to British in India to
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administratively recognise the Qadianis as a separate community. I honestly believe that this is the only way to peace. Nor ought the Qadianis to be anxious to remain as a part and parcel of a community which they regard as a community of infidels.

(5) Islam and Ahmadism *

On the appearance of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru’s three articles in the Modern Review of Calcutta I received a number of letters from Muslims of different shades of religious and political opinion. Some writers of these letters want me to further elucidate and justify the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards the Ahmadis. Others ask me what exactly I regard as the issue involved in Ahmadism. In this statement I propose first to meet these demands which I regard as perfectly legitimate, and then to answer the questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. I fear, however, that parts of this statement may not interest the Pandit, and to save his time I suggest that he may skip over such parts.

It is hardly necessary for me to say that I welcome the Pandit’s interest in what I regard as one of the greatest problems of the East and perhaps of the whole world. He is, I believe, the first Nationalist Indian leader who has expressed a desire to understand the present spiritual unrest in the world of Islam. In view of the many aspects and possible reactions of this unrest it is highly desirable that thoughtful Indian political leaders should open their mind to

* This is a reply to the questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in his criticism of Allama Iqbal’s statement on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims. Nehru’s criticism had appeared under the title Solidarity of Islam --comment on Iqbal’s Article, in the Modern Review of Calcutta and the Allama’s reply to the Pandit was published in the Islam of Lahore in January 1936.
the real meaning of what is, at the present moment, agitating the heart of Islam.

I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact either from the Pandit or from any other reader of this statement that the Pandit’s articles have for the moment given my mind rather a painful conflict of feelings. Knowing him to be a man of wide cultural sympathies, my mind cannot but incline to the view that his desire to understand the questions he has raised is perfectly genuine; yet the way in which he has expressed himself betrays a psychology which I find difficult to attribute to him. I am inclined to think that my statement on Qadianism5 no more than a mere exposition of a religious doctrine on modern lines—has embarrassed both the Pandit and the Qadianis perhaps because both inwardly resent, for different reasons, the prospects of Muslims political and religious solidarity, particularly in India. It is obvious that the Indian Nationalist, whose political idealism has practically killed his sense for fact, is intolerant of the birth of a desire for self-determination in the heart of north-west Indian Islam. He thinks wrongly in my opinion, that the only way to Indian Nationalism lies in a total suppression of the cultural entities of the country through the inter-action of which India can evolve a rich and enduring culture. A nationalism achieved by such methods can mean nothing but mutual bitterness and even oppression. It is equally obvious that the Qadianis, too, feel nervous by the political awakening of the Indian Muslims, because they feel that the rise in political prestige of the Indian Muslims is sure to defeat their designs to carve out from the ummat of the Arabian Prophet a new ummat for the Indian ‘prophet’. It is no small surprise to me that my effort to impress on the Indian Muslims the extreme necessity of internal cohesion in the present critical moment of their history in India, and my warning them against the forces of disintegration, masquerading as reformist movements, should have given

the Pandit an occasion to sympathise with such force.

However, I do not wish to pursue the unpleasant task of analysing the Pandit’s motives. For the benefit of those who want further elucidation of” the general Muslim attitude towards. the Qadianis, I would quote a passage from Durant’s Story of Philosophy which, I hope, will give the reader a clear idea of the issue involved in Qadianism. Durant has in a few sentences summed up the Jewish point of view in the excommunication of the great philosopher Spinoza. The reader must not think that in quoting this passage I mean to insinuate some sort of comparison between Spinoza and the founder of Ahmadism. The distance between them, both in point of intellect and character, is simply tremendous. The “God-intoxicated” Spinoza never claimed that he was the centre of a new organisation and that all the Jews who did not believe in him were outside the pale of Judaism. Durant’s passage, therefore, applies with much greater force to the attitude of Muslims towards Qadianism than to the attitude of the Jews towards the excommunication of Spinoza. The passage is as follows:

Fur thermore, religious unanimity seemed to the elders their sole means of preserving the little Jewish group in Amsterdam from disintegration, and almost the last means of preserving the unity, and so ensuring the survival of the scattered Jews of the world. If they had their own state, their own civil law, their own establishments of secular force and power, to compel internal cohesion and external respect, they might have been more tolerant; but their religion was to them their patriotism as well as their faith; the synagogue was their centre of social and political life as well as of ritual and worship; and the. Bible, whose veracity Spinoza had impugned, was the “Portable Fatherland” of their people; under the circumstances they thought heresy was treason, and toleration suicide.

Situated as the Jews were—a minority community in
Amsterdam — they were perfectly justified in regarding Spinoza as a disintegrating factor threatening the dissolution of their community. Similarly the Indian Muslims are right in regarding the Qadiani movement, which declares the entire world of Islam as Kafir and socially boycotts them, to be far more dangerous to the collective life of Islam in India than the metaphysics of Spinoza to the collective life of the Jews. The Indian Muslim, I believe, instinctively realises the peculiar nature of the circumstances in which he is placed in India and is naturally much more sensitive to the forces of disintegration than the Muslims of any other country. This instinctive perception of the average Muslim is in my opinion absolutely correct and has, I have no doubt, a much deeper foundation in the conscience of Indian Islam. Those who talk of toleration in a matter like this are extremely careless in using the word toleration which I fear they do not understand at all. The spirit of toleration may arise from very different attitudes of the mind of man. As Gibbon would say:

There is the toleration of the philosopher to whom all religions are equally true; of the historian to whom all are equally false; and of the politician to whom all are equally useful. There is the toleration of the man who tolerates other modes of thought and behaviour because he has himself grown absolutely indifferent to all modes of thought and behaviour. There is the toleration of the weak man who, on account of sheer weakness, must pocket all kinds of insults heaped on things or persons that he holds dear.

It is obvious that these types of tolerance have no ethical value. On the other hand, they unmistakably reveal the spiritual impoverishment of the man who practises them. True toleration is begotten of intellectual breadth and spiritual expansion. It is the toleration of the spiritually powerful man who, while jealous of the frontiers of his own faith, can tolerate and even appreciate all forms of faith other than his own. Of this type of toleration the true
Muslim alone is capable. His own faith is synthetic and for this reason he can easily find grounds of sympathy and appreciation in other faiths. Our great Indian poet, Amir Khusro, beautifully brings out the essence of this type of toleration in the story of an idol-worshipper. After giving an account of his intense attachment to his idols the poet addresses his Muslim readers as follows:

Only a true lover of God can appreciate the value of devotion even though it is directed to gods in which he himself does not believe. The folly of our preachers of toleration consists in describing the attitude of the man who is jealous of the boundaries of his own faith as one of intolerance. They wrongly consider this attitude as a sign of moral inferiority. They do not understand that the value of his attitude is essentially biological. Where the members of a group feel, either instinctively or on the basis of rational argument, that the corporate life of the social organism to which they belong is in danger, their defensive attitude must be appraised in reference mainly to a biological criterion. Every thought or deed in this connection must be judged by the life-value that it may possess. The question in this case is not whether the attitude of an individual or community towards the man who is declared to be a heretic is morally good or bad. The question is whether it is life-giving or life destroying. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru seems to think that a society founded on religious principles necessitates the institution of Inquisition. This is indeed true of the history of Christianity; but the history of Islam, contrary to the Pandit’s logic, shows that during the last thirteen hundred years of the life of Islam, the institution of Inquisition has been absolutely unknown in Muslim countries. The Quran expressly prohibited such an institution. “Do not seek out the shortcomings of others and carry not tales against your brethren.” Indeed the Pandit will find from the history of
Islam that the Jews and Christians, fleeing from religious persecution in their own lands, always found shelter in the lands of Islam. The two propositions on which the conceptual structure of Islam is based are so simple that it makes heresy in the sense of turning the heretic outside the fold of Islam almost impossible. It is true that when a person declared to be holding heretical doctrines threatens the existing social order, an independent Muslim State will certainly take action; but in such a case the action of the State will be determined more by political considerations than by purely religious ones. I can very well realise that a man like the Pandit, who is born and brought up in a society which has no well-defined boundaries and consequently no internal cohesion, finds it difficult to conceive that a religious society can live and prosper without State-appointed commissions of enquiry into the beliefs of the people. This is quite clear from the passage which he quotes from Cardinal Newman and wonders how far I would accept the application of the Cardinal’s dictum to Islam. Let me tell him that there is a tremendous difference between the inner structure of Islam and Catholicism wherein the complexity, the ultra-rational character and the number of dogmas has, as the history of Christianity shows, always fostered possibilities of fresh heretical interpretations. The simple faith of Muhammad is based on two propositions that God is One, and that Muhammad is the last of the line of those holy men who have appeared, from time to time in all countries and in all ages, to guide mankind to the right ways of living. If, as some Christian writers think, a dogma must be defined as an ultra-rational proposition which for the purpose of securing religious solidarity must be assented to without any understanding of its metaphysical import, then these two simple propositions of Islam cannot be described even as dogmas; for both of them are supported by the experience of mankind and are fairly amenable to rational argument. The question of a heresy, which needs the verdict, whether the author of it is within or without the fold, can arise, in the case of a religious society founded on such
It is true that mutual accusations of heresy for differences in minor points of law and theology among Muslim religious sects have been rather common. In this indiscriminate use of the word kufr both for minor theological points of difference as well as for the extreme cases of heresy, which involve the excommunication of the heretic, some present-day educated Muslims, who possess practically no knowledge of the history of Muslim theological disputes, see a sign of social and political disintegration of the Muslim community. This, however, is an entirely wrong notion. The history of Muslim theology shows that mutual accusation of heresy on minor points of difference has, far from working as a disruptive force, actually given an impetus to synthetic theological thought. “When we read the history of development of Mohammadan Law,” says Prof. Hurgronje, “we find that, on the one hand, the doctors of every age, on the slightest stimulus, condemn one another” to the point of mutual accusations of heresy; and, on the other hand, the very same people with greater and greater unity of purpose try to reconcile the similar quarrels of their predecessors.” The student of Muslim theology knows that among Muslim legists this kind of heresy is technically known as “heresy below heresy,” i.e. the kind of heresy which does not involve the excommunication of the culprit. It may be admitted, however, that in the hands of niullas whose intellectual laziness takes all oppositions of theological thought as
absolute and is consequently blind to the unity in difference, this minor heresy may
become a source of great mischief. This mischief can be remedied only by giving to the
students of our theological schools a clearer vision of the synthetic spirit of Islam, and by
reinitiating them into the function of logical contradiction as a principle of movement in
theological dialectic. The question of what may be called major heresy arises only when
the teaching of a thinker or a reformer affects the frontiers of the faith of Islam. Unfortu-
nately this question does arise in connection with the teachings of Qadianism. It
must be pointed out here that the Ahmadi movement is divided into two camps known as
the Qadianis and the-Lahoris. The former openly declare the founder to be a full prophet;
the latter, either by conviction or policy, have found it advisable to preach an apparently
toned down Qadianism. However, the question whether the founder of Ahmadism was a
prophet, the denial of whose mission entails what I call the “major heresy” is a matter of
dispute between the two sections. It is unnecessary for my purposes to judge the merits of
this domestic controversy of the Ahmadi. I believe, for reasons to be explained
presently, that the idea of a full prophet whose denial entails the denier’s
excommunication from Islam is essential to Ahmadism; and that the present head of the
Qadianis is far more consistent with the spirit of the movement than the Imam of the
Lahoris.

The cultural value of the idea of Finality in Islam I have fully explained elsewhere.
Its meaning is simple: No spiritual surrender to any human being after Muhammad who
emancipated his followers by giving them a law which is realisable as arising from the
very core of human conscience. Theologically the doctrine is that the socio-political
organisation called “Islam” is perfect and eternal. No revelation, the denial of which
entails heresy, is possible after Muhammad. He who claims such a revelation is a traitor
to Islam. Since the Qadianis believe the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement to be the
bearer of such a
revelation, they declare that the entire world of Islam is infidel. The founder’s own argument, quite worthy of a mediaeval theologian, is that the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam must be regarded as imperfect if it is not creative of another prophet. He claims his own prophethood to be an evidence of the prophet rearing power of the spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam. But if you further ask him whether the spirituality of Muhammad is capable of rearing more prophets than one, his answer is “No.” This virtually amounts to saying: “Muhammad is not the last Prophet; I am the last.” Far from understanding the cultural value of the Islamic idea of Finality in the history of mankind generally and of Asia especially, he thinks that Finality in the sense that no follower of Muhammad can ever reach the status of Prophethood is a mark of imperfection in Muhammad’s Prophethood. As I read the psychology of his mind he, in the interest of his own claim to prophethood, avails himself of what he describes as the creative spirituality of the Holy Prophet of Islam and at the same time deprives the Holy Prophet of his Finality by limiting the creative capacity of his spirituality to the rearing of only one prophet, i.e. the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement. In this way does the new prophet quietly steal away the Finality of one whom he claims to be his spiritual progenitor.

He claims to be buruz (____) of the Holy Prophet of Islam insinuating thereby that, being a buruz, his “finality” is virtually the Finality of Muhammad; and that this view of the matter, therefore, does not violate the Finality of the Holy Prophet. In identifying the two finalities, his own and that of the Holy Prophet, he conveniently loses sight of the temporal meaning of the idea of finality. It is, however, obvious that the word buruz, in the sense eveil of complete likeness, cannot help him at all; for the buruz must always remain the other side of its original. Only in the sense of reincarnation a buruz becomes identical with the original. Thus if we take word buruz to mean “like in spiritual
III. Islam and Qadianism

qualities” the argument remains ineffective; on the other hand, we take it to mean reincarnation of the original in the Aryan sense of the word, the argument becomes plausible; but its author turns out to be only a Magian in disguise.

It is further claimed on the authority of the great Muslim mystic, Muhyuddin Ibn-al-’Arabi of Spain, that it is possible for a Muslim saint to attain, in his spiritual evolution, to the kind of experience characteristic of the Prophetic consciousness. I personally believe this view of Sheikh Muhyuddin Ibn-al-’Arabi to be psychologically unsound; but assuming it to be correct, the Qadiani argument is based on a complete misunderstanding of his exact position. The Sheikh regards it as a purely private achievement which does not, and in the nature of things cannot, entitle such a saint to declare that all those who do not believe in him are outside the pale of Islam. Indeed, from the Sheikh’s point of view, there may be more than one saint, living in the same age or country, who may attain to Prophetic consciousness. The point to be seized is that while it is psychologically possible for a saint to attain to Prophetic experience his experience will have no socio-political significance making him the centre of a new organisation and entitling him to declare this organisation to be the criterion of the faith or disbelief of the followers of Muhammad.

Leaving his mystical psychology aside I am convinced from a careful study of the relevant passage of the Futuhat that the great Spanish mystic is as firm a believer in the Finality of Muhammad as any orthodox Muslim. And if he had seen in his mystical vision that one day in the east some Indian amateur in Sufism would seek to destroy the Holy Prophet’s Finality under cover of his mystical psychology, he would have certainly anticipated the Indian ule, na in warning the Muslims of the world against such traitors to Islam.
II

Coming now to the essence of Ahmadism. A discussion of its sources and of the way in which pre-Islamic Magian ideas have, through the channels of Islamic mysticism, worked on the mind of its author would be extremely interesting from the standpoint of comparative religion. It is, however, impossible for me to undertake this discussion here. Suffice it to say that the real nature of Ahmadism is hidden behind the mist of mediaeval mysticism and theology. The Indian ulema, therefore, took it to be a purely theological movement and came out with theological weapons to deal with it. I believe, however, that this was not the proper method of dealing with the movement; and that the success of the ulema was, therefore, only partial. A careful psychological analysis of the revelations of the founder would perhaps be an effective method of dissecting the inner life of his personality. In this connection I may mention Maulvi Manzoor Elahi’s collection of the founder’s revelations which offers rich and varied material for psychological research. In my opinion the book provides a key to the character and personality of the founder; and I do hope that one day some young student of modern psychology will take it up for serious study. If he takes the Quran for his criterion, as he must for reasons which cannot be explained here, and extends his study to a comparative examination of the experiences of the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement and contemporary non-Muslim mystics, such an Rama Krishna of Bengal, he is sure to meet more than one surprise as to the essential character of the experience on the basis of which prophethood is claimed for the originator of Ahmadism.

Another equally effective and more fruitful method, from the standpoint of the plain man, is to understand the real content of Ahmadism in the light of the history of Muslim theological thought in India, at least from the year 1799. The
year 1799 is extremely important in the history of the world of Islam. In this year fell Tippu, and his fall meant the extinguishment of Muslim hopes for political prestige in India. In the same year was fought the battle of Navarino which saw the destruction of the Turkish fleet. Prophetic were the words of the author of the chronogram of Tippu’s fall which visitors of Serangapatam find engraved on the wall of Tippu’s mausoleum: “Gone is the glory of Ind as well as of Roum.” Thus in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam in Asia reached its climax. But just as out of the humiliation of Germany on the day of Jena arose the modern German nation, it may be said with equal truth that out of the political humiliation of Islam in the year 1799 arose modern Islam and her problems. This point I shall explain in the sequel. For the present I want to draw the reader’s attention to some questions which have arisen in Muslim India since the fall of Tippu and the development of European imperialism in Asia.

Does the idea of Caliphate in Islam embody a religious institution? How are the Indian Muslims and for that matter all the Muslims outside the Turkish Empire related to the Turkish Caliphate? Is India Dar-ul-Harb or Dar-ul-Islam? What is the real meaning of the doctrine of Jihad in Islam? What is the meaning of the expression “from amongst you” in the Quranic verse: “Obey God, obey the Prophet and the masters of the affairs (i.e. rulers) from amongst you?” What is the character of the traditions of the Prophet foretelling the advent of Imam Mehdi? These questions and some others which arose subsequently were, for obvious reasons, questions for Indian Muslims only. European imperialism, however, which was then rapidly penetrating the world of Islam was also intimately interested in them. The controversies which these questions created form a most interesting chapter in the history of Islam in India. The story is a long one and is still waiting for a powerful pen. Muslim politicians whose eyes were mainly fixed on the realities of the situation succeeded in winning over a section of the
ulema to adopt a line of theological argument which, as they thought, suited the situation; but it was not easy to conquer by mere logic the beliefs which had ruled for centuries the conscience of the masses of Islam in India. In such a situation logic can either proceed on the ground of political expediency or on the lines of a fresh orientation of texts and traditions. In either case the argument will fail to appeal to the masses. To the intensely religious masses of Islam only one thing can make a conclusive appeal, and that is Divine Authority. For an effective eradication of orthodox beliefs it was found necessary to find a revelational basis for a politically suitable orientation of theological doctrines involved in the questions mentioned above. This revelational basis is provided by Ahmadism. And the Ahamdis themselves claim this to be the greatest service rendered by them to British imperialism. The prophetic claim to a revelational basis for theological views of a political significance amounts to declaring that those who do not accept the claimant’s views are infidel of the first water and destined for the flames of Hell. As I understand the significance of the movement, the Ahmadi belief that Christ died the death of an ordinary mortal, and that his second advent means only the advent of a person who is spiritually “like unto him,” gives the movement some sort of a rational appearance; but they are not really essential to the spirit of the movement, in my opinion they are only preliminary steps towards the idea of full prophethood which alone can serve the purposes of the movement eventually brought into being by new political forces. In primitive countries it is not logic but authority that appeals. Given a sufficient amount of ignorance, credulity which strangely enough sometimes coexists with good intelligence, and a person sufficiently audacious to declare himself a recipient of Divine revelation whose denial would entail eternal damnation, it is easy, in a subject Muslim country, to invent a political servility. And in the Punjab even an ill-woven net of vague theological expressions can easily capture the innocent peasant who has been for centuries exposed to all kinds of exploitation.
Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru advises the orthodox of all religions to unite and thus to delay the coming of what he conceives to be Indian nationalism. This ironical advice assumes that Ahmadism is a reform movement; he does not know that as far as Islam in India is concerned, Ahmadism involves both religious and political issues of the highest importance. As I have explained above, the function of Ahmadism in the history of Muslim religious thought is to furnish a revelational basis for India’s present political subjugation. Leaving aside the purely religious issues, on the ground of political issues alone, I think, it does not lie in the mouth of a in-an like Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to accuse Indian Muslims of reactionary conservatism. I have no doubt that if he had grasped the real nature of Ahmadism he would have very much appreciated the attitude of Indian Muslims towards a religious movement which claims Divine authority for the woes of India.

Thus the reader will see that the pallor of Ahmadism which we find on the cheeks of Indian Islam today is not an abrupt phenomenon in the history of Muslim religious thought in India. The ideas which eventually shaped themselves in the form of this movement became prominent in theological discussions long before the founder of Ahmadism was born. Nor do I mean to insinuate that the founder of Ahmadism and his companions deliberately planned their programme. I dare say the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement did hear a voice; but whether this voice came from the God of Life and Power or arose out of the spiritual impoverishment of the people must depend upon the nature of the movement which it has created and the kind of thought and emotion which it has given to those who have listened to it. The reader must not think that I am using metaphorical language The live-history of nations shows that when the tide of life in a people begins to ebb, decadence itself becomes a source of inspiration, inspiring their poets, philosophers, saints, statesmen, and turning them into a class of apostles whose sole ministry is to glorify,
by the force of a seductive art of logic, all that is ignoble and ugly in the life of their people. Those apostles unconsciously clothe despair in the glittering garment of hope, undermine the traditional values of conduct and thus destroy the spiritual virility of those who happen to be their victims. One can only imagine the rotten state of a people’s will who are, on the basis of Divine authority, made to accept their political environment as final. Thus all the actors who participated in the drama of Ahmadism were, I think, only innocent instruments in the hands of decadence. A similar drama had already been acted in Perisa; but it did not lead, arid could not have led, to the religious and political issues which Ahmadism has created for Islam in India. Russia offered tolerance to Babism and allowed the Babis to open their first missionary centre in Ashkabad. England showed Ahmadis the same tolerance in allowing them to open their first missionary centre in Woking. Whether Russia and England showed this tolerance on the ground of imperial expediency or pure broad-mindedness is difficult for us to decide. This much is absolutely clear that this tolerance has created difficult problems for Islam in Asia. In view of the structure of Islam, as I understand it, I have not the least doubt in my mind that Islam will emerge purer out of the difficulties thus created for her. Times are changing. Things in India have already taken a new turn. The new spirit of democracy which is coming to India is sure to disillusion the Ahmadis and to convince them of the absolute futility of their theological inventions.

Nor will Islam tolerate any revival of mediaeval mysticism which has already robbed its followers of their healthy instincts and given them only obscure thinking in return. It has, during the course of the past centuries, absorbed the best minds of Islam leaving the affairs of the State to mere mediocrities. Modern Islam cannot afford to repeat the experiment. Nor can it tolerate a repetition of the Punjab experiment of keeping Muslims occupied for half a century in theological problems which had absolutely no bearing on
III. Islam and Qadianism

III

Let me now turn to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru’s questions. I fear the Pandit’s articles reveal practically no acquaintance with Islam or its religious history during the nineteenth century. Nor does he seem to have read what I have already written on the subject of his questions. It is not possible for me to reproduce here all that I have written before. Nor is it possible to write here a religious history of Islam in the nineteenth century without which a thorough understanding of the present situation in the world of Islam is impossible. Hundreds of books and articles have been written on Turkey and modern Islam. I have read most of this literature and probably the Pandit has also read it. I assure him, however, that not one of these writers understands the nature of the effect or of the cause that has brought about that effect. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly indicate the main currents of Muslim thought in Asia during the nineteenth century.

I have said above that in the year 1799 the political decay of Islam reached its climax. There can, however, be no greater testimony to the inner vitality of Islam than the fact that it practically took no time to realise its position in the world. During the nineteenth century were born Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani in Afghanistan and Mufti Alam Jan in Russia. These men were probably inspired by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab who was born in Nejd in 1700, the founder of the so-called Wahabi movement which may fitly be described as the first throb of life in modern Islam. The influence of Syed Ahmad Khan remained on the whole confined to India. It is probable,
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however, that he was the first modern Muslim to catch a glimpse of the positive character of the age which was coming. The remedy for the ills of Islam proposed by him, as by Mufti Alam Jan in Russia, was modern education. But the real greatness of the man consists in the fact that he was the first Indian Muslim who felt the need of a fresh orientation of Islam and worked for it. We may differ from his religious views, but there can be no denying the fact that his sensitive soul was the first to react to the modern age.

The extreme conservatism of Indian Muslims which had lost its hold on the realities of life failed to see the real meaning of the religious attitude of Syed Ahmad Khan. In the North-West of India, a country more primitive and more saint-ridden than the rest of India, the Syed’s movement was soon followed by the reaction of Ahmadism—a strange mixture of Semitic and Aryan mysticism with whom spiritual revival consists not in the purification of the individual’s inner life according to the principle of the old Islamic Sufism, but in satisfying the expectant attitude of the masses by providing a “promised Messiah.” The function of this “promised Messiah” is not to extricate the individual from an enervating present but to make him slavishly surrender his ego to its dictates. This reaction carries within itself a very subtle contradiction. It retains the discipline of Islam but destroys the will which that discipline was intended to fortify.

Maulana Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was a man of a different stamp. Strange are the ways of Providence. One of the most advanced Muslims of our time, both in religious thought and action, was born in Afghanistan! A perfect master of nearly all the Muslim languages of the world and endowed with the most winning eloquence, his restless soul migrated from one Muslim country to another influencing some of the most prominent men in Persia, Egypt and Turkey. Some of the greatest theologians of our time, such as Mufti Muhammad ‘Abduhu, and some of the men of the younger generation who later became political leaders, such
as Zaghlul Pasha of Egypt, were his disciples. He wrote little, spoke much and thereby transformed into miniature Jamalud-Dins all those who came into contact with him. He never claimed to be a prophet or a renewer; yet no man in our time has stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than he! His spirit is still working in the world of Islam and nobody knows where it will end.

It may, however, be asked what exactly was the objective of these great Muslims. The answer is that they found the world of Islam ruled by three main forces and they concentrated their whole energy on creating a revolt against these forces.

(i) Mullaism.— The ulema have always been a source of great strength to Islam. But during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad, they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of Ijtihad i.e. the forming of independent judgment in matters of law. The Wahabi movement which was a source of inspiration to the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers was really a revolt against this rigidity of the Ulema. Thus the first objective of the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and a freedom to reinterpret the law in the light of advancing experience.

(ii) Mysticism —The masses of Islam were swayed by the kind of mysticism which blinked actualities, enervated the people and kept them steeped in all kinds of superstition. From its high state as a force of spiritual education mysticism had fallen down to a mere means of exploiting the ignorance and the credulity of the people. It gradually and invisibly unnerved the will of Islam and softened it to the extent of seeking relief from the rigorous discipline of the law of Islam. The nineteenth-century reformers rose in revolt against this mysticism and called Muslims to the broad daylight of the modern world. Not that they were materialists. Their mission was to open the eyes of the Muslims to the spirit of Islam which aimed at the conquest
of matter and not flight from it.

(iii) Muslim Kings — The gaze of Muslim Kings was solely fixed on their own dynastic interests and, so long as these were protected, did not hesitate to sell their countries to the highest bidder. To prepare the masses of Muslims for a revolt against such a state of things in the world of Islam was the special mission of Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani.

It is not possible here to give a detailed account of the transformation which these reformers brought about in the world of Muslim thought and feeling. One thing, however, is clear. They prepared to a great extent the ground for another set of men, i.e. Zaghlul Pasha, Mustafa Kamal and Raza Shah. The reformers interpreted, argued and explained but the set of men who came after them, although inferior in academic learning, were men who, relying on their healthy instincts, had the courage to rush into sun-lit space and do, even by force, what the new conditions of life demanded. Such men are liable to make mistakes; but the history of nations shows that even their mistakes have sometimes borne good fruit. In them it is not logic but life that struggles restless to solve its own problems. It may be pointed out here that Syed Ahmad Khan, Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and hundreds of the latter’s disciples in Muslim countries were not westernised Muslims. They were men who had sat on their knees before the mullas of the old school and had breathed the very intellectual and spiritual atmosphere which they later sought to reconstruct. Pressure of modern ideas may be admitted; hut the history thus briefly indicated above clearly shows that the upheaval which has come to Turkey and which is likely, sooner or later, to come to other Muslim countries, is almost wholly determined by the forces within. It is only the superficial observer of the modern world of Islam who thinks that the present crisis in the world of Islam is wholly due to the working of alien forces.

Has then the world of Islam outside India, or especially Turkey, abandoned Islam? Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru thinks
that Turkey had ceased to be a Muslim country. He does not seem to realise that the question whether a person or a community has ceased to be a member of Islam is, from the Muslim point of view, a purely legal question and must be decided in view of the structural principles of Islam. As long as a person is loyal to the two basic principles of Islam, i.e. the Unity of God and Finality of the Holy Prophet, not even the strictest mulla can turn him outside the pale of Islam even though his interpretations of the Law or of the text of the Quran are believed to be erroneous. But perhaps Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru has in his mind the supposed or real innovations which the Ataturk has introduced. Let us for a moment examine these. Is it the development of a general materialist outlook in Turkey which seems inimical to Islam? Islam has had too much of renunciation; it is time for the Muslims to look to realities. Materialism is a bad weapon against religion; but it is quite an effective one against mulla-craft and Sufi-craft which deliberately mystify the people with a view to exploit their ignorance and credulity. The spirit of Islam is not afraid of its contact with matter. Indeed the Quran says: “Forget not thy share in the world.” It is difficult for a non-Muslim to understand that, considering the history of the Muslim world during the last few centuries, the progress of a materialist outlook is only a form of self-realisation. Is it then the abolition of the old dress or the introduction of the Latin script? Islam as a religion has no country; as a society it has no specific language, no specific dress. Even the recitation of the Quran in Turkish is not without some precedent in Muslim history. Personally I regard it as a serious error of judgment; for the modern student of the Arabic language and literature knows full well that the only non-European language which has a future is Arabic. But the reports are that the Truks have already abandoned the vernacular-recitation of the Quran. Is it then the abolition of polygamy or the licentiate ulerna? According to the Law of Islam the Amir of a Muslim State has the power to revoke the “permission” of the law if he is convinced that they tend to cause social corruption. As to
the licentiate ulema I would certainly introduce it in Muslim India if I had the power to do so. The inventions of the myth-making mulla is largely due the stupidity of the average Muslim. In excluding him from the religious life of the people the Ataturk has done what would have delighted the heart of an Ibn-i-Taimiyya or a Shah Wali Ullah. There is a tradition of the Holy Prophet reported in the Mishkat to the effect that only the Amir of the Muslim State and the person or persons appointed by him are entitled to preach to the people. I do not know whether the Ataturk ever knew of this tradition; yet it is striking how the light of his Islamic conscience has illumined the zone of his action in this important matter. The adoption of the Swiss code with its rule of inheritance is certainly a serious error which has arisen out of the youthful zeal for reform excusable in a people furiously desiring to go ahead. The joy of emancipation from the fetters of a long-standing priest-craft sometimes drives a people to untried courses of action. But Turkey as well as the rest of the world of Islam has yet to realise the hitherto unrevealed economic aspects of the Islamic law of inheritance which Von Kremer describes as the “supremely original branch of Muslim law.” Is it the abolition of the Caliphate or the separation of Church and State? In its essence Islam is not Imperialism. In the abolition of the Caliphate which since the days of Omayyads had practically become a kind of Empire it is only the spirit of Islam that has worked out through the Ataturk. In order to understand the Turkish Ijtihad in the matter of the Caliphate we cannot but seek the guidance of Ibn-i Khaldun—the great philosophical historian of Islam, and the father of modern history. I can do no better than quote here a passage from my Reconstruction:  

Ibn-i-Khaldun, in his famous Prolegornena, mentions three distinct views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam: (1) That Universal Imamate is a Divine institution and is

consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken by the Khawarij, the early republicans of Islam. It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of the Muttazilla who regarded Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization of modern Islam.

Nor is the idea of separation of Church and State alien to Islam. The doctrine of the Major Occultation of the Imam in a sense effected this separation long ago in Shi’a Persia. The Islamic idea of the division of the religious and political functions of the State must not be confounded with the European idea of the separation of Church and State. The former is only a division of functions as is clear from the gradual creation in the Muslim State of the offices of Shaikh-ul-Islam and Ministers; the latter is based on the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter. Christianity began as an order of monks having nothing to do with the affairs of the world; Islam was, from the very beginning, a civil society with laws civil in their nature though believed to be revelational in origin. The metaphysical dualism on which the European idea is based has borne bitter fruit among Western nations. Many years ago a book was written in America called If Christ came to Chicago. In reviewing this book an American author says:

The lesson to be learned from Mr. Stead’s book is that the great evils from which humanity is suffering today are evils that can be handled only by religious sentiments; that the handling of those evils has been in the great part surrendered
to the State; that the State has itself been delivered over to corrupt political machines; that such machines are not only unwilling, but unable, to deal with those evils; and that nothing but a religious awakening of the citizens to their public duties can save countless millions from misery, and the State itself from degradation.

In the history of Muslim political experience this separation has meant only a separation of functions, not of ideas. It cannot be maintained that in Muslim countries the separation of Church and State means the freedom of Muslim legislative activity from the conscience of the people which has for centuries been trained and developed by the spirituality of Islam. Experience alone will show how the idea will work in modern Turkey. We can only hope that it will not be productive of the evils which it has produced in Europe and America.

I have briefly discussed the above innovations more for the sake of the Muslim reader than for Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. The innovation specifically mentioned by the Pandit is the adoption by the Turks and Persians of racial and nationalist ideals. He seems to think that the adoption of such ideals means the abandonment of Islam by Turkey and Persia. The student of history knows very well that Islam was born at a time when the old principles of human unification, such as blood-relationship and throne-culture, were failing. It, therefore, finds the principle of human unification not in the blood and bones but in the mind of man. Indeed its social message to mankind is: “Deracialise yourself or perish by internecine war.” It is no exaggeration to say that Islam looks askance at Nature’s race-building plans and creates, by means of its peculiar institutions, an outlook which would counteract the race building forces of nature. In the direction of human domestication it has done in one thousand years far more important work than Christianity and Buddhism ever did in two thousand years or more. It is no less than a miracle that an Indian Muslim finds himself at
home in Morocco in spite of the disparity of race and language. Yet it cannot be said that Islam is totally opposed to race. Its history shows that in social reform it relies mainly on its scheme for gradual deracialisation and proceeds on the lines of least resistance. “Verily,” says the Quran, “We have made you into tribes and sub-tribes so that you may be identified; but the best among you in the eye of God is he who is the purest in life.” Considering the mightiness of the problem of race and the amount of time which the deracialisation of mankind must necessarily take, the attitude of Islam towards the problem of race, i.e. stooping to conquer without itself becoming a race-making factor, is the only rational and workable attitude. There is a remarkable passage in Sir Arthur Keith’s little book, The Problem of Race, which is worth quoting here:

And now man is awakening to the fact that Nature’s primary end—race-building—is incompatible with the necessities of the modern economic world and is asking himself: What must I do? Bring race-building as practised hitherto by nature to an end and have eternal peace? Or permit Nature to pursue old course and have, as a necessary consequence—War? Man has to choose the one course or the other. There is no intermediate course possible.

It is, therefore, clear that if the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism he is going not so much against the spirit of Islam as against the spirit of the times. And if he is a believer in the absoluteness of races, he is sure to be defeated by the spirit of modern times which is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Islam. Personally, however, I do not think that the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism, as I believe his Pan-Turanianism is only a political retort to Pan-Slavonism or Pan-Germanism, or Pan-Anglo-Saxonism.

If the meaning of the above paragraph is well understood it is not difficult to see the attitude of Islam towards nationalist ideals. Nationalism in the sense of love of one’s country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of
the Muslim’s faith; it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life. In Turkey, Persia, Egypt and other Muslim countries it will never become a problem. In these countries Muslims constitute an overwhelming majority and their minorities, i.e. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, according to the law of Islam, are either “People of the Book” or “like the People of the Book” with whom the law of Islam allows free social relations including matrimonial alliances. It becomes a problem for Muslims only in countries where they happen to be in a minority, and nationalism demands their complete self-effacement. In majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism; for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; in minority countries it is justified in seeking self determination as a cultural unit. In either case, it is thoroughly consistent with itself.

The above paragraphs briefly sum up the exact situation in the world of Islam to-day. If this is properly understood it will become clear that the fundamentals of Islamic solidarity are not in any way shaken by any external or internal forces. The solidarity of Islam, as I have explained before, consists in a uniform belief in the two structural principles of Islam supplemented by the five well-known “practices of faith”. These are the first essentials of Islamic solidarity which has, in this sense, existed ever since the days of the Holy Prophet until it was recently disturbed by the Bahais in Persia and the Qadianis in India. It is a guarantee for a practically uniform spiritual atmosphere in the world of Islam. It facilitates the political combination of Muslim States, which combination may either assume the form of a world-State (ideal) or of a league of Muslim States, or of a number of independent States whose pacts and alliances are determined by purely economic and political considerations. That is how the conceptual structure of this simple faith is
related to the process of time. The profundity of this relation can be understood only in the light of certain verses of the Quran which it is not possible to explain here without drifting away from the point immediately before us. Politically, then, the solidarity of Islam is shaken only when Muslim States war on one another; religiously it is shaken only when Muslims rebel against any of the basic beliefs and practices of the Faith. It is in the interest of the eternal solidarity that Islam cannot tolerate any rebellious group within its fold. Outside the fold such a group is entitled to as much toleration as the followers of any other faith. It appears to me that at the present moment Islam is passing through a period of transition. It is shifting from one form of political solidarity to some other form which the forces of history have yet to determine. Events are so rapidly moving in the modern world that it is almost impossible to make a prediction. As to what will be the attitude towards non-Muslims of a politically united Islam, if such a thing ever comes, is a question which history alone can answer. All that I can say is that, tying midway between Asia and Europe and being a synthesis of Eastern and Western outlooks on life, Islam ought to act as a kind of intermediary between the East and the West. But what if the follies of Europe create an irreconcilable Islam? As things are developing in Europe from day to day they demand a radical transformation of Europe’s attitude towards Islam. We can only hope that political vision will not allow itself to be obscured by the dictates of imperial ambition or economic exploitation. In so far as India is concerned I can say with perfect confidence that the Muslims of India will not submit to any kind of political idealism which would seek to annihilate their cultural entity. Sure of this they may be trusted to know how to reconcile the claims of religion and patriotism.

One word about His Highness the Agha Khan. What has led Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to attack the Agha Khan? It is

7. Nehru had, inter alia, written: “I have long had a vague kind of idea ... that he (the Agha Khan), hardly belongs to the inner orthodox fold, and I have admired him for
difficult for me to discover. Perhaps he thinks that the Qadianis and the Isma’ilis fall under the same category. He is obviously not aware that however the theological interpretation of the Isma’ilis may err, they believe in the basic principles of Islam. It is true that they believe in a perpetual Imamate; but the Imam according to them is not a recipient of Divine revelation. He is only an expounder of the Law. It is only the other day (vide The Star of Allahahad, March 12, 1934) that His Highness the Agha Khan addressed his followers as follows:

Bear witness that Allah is One, Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah. Quran is the Book of Allah. Kaaba is the Qibla of all. You are Muslims and should live with Muslims. Greet Muslims with Assalamo-o-'Alaikum.

Give your children Islamic names. Pray with Muslim congregations in mosques. Keep fast regularly. Solemnize your marriages according to Islamic rules of nikah. Treat all Muslims as your brothers.

It is the Pandit now to decide whether the Agha Khan represents the solidarity of Islam or not.

(6)

Letter to Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru
about the Ahmadis, 21st June, 1936. *

Thank you so much for your letter which I received yesterday. At the time I wrote in reply to your articles I

the truly wonderful way in which he manages to combine, and gracefully carry in his own person, the most contradictory qualities, and to take part in multifarious activities which appear to be mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable” (Modem Review, Calcutta, November 1935, p. 505(. (Ed.)

Ahmadis. Indeed the main reason why I wrote a reply was to show, especially to you, how Muslim loyalty had originated and how eventually it had found a revelational basis in Ahmadism. After the publication of my paper I discovered, to my great surprise, that even the educated Muslims had no idea of the historical causes which had shaped the teachings of Ahmadism. Moreover your Muslim admirers in the Punjab and elsewhere felt perturbed over your articles as they thought you were in sympathy with the Ahmadiyya movement. This was mainly due to the fact that the Ahmadis were jubilant over your articles. The Ahmadi Press was mainly responsible for this misunderstanding about you. However I am glad to know that my impression was erroneous. I myself have little interest in theology, but had to dabble in it a bit in order to meet the Ahmadis on their own ground. I assure you that my paper was written with the best of intentions for Islam and India. I have no doubt in my mind that the Ahmadis are traitors both to Islam and to India.

I was extremely sorry to miss the opportunity of meeting you in Lahore. I was very ill in those days and could not leave my rooms. For the last two years I have been living a life practically of retirement on account of continued illness. Do let me know when you come to the Punjab next. Did you receive my letter regarding your proposed Union for Civil Liberties? As you do not acknowledge it in your letter I fear it never reached you.
Speeches and Statements of Iqbal
IV. Miscellaneous Statements, etc.

PART FOUR

MISCELLANEOUS STATEMENTS, ETC.
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Speeches and Statements of Iqbal
IV. Miscellaneous Statements, etc.

(1)
Letter to M.K. Gandhi, declining the offer
of Vice-Chancellorship of Jamiah Milliyah
Islamiyah, Aligarh, 29th November, 1920. *

Thank you so much for your letter which I received the day before yesterday. I regret very much my inability to respond to the call of those for whom I have the highest respect, for reasons which need not and perhaps cannot be mentioned at present. While I am a strong supporter of National Education I do not think I possess all the necessary qualifications for the guidance of a University which requires a man who would steer the infant institution through all the struggles and rivalries likely to arise in the earlier stages of its life. And I am, by nature, a peace-time worker.

There is one further point. Situated as we are, political independence must be preceded by Economic independence and in this respect the Muslims of India are far behind other communities of this country. Their principal need is not Literature and Philosophy but technical Education which would make them economically independent. And it is on this latter form of Education that they should, for the present, focus all their energies. The gentlemen responsible for the creation of the new University of Aligarh will be well advised if they make it an institution devoted mainly to the technical side of National Science supplemented by such religious education as may be considered necessary.

* Reproduced from Donald P. Little, Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyazi Berkes (Leiden, 1976), P. 212.
There is no doubt that in view of the events that have happened in the Muslim world—especially with regard to Arabia and the Holy places—the Mussulmans of India will consider themselves justified in adopting some form of Noncooperation, but the religious aspect of the question of Education is, to my mind, still obscure, and I have already published proposals for a thorough discussion of the whole question. I am afraid I am not an expert on the Shari’a, but it is my conviction that in connection with the question of Education the law of Islam cannot fail to give us a suitable line of action under our present limitation.

Hoping you are well.

(2)
Letter of Resignation from the Office of
The Secretary of the All-India Muslim League,
published on 24th June, 1928

As you know I have been suffering from a slight indisposition since the middle of May last and had gone recently to Delhi for treatment.

On my return on June 21, I found the substance of the League’s memorandum to the Simon Commission published in the Press.

You are aware that I had expressed my difference of opinion relating to some important points—principally the question of provincial autonomy in the first meeting of the Draft Committee which was held at the President’s residence.

The original draft was merely tentative, meant for eliciting opinions from other members of the League, a large number of whom expressed their opinions in due course.
regarding the various points discussed in the original draft.

A final draft was prepared after the receipt of these opinions but by that time I had unfortunately fallen ill and was, for this reason, unable to attend the discussion of the final draft.

I now find that the extract of the League memorandum as published in the Press makes no demand for full provincial autonomy and suggests a unitary form of provincial government in which law, order and justice would be placed under the direct charge of the Governor. It is hardly necessary for me to say that this suggestion is only a veiled form of diarchy and means no constitutional advance at all.

Since I still stick to my opinion, which I expressed at the first meeting of the Draft Committee, that the All-India Muslim League should demand full provincial autonomy (which, in my opinion, is the demand of the whole Punjab Muslim community), I ought not, in the circumstances, remain Secretary of the All-India Muslim League. Kindly accept my resignation.

(3)


I have read with great interest the pages in Life in the Stars which have been devoted to the discussion of that illuminating conception of esprit de corps you have taken. This notion of esprit de corps, the application of which you have so widely extended, may be considered as constituting the very essence of this book.

You have put a lofty ideal before us which, let us hope, the British people and the rest of the world will strive to
realise. England to whom this book is primarily addressed and in whose capacity to serve this ideal you seem to have a profound faith must take the lead in the campaign against the forces of war and hatred and we in this country shall be proud to co-operate with her in this noble task. I do not say so in any spirit of sarcasm. A great many of us here, including myself, believe that England is capable of leading humanity in that direction. The tremendous common sense of her people, her political wisdom based on a sound knowledge of human nature, the calmness and dignity of her people, her moral superiority over others in many essential respects, her wonderful control of the material forces at her command, the many humanitarian movements which are in existence in the country today and the general discipline which one observes in every department of British life are all facts which no outside observer can fail to recognise. It is the harmonious combination of these qualities of character in the British race which has been the cause of its ascendancy in the world.

I am looking forward to the day when the disputes between England and India will be settled and the two countries will begin to work together not only for their mutual benefit but for the great good of mankind.

There is no need for pessimism on either side. There are people who seem to be overwhelmed by the strength and apparent universality of the bad feelings which exist between the two countries today. I am not one of them.

In my judgement they are normal and inevitable accompaniment of an age of readjustment and will pass away without irremediable disaster to anybody, if we keep our heads and our sense of humour and have the self-control to resist the appeal to hatred or pride, violence or intolerance to which they are always trying to allure us.

The periods of readjustment are the common-places of history. They have been going on ever since time began. The
history of Europe deals with little else. And readjustment is no less inevitable between the East and the West though the transition there has naturally taken longer to work out.

It is no doubt true that we in this country need readjustment between ourselves. We cannot look forward to international peace unless and until our own house is set in order and we learn to live in harmony with one another.

India’s internal strife and disunion have been a great disturbing factor in the peace of the world. Grave as the situation may seem at the present moment, I have not lost faith in the possibility of achieving communal agreement in India. While realising the seriousness and importance of the Hindu-Muslim problem, with which this country is confronted today, and the practical difficulties involved in finding a satisfactory solution of it, I cannot allow myself to believe, as many people unfortunately do both here and in England, that all human efforts directed to uniting the two communities are doomed to failure.

I am not ashamed to say that in solving this problem we may need the assistance of Britain guided by the best of motives.

Any attempt on the part of Great Britain at the next Round Table Conference to take an undue advantage of communal split will ultimately prove disastrous to both countries. If you transfer political authority to the Hindu and keep him in power for any material benefit to Great Britain, you will drive the Indian Muslim to use the same weapon against the Swaraj or Anglo-Swaraj Government as Gandhi did against the British Government.

Moreover, it may result in the whole of Muslim Asia being driven into the lap of Russian communism which would serve as a coup de grace to British supremacy in the East.

I do not myself believe that the Russians are by nature an
irreligious people. On the contrary, I think that they are men and women of strong religious tendencies and the present negative state of Russian mind will not last indefinitely, for no system of society can rest on an atheistic basis. As soon as things settle down in that country and its people have time to think calmly, they will be forced to find a positive foundation for their system.

Since Bolshevism plus God is almost identical with Islam, I should not be surprised if, in the course of time, either Islam would devour Russia or Russia Islam. The result will depend, I think, to a considerable extent on the position which is given to the Indian Muslims under the new constitution.

Please do not think that I have any prejudice against the Hindus. In fact, I have great admiration for the spirit of self-sacrifice and courage which they have shown in recent years. They have produced men of eminence in every walk of life and are fast advancing along social and economic lines.

I shall have no objection to be ruled by the Hindu if he has the tact and the ability to govern, but I cannot worship two gods. It must be either him alone or the British alone, but not the two together.

I have stated to you in a nutshell the position taken by the Indian Muslims today. This does not, however, mean that I am pessimistic about the future of Hindu-Muslim question. Somehow I feel hopeful that some solution of the Indian communal problem will be found at the next Round Table Conference which would satisfy all parties, including the British. We must approach this problem in a spirit of optimism, hoping for the best, expecting the ordinary and being prepared for the worse.

I imagine that some people would say: “It is all very well to indulge in such pious hopes but look at the continual quarrelling and disturbance, at non-cooperation and civil disobedience, at the repression of the British authorities, at
the terrorism by the extremists in Bengal and at the Cawnpore riots.” Well, what do you
expect? Democracy means rows. If anybody thinks that approach to democracy means
sailing into a kind of lotus land, he cannot have read a word of history. The truth is
exactly the opposite.

Democracy lets loose all sorts of aspirations and grievances which were
suppressed or unrealised under autocracy; it arouses hopes and ambitions often quite
unpractical and it relies not on authority but on argument or controversy from the
platform, in the Press, in Parliament, gradually to educate people to the acceptance of a
solution which may not be ideal but which is the only practical one in the circumstances
of the time.

Therefore, when I look over the tempestuous history of the last ten years in India I
feel inclined not to groan or despair but to congratulate both India and England on
making a very good start.

We certainly have had the growing pains of democracy, but I do not think that
there is a person in England or here who will not agree that as a result everybody in India
and Britain alike understands what the real problems of Indian self-government are far
better than they did ten years ago. And they have had all this painful but salutary
education without destroying the structure of government itself.

Democratic government has attendant difficulties but these are difficulties which
human experience elsewhere shows to be surmountable, It is, and has always been, a
question of faith. Our faith too depends on affection and understanding.

What we need for a swift solution of the political problem of India is faith. I
believe it to be growing rapidly among you in the West. I believe our rulers and their
officials to be now realising its significance in a fashion in which they did not realise it
ten years ago.
To the recognition of a common ideal and to the avoidance of friction in advancing along the path of self-rule let us here and in the West address ourselves.

(4)
Statement on His Impressions of World
Muslim Congress, published on
1st January, 1932

I approached some of the holy places common to Islam, Christianity and Judaism with a rather sceptic mind as to the authenticity of the traditions centred round them. But in spite of this feeling I was very much affected by them, particularly by the birth-place of Christ.

I discovered, however, that the altar of the church at Bethlehem was divided into three parts which were allotted to the Armenian, Greek and Catholic churches respectively. These sects continuously fight among themselves, sometimes indulging in bloodshed and defiling one another’s altars and contrary to the state of affairs in India, it is two Muslim policemen who have to keep the peace among them.

I was a member of the various sub-committees formed to discuss distinct proposals, but unfortunately was not able to take part in all of them. In one sub-committee I strongly opposed the idea of establishing at Jerusalem a university on the old and antiquated lines of Jamia Azhar in Cairo and insisted on the proposed university being of a thoroughly modern type...

I do not know how the misunderstanding arose which caused the rumour that I was opposed to the establishment of any kind of university in Jerusalem. Reuter sent out a wire to that effect. Actually I am a strong advocate of Arabic-speaking countries setting up not one but several
universities for the purpose of transferring modern knowledge to Arabic which is the only non-European language that has kept pace with the progress of thought in modern times.

(5)

Statement on the Report or the Indian Franchise Committee, published
On 5th June, 1932

I personally do not believe that undiluted Western democracy can be a success here and, therefore, very much appreciate the various methods by which the Committee has tried to secure an opportunity of self-expression to the different classes and numerous interests which constitute India. One of the methods which the economically backward classes ought to welcome is the Committee’s departure from the rule of uniform franchise.

Another noteworthy feature of the Report is the Committee’s recommendation for immediate preparation of an electoral roll in order to judge before the actual introduction of reforms how far the population of various communities is reflected among voters.
Statement Explaining the Postponement of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the All-India Muslim Conference, issued on 29th June, 1932

Several members of the Executive Board of the All-India Muslim Conference considering it advisable to postpone the meeting of the Board to be held at Allahabad on July 3, the meeting is postponed till the end of July. A meeting of the Working Committee is, however, likely to be held as early as possible in order to consider the situation.

The Muslims of India expect that a definite announcement will be made by the end of July. I hope that with all the material necessary for the decision of the communal problem before the British Government, they will not delay the decision any further.

It is my considered opinion that in the present circumstances and in view of our work during the last two years the postponement of the Allahabad meeting is highly advisable.

In postponing the meeting I am fully sensible of my responsibility as President of the Conference. While I am aware of the impatience of the Muslims of India for the expected decision, I am firmly of the opinion that the real question now before the community relates to the nature of the announcement and not to the date of it. The character of our future programme must be determined by the nature of the announcement and not by the fact of its being delayed.
I have read the proceedings of the public meeting held by certain prominent members of the All-India Muslim Conference at Allahabad on July 4. I welcome the formation of an Independent Party within the Conference. In my address to the Lahore session of the Muslim Conference I said as follows:

The guidance offered to the community is not always independently conceived, and the result is ruptures, sometimes at critical movements, within our political organisations. Thus these organisations cannot properly develop the kind of discipline which is absolutely essential to the life and power of political bodies. To remedy this evil I suggest that the Indian Muslims should have only one political organisation with provincial and district branches all over the country. Call it whatever you like. What is essential is that its constitution must be such as to make it possible for any school of political thought to come into power, and to guide the community according to its own ideas and methods. In my opinion this is the only way to make ruptures impossible, and to reintegrate and discipline our scattered forces to the best interests of Islam in India.

I have, therefore, no doubt that in forming a party within the Conference, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and others have taken a step in the right direction.

1. See Part 1(2).
I think, however, that the Muslims of India are entitled to know my view of the situation created by the resignation of Maulana Shafi Daudi and the resolution passed by the public meeting at Allahabad protesting against what they call my action in postponing the meeting of the Executive Board which was to have been held on July 3.

I honestly believe that Maulana Shafi Daudi is not at all justified in his action. I requested him immediately after the publication of his resignation in the Press to withdraw it and to settle matters amicably with Syed Zakir All and others.

As to the postponement of the meeting of the Executive Board what I did was simply to advise postponement on certain grounds. This advice I am convinced was perfectly sound not only because of the innumerable telegrams received by Maulana Shafi Daudi, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad Khan, and myself but also because of the fact that a meeting of the Working Committee held at Simla, where I was unfortunately unable to be present, had authorised Maulana Shafi Daudi to postpone the meeting in case, in his opinion, there was no likelihood of the communal decision being announced by July 3.

This authorisation was unanimously accepted by all members of the Working Committee who were present. Maulana Shafi Daudi too willingly accepted the responsibility. Why he has not mentioned this fact in his resignation or subsequent statements it is not possible for me to say.

In the circumstances it is unfair to me to say that I acted as a dictator. According to my judgment, postponement was desired by a majority of members of the Conference. My personal opinion was the same. After giving the matter most anxious consideration I arrived at the conclusion that while it was the duty of the community to fight the Government in case the communal decision was not favourable to Muslims, I ought not to advise them to start any kind of direct action.
merely because the Government was guilty of not announcing the communal decision within a certain time-limit. This frank statement of facts will, I hope, enable the Muslims to see whether my advice for postponement of the meeting of the Executive Board was inspired by Simla dictates. In my private and public life I have never followed another man’s conscience. I regard the man who is capable of following another’s conscience when the most important interests of the community are at stake as unworthy of Islam and humanity.

Let me make it perfectly clear that the cautious behaviour of those who desired postponement should not be so interpreted as to mean that they are less anxious than others to act on the Lahore resolution if necessity for action arises. Until such necessity arises the community should hold its forces in reserve. Wisdom lies not in wasting one’s energy on unessentials but in saving it for expenditure on issues which really matter.

(8)
Statement on the Reported Split in the
All-India Muslim Conference,
issued on 25th July, 1932

There is no real split as far as the present Muslim attitude towards the announcement of the communal decision is concerned. The leaders of the new party were in Lahore a few days ago and had long talks with me about the past work of the Conference and future possibilities. They finally agreed to my view that since the British Government had undertaken to decide the communal problem, practically at the request of the Indian communities we must wait till that decision and hold the postponed, meeting of the Executive Board of the Conference at a suitable place
shortly after its announcement.

I am glad that the good sense of our community has saved us from mutual
dissension on this issue. I am sure that on account of the experience acquired by it during
the last ten years, the community as a whole fully understands the
many sides of the present political problem in the country; and I have every hope that its
strong common sense will not fail it when it is again called upon to appraise the value of
political alternative which the future may disclose.

(9)

Statement on Sikh Demands, issued
on 25th July, 1932

I have read the Sikh leaders’ memorials, manifestoes and resolutions with much
interest. But I do not think it necessary to enter in verbal wrangling with these gentlemen,
some of whom are my personal friends.

The kind of demonstration embodied in these memorials, manifestoes and
meetings was only to be expected on the eve of the decision of the communal problem.
Moreover, as Sardar Ujjal Singh has pointed out, the Sikhs are concerned more with the
communal problem than with the constitutional progress of the country. Such an attitude,
even if inspired by love of one’s own community, cannot appeal to those who, while
anxious to protect the legitimate interests of a particular class, find it impossible to ignore
the interests of India as a whole.

Nor is it necessary for any Muslim to take serious notice of my Sikh friends’
attempt to discover something like historical justification for their opposition to the
Muslim demands, though I greatly regret the language in which they have chosen to
express this opposition and which
unfortunately tends to excite religious fanaticism among the Sikh masses. It is further unfortunate that the consequences of the purely negative attitude of the Sikhs in opposing the Muslim right to majority representation in the Punjab are not fully realised. The Sikh attitude in the Punjab, encouraged, as it is, by Hindus, is, I am very much afraid, producing its natural reaction in making Muslims and other minorities seriously apprehensive of domination by a communal majority which will be in power at the Centre and in six provinces. This growing apprehension on the part of the minorities is bound to have a most pernicious effect on the future history of India.

Our own position is, however, perfectly clear. The Muslims of India are as anxious to protect their communal interests as to secure the constitutional advance of the country. The safeguards which they demand are essential for their protection as an all-India minority. They accept the principle of majority rule in the Centre and in those provinces where they happen to be in a hopeless minority provided they are not deprived of the countervailing and legitimate advantage of being in a majority in certain other provinces. They have explained their position time and again to the sister communities and the British Government and, with the sole exception of the Sikhs, all Indian minorities have agreed to their demands.

(10)

Statement on Sir Jogendra Singh’s Proposal for Sikh-Muslim Negotiations, published on 4th August, 1932

I received, on July 29, from Sardar Sir Jogendra Singh what he described as a short note which, according to him, might form the basis of a discussion and I was asked what I
thought of it. I cannot say whether he wrote similar letters to other Muslims. The letter which he sent to me was marked private. It seems, however, that its contents have already been disclosed to the Press.

I would have heartily endorsed a communal pact for the Punjab on a reasonable basis. But the way in which publicity has been given to Sir Jogendra’s note makes me suspect the whole affair.

My reasons, however, for rejecting Sir Jogendra’s proposals were, as mentioned in my reply, that while they were apparently intended to concede to Muslims a majority of one in the total House, they would actually reduce Muslims to an equality with non-Muslims and most probably to a minority.

I further pointed out that Muslims could in no case accept less than 51 per cent seats and that a concession of 51 per cent seats to them could not amount to what was being called a Muslim raj.

Seeing that Sir Jogendra meant to arrive at a settlement before the British Government’s announcement, I also wrote to him that the subject of his note could be discussed even after the announcement.

In reply to my letter I received from him, on August 3, another letter in which he suggested a totally different scheme which, in my opinion, was as unacceptable to Muslims as the first one. Since, according to an Associated Press message, these negotiations have been communicated to the British Government, my fear is that this may result in delaying the promised announcement by the British Government.

I, therefore, consider it absolutely necessary to emphasise the fact that since no communal settlement prior or subsequent to the announcement can be acceptable to Muslims unless it provides for 51 per cent seats for Muslims.
in the provincial legislature as agreed to in the Minorities’ Pact, it will only aggravate the situation if the announcement is allowed to be delayed by such negotiations.

It is obvious that Sir Jogendra’s proposals recognise the principle of separate electorates to the extent of 150 seats in a total number of 175. His calculations mentioned in his note further give a majority of at least one to Muslims in the total House. In the circumstances I see no reason why our Sikh brethren should not further try to remove Muslim fears of being reduced to a minority or an equality by agreeing to the minimum demands of Muslims which other Indian minorities have already agreed to.

(11)
Statement Explaining the Resolution Passed by the Working Committee of the All India Muslim Conference regarding Sikh-Muslim Conversations, issued on 10th August, 1932

I consider it my duty to make it perfectly clear why the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference at its last meeting in Delhi passed the resolution relating to the Sikh-Muslim conversations in Simla.

Firstly, while fully recognising the value of communal concord, the members of the Committee thought that such conversations at the present moment might delay the Government announcement and still further aggravate the Sikh-Muslim situation in the Punjab.

Secondly, in view of certain statements issued to the Press by some of the Sikh leaders, they felt that nothing was likely to come out of these conversations. This feeling is amply justified by the latest statement of Sir Jogendra
published today. In his letter to me Sir Jogendra clearly mentioned the figures 88 and 87 for Muslims and non-Muslims respectively.

These figures were no doubt based on his calculation relating to special constituencies, but I hope he will excuse me for a bit of cruel psychology when I say that mention of specific figures was perhaps meant only to decoy me in the belief that he agreed at least to a majority of one for Muslims in the total House. Sir Jogendra accuses me of drawing unfortunate inferences from his proposals. I assure him that in the presence of the specific figures mentioned in his letter no inference was necessary.

On the other hand, in spite of these figures, I could not but understand him to mean what he has now plainly stated without the mention of any specific figures, namely, that he offered only a possibility to Muslims for securing more seats out of those allotted to special constituencies.

I agree that he offered only a possibility, but if this is the Sikh view of the situation then the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference was right in thinking that there was no likelihood of any material settlement.

Again Sir Jogendra says that whatever the offer was, it was not made on behalf of the Sikh community. I do not pretend to know anything about the origin of his proposal. Nor was it necessary to hazard a guess. After giving some important details of his proposals Sir Jogendra himself says in his letter:

Muslims to give support to Sikhs to secure for them 5 per cent seats in the Central Legislature, 6 per cent in the Frontier Province and a seat in the Central Cabinet. The Sikhs will join the Minorities’ Pact.

However, it is unnecessary now to enter into a controversy of the kind. My object in this statement is to make the position of the Working Committee as clear as
possible and I hope I have done so.

As far as the Sikh-Muslim conversations at Simla are concerned, I must make it plain that although I would welcome any reasonable material settlement, which need not necessarily be prior to the announcement to be made on August 17, I cannot, as President of the Muslim Conference, participate in these conversations unless properly authorised by the Working Committee of that body.

(12)
Statement on the Communal Award,
issued on 24th August, 1932

The decision of His Majesty’s Government has invoked divergent criticisms characteristic of this land of minorities. This in itself ought to be instructive to those fact-shy politicians who take an easy view of the complexity of the Indian constitutional problem and think that India possesses, or is capable of possessing, on the whole a single national point of view. And all this unhappy fire-work of phrases comes from people who openly confessed their inability to solve their own problems in requesting a third party to give them a decision which, be it remembered, does not close the door for an agreed settlement.

Amidst this welter of indiscriminate criticism, however, a disinterested student of Indian politics will find great relief in reading the views of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru _ the acute politician who combines a clear vision of present actualities with a penetrating glance into the future and shows infinite patience’ in working out the minute details of a complex situation.

I may also recall the amusing observation made in this connection by a gentleman of Bombay who said that the
British Government’s decision might as well have been written by myself. I assure him that if I had been called upon to give a decision on the Indian communal problem, I should not have done such glaring injustice to Muslims as the present decision does.

I honestly believe that no community has a more genuine grievance against the decision than Muslims. Indeed I cannot explain to myself how the British conscience has tolerated this injustice.

The outcry that the decision has given a majority representation to Punjab Muslims has absolutely no justification. A Muslim majority, whatever its character, in this province ought not to form a ground of grievance for any community. Besides, in the present case this majority has been made dependent on Muslims winning a number of seats through joint electorates.

The views of the Indian Muslims on the British Government’s decision are embodied in the resolution adopted by the Executive Board of the All-India Muslim Conference at Delhi the other day. I need not repeat them. But it appears from a careful study of the decision that it attempts to vindicate two political principles, i.e. no majority should be reduced to a minority and the interests of the minorities should be protected by giving them suitable weightage. In the application of both these principles it is the Muslims who suffer.

The position of Muslims in Bengal proves the violation of the first principle to the detriment of the Muslims and the figures relating to the weightage given to minorities in various provinces prove that the second principle has been applied more generously to Hindus in the Frontier province than to Muslims in any other province. In the Punjab the Sikh minority has been given weightage to an extent which reduces the probable Muslim majority to the narrowest possible margin.
The Muslim of Bengal who have been given 48.4 instead of 51 per cent needed only another 2 per cent to ensure an odd majority for them. But His Majesty’s Government have thought fit to observe the terms of the Minorities’ Pact as far as it related to Europeans and to ignore it as far as it related to Bengal Muslims. Is it because blood is thicker than water or because this injustice to Muslims serves the double object of helping the Europeans and pleasing the Hindus?

The important question for Muslims, however, is: what is to be done? I believe that a perfectly constitutional method is open to Muslims to adopt in this connection. Bengal is one of those provinces which have demanded two Houses of Legislature. The constitution of an Upper House for it is yet to be framed and what the relations between the two Houses will be and whether the Government will be responsible to the Lower House only or to both Houses put together, are questions which are yet to be settled. If representation on a population basis is secured for Muslims in the Upper House and if Government is made responsible to both Houses put together, Muslims may still have a majority in that province. In view of the fact that special interests have received full attention in the Lower House the above method will only do bare justice to Bengal Muslims.

I must add that mere allotment of seats to various communities is in itself of no great consequence. What is vital is the amount of power which may be transferred to the provinces of India. If real power comes to the provinces there is no doubt that the minorities of India, Muslims and non-Muslims will have an opportunity of improving their political position in the country and that in working out the coming constitution, Muslims in their majority provinces will, in view of their past history and traditions, prove themselves free from all pettiness of mind and narrowness of outlook. Their one duty, to my mind, is a war against illiteracy and economic slavery.
Speeches and Statements of Iqbal

(13)

Statement on the Lucknow Conference of Nationalist Muslim Leaders, issued on 8th October, 1932

I returned from Simla to Lahore on Friday and found a telegram from Shaikh ‘Abdul Majid Sindhi, President of the Khilafat Conference, awaiting me. Mr. Sindhi asked my opinion about holding a conference of Muslim leaders with a view to some sort of a settlement with the majority community. I wired to him that in the absence of any definite proposals from the majority community such a conference would be inadvisable and futile.

The same evening I received another telegram from Mr. Sindhi informing me that my reply had reached him too late and that an informal conference of Muslim leaders had been decided upon. He asked me to participate in the deliberations of this conference. In reply I requested him to reconsider his decision and since I believed such a conference to be inexpedient as well as logically unwarranted, I informed him of my inability to participate in its deliberations.

Since then I have received telegrams from various places asking me to hold a special session of the All-India Muslim Conference to reiterate the position of the Conference and counter the Bombay² move. In these circumstances I consider it my duty to voice the community’s strong opposition to the proposed Lucknow conference. In the

2. This conference was a sequel to talks in Bombay between Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and others. (Ed.)
absence of definite proposals from Hindu leaders I fail to see what we are asked to discuss in this conferenâe.

The Muslims of India have always shown readiness for a mutual settlement with other communities, but the way which is now being adopted is not the way to a settlement with Hindus but to disunity in our own ranks which we have consolidated with great difficulty.

To treat the question of electorates lightly and reopen it in spite of the community’s clear verdict, as embodied in the resolutions of the Muslim Conference and the Muslim League, is a most inadvisable course which may have far-reaching consequences for the community. In the wider interests of the community and the country this question should be considered as closed for the time being. There are before us other questions of far greater importance than that of joint versus separate electorates. Nor are separate electorates really contrary to nationalist ideas.

I consider the proposed conference harmful to the interests of Islam and India and an absolute waste of time. I hope that the sponsors of the conference will reconsider their position. The Muslim community should now be called upon to look forward to the solution of important constitutional problems lying ahead instead of being dragged back to the problems which have already cost us many bitter controversies but which we have now left behind.

(14)


In the course of an interview with a representative of the Roznamah-e-Klzikafat, Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal said with
regard to the Lucknow Conference:

“My own wish was that it should have been held after the Third Round Table Conference. I am also desirous of a united India like Maulana Shaukat Ali. A united India is possible if the Nationalist Muslims accept all of our demands today.”

In reply to a further question, Dr. Iqbal said: “Inter-communal unity is necessary, no doubt, but to say that it cannot be attained, as long as separate electorates are there, is wrong. Unity can be achieved in spite of it. In my opinion economic questions can unite the different communities of India. Experience of the Punjab Council is there to show that on many questions Hindus and Musalmans were at one. They differed in regard to one enactment only which pertained to the Mahajans. The other bone of contention is Government service. In this matter also, I maintain that unity can be achieved for which joint electorates are not a sine qua non.”

The representative then put a direct question to Dr. Iqbal, and enquired whether he would oppose any effort at peace-making. The Doctor said:

“No, never, I only say that the peace message ought to have emanated from the majority community.”

“If the non-Muslims accept the 13 demands of the Musalmans with joint electorates, what will be your position?”

“In my opinion,” said Dr. Iqbal, “the Musalmans do not want to give up separate electorates, at least the Punjab Musalmans will never agree to it.”

“What advice do you give to the Musalmans?”

“I am in favour of unity and I shall welcome the move,” he said, “in case the Hindus take the initiative. In that case unity must be achieved. But it is not proper to give up
separate electorates. So far as I have been able to understand, the Hindus want that the Musalmans should give up separate electorates. If they want peace, why do they attach such a condition? The Muslim majority is in favour of separate electorates.”

The representative enquired that if the Muslim majority thought otherwise at the forthcoming Conference, in that case what he would say?

The Doctor replied: “My own view is that the Muslim majority would never give up separate electorates. Anybody who differs from this view should regard it as my personal opinion. But if all the associations of India accept joint electorates at the forthcoming representative Conference, then I, too, shall abide by that decision and will not work against it.

The Khilafat reporter then handed over to Dr. Iqbal the telegram from Maulana Shaukat Ali, regretting his absence from Bombay and stating that Dr. Iqbal’s message given to the Musalmans on the eve of his departure from Lahore was a source of strength to him (Shaukat Ali).

(15)

Statement on the Resolution Passed at the Lucknow Conference, issued on 17th October, 1932.

After reading the resolution of the Lucknow conference I feel that it is not without its saving grace. The resolution practically repeats the position which I took up in regard to communal negotiations—that definite proposals should first come from the side of the majority community.

The resolution makes any consideration of the question of electorates by Muslims dependent on a definite
acceptance of the other thirteen demands of the All-India Muslim Conference. It is now for the Hindus to say whether they are prepared to open negotiations.

I think that on the whole the resolution brings our Nationalist Muslim brethren much nearer to the general body of Muslims than they have been so far. They have now agreed to abide by the verdict of the Muslim community on the question of electorates. I am convinced that the resolutions of the All-India Muslim Conference and the All-India Muslim League already constitute such a verdict. But if another verdict is needed they are welcome to have it.

(16)
Statement on the Constitution Emerging from the Round Table Conference issued on 26th February, 1933.

As far as the Indian Muslims are concerned, it is their duty to organise themselves for the coming elections and scrupulously avoid all causes of action which may lead to sectional differences among themselves. The proposed constitution clearly recognises the principle of protection of minorities. This is the only way of giving the minorities a national outlook. It is now for the minorities themselves, who were parties to the Minorities’ Pact made in London, to take full advantage of the opportunities given to them.

Whatever else one may say about the results of the Round Table Conferences, nobody can deny that they have given birth to a people who are at once new and ancient. I believe it to be one of the most remarkable facts of modern history. Not even a farsighted historian can realise the full consequences of the birth of this “new-ancient” people. I only hope that their leaders will remain alert and not allow the growth of self-consciousness among their people to be
arrested by external forces, social or political.

(17)
Statement on the Conditions Prevailing in Europe, issued on 26th February, 1933.

After visiting different European countries and seeing the general moral chaos of the modern world, I am convinced that the great opportunity for Islam as a faith has come. Millions upon millions of men and women in Europe are anxious to know what Islam and its cultural ideals are. The sooner the younger generation of Muslims realises this fact, the better. European Muslims have already realised it. They are holding a conference in Geneva in August next, the object of the proposed conference being purely social and cultural. I hope the Muslims of Asia and Africa will generously respond to the promoters of the conference.

I visited Cordova, Granada, Seville, Toledo and Madrid and besides seeing the historic mosque at Cordova, and the Alhambra in Granada, I visited the ruins of Madinatuz Zehra, the famous palace built on a mountain by Abdur Rehman for his wife Zehra, where excavations are still going on. It was there that the first demonstration of a flying machine was given in the twelfth century by a Muslim inventor. I had the privilege of meeting, among others, the Education Minister of the Spanish Government, an exceedingly courteous gentleman with a breadth of vision hardly to be expected in a country like Spain, and Professor Asin, the well-known author of Divine Comedy and Islam. Under the directions of the Education Minister the department of Arabic in the University of Granada is being greatly expanded. The head of this department is a disciple of Professor Asin.

The Spaniards living in the south of the country are
proud of their Moorish origin and of the great monuments of Islamic culture which are to be found there. A new consciousness is steadily growing in the country and will further expand with the development of education. The movement of reform started by Luther has not yet exhausted itself. It is still working quietly in different European countries and the hold of priesthood, especially in Spain, is gradually loosening.

(18)
Statement on the Constitution Outlined in the White Paper, issued on 20th March, 1933.

It is of course impossible for a document of this kind fully to satisfy all sections of people, especially in a country like India. Whether a community would be willing to give a trial to the proposed scheme in spite of its unsatisfactory character depends on a multiplicity of actualities which would have to be carefully examined. I Muslims would be greatly disappointed by the proposed composition of Federal Legislature. In the Lower House the Muslims have been guaranteed only 82 seats out of a proposed total of 375. The Muslim share works out at 21.8 per cent of the total House. Indian States which, on a population basis, are entitled only to 25 per cent seats in the Federal Legislature have been given 33.3 per cent which means a weightage of 8 per cent Such a weightage should in fairness have gone to Muslims as an imoñant minority community and not to the States which are in no sense a minority and whose interests are in no danger of encroachment. The present scheme amounts to packing the Central Legislature with practically nominated members at the expense of Muslim minority which had demanded
Federation for the protection of its own as well as the other minorities' interests.

The allocation of 9 seats to women as a “special interest” is another undesirable feature of the Federal Legislature. The electorate for these seats will be predominantly non-Muslim and it will be impossible for Muslim women to be elected. Muslim women ought to have been considered part of their community. In this respect Sir Mohammad Yakub’s note of dissent to the Franchise Committee’s Report has been completely ignored.

In the Upper House the system of a single transferable vote to be exercised by members of provincial legislatures introduces the principle of joint electorates and would fail to secure a due proportion of seats for Muslims.

Under the new scheme ministers in the provinces will be as little responsible to the legislature and as much responsible to Governors as they are now. The special responsibilities of Governors cover a very wide field.

The scheme proposed for Baluchistan will never satisfy the Baluchis or the Muslim community in general. Nor do I find in the scheme any adequate safeguard for the personal law of Muslims.

The White Paper demands serious consideration by the Muslim community. I hope the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim Conference will fully consider it and give the community a clear lead.

(19)


Turkestan in a vast country divided into three parts, one
of which is ruled by Russia, the other by Afghanistan and the third by China. In 1914 there was a great deal of discontent in Chinese Turkestan owing to the appointment of Chinese magistrates in that country and an attempt made by the Chinese Government to impose the Chinese language on the population which is almost wholly Muslim. But matters did not come to a head then. As far as I know the present revolution in that country began in 1930 under the leadership of a 17 year old Muslim boy named Chong Yng.

Mr. Petro of the Citroen Haardt expedition who met this “infant” Muslim general in Turkestan related his experiences during a lecture to the Central Asian Society in England in 1932. During that year, Ma Chong Yng was besieging the City of Hami and the services of Mr. Petro were availed of for purposes of peace negotiations with the besieged Chinese forces. Mr. Petro, who was received by the Chinese General and the Chinese Defence Consul in the city, was expecting to be questioned regarding the strength and plans of the army of besiegers. Much to his surprise, however, the first and only question put to him by the Chinese General was: “Is it true that Ma Chong Yng is only 20 years old?” On being told that Ma was less than that age the Chinese General turned to the Defence Consul who was in favour of surrendering the city and said, “I am 81 years old and my hair has been white for a long time. My great-grandson is older than this suckling. How do you think I can surrender this city to an infant?”

The old General acted up to his words and resolutely faced hunger and other privations until he received help from the Chinese Government. During a hard struggle Ma was badly wounded and fled to Kan-su and hostilities came to an end only to be resumed shortly afterwards. Whether Ma is leading the rebellion at its present stage I cannot say; but his career which, according to Mr. Petro, may well form the subject of a modern Odyssey shows that the home of Changez, Taimur and Babar has not ceased to produce
military geniuses of the highest order.

I do not think that the cause of this rebellion is religious fanaticism, though in a movement like this all sorts of human sentiments are liable to be exploited by leaders. The causes, I believe, are mainly economic. The world is also thinking today in terms of race—an attitude of mind which I consider the greatest blot on modern civilisation. I apprehend that the birth of a race-problem in Asia will lead to most disastrous results. The main endeavour of Islam as a religion has been to solve this problem and if modern Asia wishes to avoid the fate of Europe there is no other remedy but to assimilate the ideals of Islam and to think not in terms of race but in terms of mankind.

My apprehension that the revolution in Chinese Turkestan may develop into a Pan-Turanian movement is borne out by the trend of thought in Central Asia. Only the other day the well-edited monthly of Afghanistan, Kabul, published an article from the pen of Dr. Afshaar of Persia calling upon Afghanistan, which was described by the writer as forming part of “the Greater Persia,” to join hands with Persia in order to meet the growing menace of Turanism. In any case the revolution, if it succeeds, is bound to produce repercussions in Afghan and Russian Turkestan, particularly in the latter which is already seething with discontent owing to religious persecution and owing to serious food problem created in the country by the Russian Government’s policy of turning it into a huge cotton farm. In so far as Afghan Turkestan is concerned, the people of Asia may rely, I hope, on the far-sighted idealism of King Nadir Shah.

The success of the revolution will also mean the birth of a prosperous and strong Muslim State in Chinese Turkestan where Muslims, who are about 99 per cent of the population, will be freed from the age-old Chinese oppression. Chinese Turkestan is an extremely fertile country, but owing to Chinese oppression and misrule only five per cent of its land is at present under cultivation. The establishment of another
Muslim State between India and Russia will push the menace of the atheistic materialism of Bolshevism farther away from the borders of our country, even if it does not drive this menace away from Central Asia as a whole.

The Government of Lord Willingdon, who has the gift of rare political vision, has taken up a wise attitude towards happenings in Chinese Turkestan. This attitude explains and justifies the Government of India’s policy regarding the frontiers of Kashmir State.

(20)
Statement on the Disturbances in Kashmir State, issued on 7th June, 1933.

The latest communiqué issued by the Kashmir Government states that things are quiet in Srinagar. The information that has reached me from reliable sources is, however, that the situation is not so easy as the official communiqué tries to make out. I fear that in the Kashmir Government itself there are forces which have worked in the direction of defeating Col. Colvin’s policy.

A communiqué recently issued by the Kashmir Government informed the world that the leaders of Muslim parties were arrested according to a unanimous decision of the Cabinet. This is another statement which is not borne out by private information which comes from reliable sources. It seems to me that Colvin’s judgment of the situation was perfectly correct—a fact which is proved by the results of the so-called unanimous action on the part of the Kashmir Government.

2. Prime Minister, Kashmir State. (Ed.)
3. Mr. Wazir Yusuf’s party and Shaikh Muhammad Abdullah’s party. (Ed.)
I hold no brief for any of the political parties in Kashmir. But the arrests of the leaders of the two parties and subsequent flogging of people and firing and lathi charges on women and children are likely to plunge Kashmir into the same conditions from which it was rescued by Col. Colvin’s policy.

I hope the Kashmir Government will try to discover the psychological background of the present events and adopt an attitude which may bring peace and goodwill.

Recently several Muslims from Jammu and Kashmir have brought to me and other Muslims in Lahore various reports about Kashmir affairs. It was, however, easy to see that their object was to poison the minds of British Indian Muslims against the Muslims in Kashmir. I cannot say why these people have undertaken this curious mission. I, however, consider it my duty to warn, whosoever may be at the back of this move, that members of the Kashmir Committee are not fools and will not fall mb the traps which are perhaps being laid for them.

In conclusion, I appeal to Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the forces that are working against them and to Unite their ranks. The time for two or three Muslim political parties in Kashmir has not yet come. The supreme need of the moment is a single party representing all Muslims in the State. If perfect unanimity of political opinion is not secured in Kashmir, all efforts of leaders to advance the interests of the people of the State will prove ineffective.

4. In his capacity as President of the All-India Kashmir Committee. (Ed.)
Statement on His Resignation of the
Office of the President of the
All-India Kashmir Committee,
Issued on 20th June, 1933.

My Presidentship of the All-India Kaslimir Committee was a temporary arrangement. It will be recalled that the Committee was formed in order to meet a situation which had suddenly arisen in Kashmir. It was considered that the need for such a Committee would disappear before long and no constitution of the Committee was, therefore, framed, its President having been given practically dictatorial authority.

The belief that the Kashmir Committee would not be needed as a permanent institution was, however, falsified by subsequent developments in the Kashmir situation. Most members, therefore, thought that the Committee should have a regular constitution and elect new office-bearers. This idea was reinforced by a certain amount of dissatisfaction which was felt against the composition and working of the Committee on grounds which it would be unpleasant to mention. A meeting of the Committee was therefore called in which the former President submitted his resignation, which was accepted.

In a subsequent meeting of the Committee held during the last week-end, a draft constitution was placed before the members. It aimed at giving the Committee a thoroughly representative character but was opposed by certain members. Further discussion revealed a spirit which gave me to understand that the idea of these gentlemen was to split the Committee into two bodies which would only retain a semblance of outward unity. This is what I plainly told the members before I submitted my resignation.

Unfortunately there are members in the Committee who
recognise no loyalty except to the head of their particular religious sect. This was made clear by a public statement recently made by one of the Ahmadi pleaders who had been conducting the Mirpur cases. He plainly admitted that he recognised no Kashmir Committee and that whatever he or his colleagues did was done in obedience to the command of their religious leader. I confess that I interpreted this statement as a general indication of the Ahmadi attitude of mind and felt doubts about the future working of the Kashmir Committee.

I do not mean to stigmatise anybody. A man is free to develop an attitude which intellectually and spiritually suits his mind best. Indeed I have every sympathy for a man who needs a spiritual prop and finds one in the shrine of a bygone saint or in a living pir.

As far as I am aware there are no differences of opinion among members of the Kashmir Committee regarding the Committee’s general policy. To the formation of a party on the grounds of differences in policy nobody can object. But, according to my view of the situation, the differences in the Kashmir Committee are utterly irrelevant. I do not believe that a smooth working is possible and feel that in the best interests of all concerned the present Kashmir Committee should cease to exist.

At the same time I believe that Kashmir Muslims need the help and guidance of a Kashmir Committee in British India. If British Indian Muslims are anxious to help and guide their Kashmir brethren they are free to reconstitute a Kashmir Committee in a mass meeting. In view of the present situation this is the only course that I can suggest.

I have made an absolutely frank statement of the feelings which led me to resign my office. I hope this plain speaking will hurt nobody as there is no spirit of ill-will or mental reservation behind it.
I thought it unfair to the All-India Kashmir Committee, of which I am the President, to reply to the letter containing the offer without giving my Committee an opportunity of expressing its opinion on it. I informed Dr. Mirza Yaqub Beg to that effect. It has been wrongly inferred from my letter by certain writers in the Press who are probably Qadianis that I have no objection on principle to accepting the office which was offered to me. I therefore hasten to make it clear that I have serious objections on principle not only to accepting the offer but even to entertaining it. My reasons for this attitude are the same as led me to suggest the reconstitution of the All-India Kashmir Committee some time ago.

The offer which has been made to me is obviously a camouflage intended to hoodwink the public into a belief that the old All-India Kashmir Committee still exists as a distinct body from the reconstituted Committee and that the gentlemen who were excluded from the reconstituted Committee are prepared to work under the leadership of the very man who was mainly responsible for the reconstitution.

This device, however, cannot convince me or the Muslim public that the reasons which led me to the reconstitution of the Kashmir Committee have disappeared. No definite declaration has yet emanated from the Qadiani headquarters that in the event of the Qadianis joining a Muslim political organisation, their allegiance will not be divided. On the other hand, events have revealed that what the Qadiani Press describes as “Tehrik-i-Kashmir” and in which, according to the Qadiani newspaper Al-Fazl, Muslims
were only courteously allowed to participate, has entirely different aims and objects from those of the All-India Kashmir Committee. Certain open letters addressed by the head of the Qadiani community to his “Kashmir brethren”—a phrase which appears to have been used in order to avoid the use of the term Muslim for non-Qadiani Kashmiris—disclosed at least some of the inner motives of this Qadiani “Tehrik-i-Kashmir”.

In these circumstances I fail to understand how any Muslim can associate himself with a “Tehrik” which has revealed itself to be the instrument of a specific propaganda even though it seeks to cover itself with a thin veneer of non-sectarianism.

(23)
Statement on the Administrative Reforms in Kashmir, issued on 3rd August, 1933.

The people of India will welcome this communiqué. I hope all the recommendations made by the Glancy Commission will be carried out as soon as possible and that the Kashmir Government will succeed in inspiring complete confidence in the minds of those for whom the reforms are intended. For this purpose an atmosphere of peace and good-will is indispensable between the rulers and the ruled towards whom the Government should behave in such a manner as to make them feel that the Government is not a factor alien to their life and aspirations but an institution of their own through which their legitimate aspirations are to find expression.

I cannot help suggesting to Col. Colvin that in order to win the confidence of the people and restore happy relations

5. Prime Minister, Kashmir State. (Ed.)
between them and the Government he should order the withdrawal of criminal cases pending in Mirpur and Baramula. This will vastly enhance the prestige of the Kashmir administration and the European Prime Minister and take away the sting of propaganda now carried on against him.

(24) Statement on the “Punjab Communal Formula,” issued on 14th July, 1933.

The sponsors of the formula⁶ are alleged to have agreed that the occasion for Punjab Muslims to express an opinion on it would arise only when Hindus and Sikhs have agreed to it. I find that the Hindu Press is opposed to it and the Sikh leader, Master Tara Sigh, has expressed his intention “to fight it tooth and nail”. It is, therefore, hardly necessary for me to enter into a detailed criticism of the formula or the principles underlying it. But I should like to express my general opinion that the formula can be no solution of the Punjab problem. On the other hand, it is likely to become a source of a series of unforeseen disputes among the communities.

Howsoever the constituencies in the provinces may be reserved in order to secure the effect of the Premier’s Award, the scheme will be open to serious objection from the point of view of the urban as well as the rural population. When worked out the scheme is calculated to deprive even

⁶ The “Punjab Communal Formula” was evolved by certain leaders with a view to substituting it in the Punjab for the Premiers Communal Award. Inter alia, it provided that (i) the franchise qualification of three communities be so modified as to reflect the population of each community in the voting register; (ii) the electorates shall be joint and the whole province was to be divided into singlemember constituencies, the division being territorial on a population basis; and (iii) the constituencies allotted to each community shall be such wherein its percentage of voters was the largest. (Ed.)
those rural sections of proper representation who are in a majority in their constituencies.

After having considered all its various aspects and all the possible disputes which it may create, I am firmly of the opinion that the scheme is harmful to the best interests of every community and not nearly as good from the point of view of any community as the Premier’s Award.

In view of the opposition offered to the scheme by Hindus and Sikhs and in view of the fact that the motives for its Muslim sponsors, if there are any, are being misinterpreted, I earnestly appeal to the authors of the scheme to wash their hands off a formula which cannot inspire confidence in the mind of any community and refrain from introducing it in the Punjab Legislative Council.

(25)
Statement Explaining Sir Fazl-i-Husain’s Observation in the Council of State regarding Pan-Islamism, issued on 19th September, 1933.

Sir Fazl-i-Husain is perfectly correct when he says that political Pan-Islamism never existed. It has existed, if at all, only in the imagination of those who invented the phrase or possibly as a diplomatic weapon in the hands of Sultan Abdul Hamid Khan of Turkey. Even Jamal-ul-Din Afghani, whose name is closely associated with what is called Pan-Islamic movement, never dreamed of a unification of Muslims into a political State.

It is significant that in no Islamic language—Arabic, Persian or Turkish—does there exist a phrase corresponding to Pan-Islamism.

It is, however, true that Islam as a society or as a practical
scheme for the combination not only of races and nations but also of all religions does not recognise the barriers of race and nationality or geographical frontiers. In the sense of this humanitarian ideal Pan-Islamism—if one prefers to use this unnecessarily long phrase to the simple expression “Islam”—does and will always exist.

Sir Fazl-i-Husain’s advice to Indian Muslims to stand on their own legs as an Indian nation is perfectly sound and I have no doubt that Muslims fully understand and appreciate it. Indian Muslims, who happen to be a more numerous people than the Muslims of all other Asiatic countries put together, ought to consider themselves the greatest asset of Islam and should sink in their own deeper self like other Muslim nations of Asia in order to gather up their scattered sources of life and, according to Sir Fazli’s advice, “stand on their own legs.”

(26)
Statement on the Proposed Afghan University, published on 19th October, 1933.

An educated Afghanistan will be the best friend of India. The building of a new University at Kabul and the development of the Peshawar Islamia College into another University on the western border of India will very much help in the uplift of the shrewd Afghan tribes who inhabit the country that lies between our frontier and the Afghan frontier.

His Majesty the King of Afghanistan invited us to advise

7. Dr. Iqbal, Sir Ross Masud and Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. (Ed.)
his Education Minister on matters connected with the proposed University at Kabul. We felt it our duty to respond to his call. It appears from the various publications emerging from Kabul that the younger generation of Afghans are thoroughly in earnest about modern knowledge, and its coordination with their religion and culture. The Afghans are a fine people and as Indians it is our duty to help them to advance as much as they can. There are very clear indications of the development of new consciousness in that people, and we hope we may be able to advise them on matters of education in the light of our Indian experience. Personally I believe that complete secularisation of education has not produced good results anywhere especially in Muslim lands. Nor is there any absolute system of education. Each country has its own needs and its educational problems must be discussed and solved in the light of those needs.

(27)
Statement on the Conditions in Afghanistan, issued on 6th November, 1933.

The first thing which we noticed was that there is complete safety of life and property in the country. This is in itself a remarkable achievement for a Government which overcame a widespread rebellion only four years ago. Another thing which impressed us was the very earnest manner in which all the Ministers are discharging their duties. Even the orthodox party stands solidly behind these

8. This statement was issued jointly with Sir Ross Masud and Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. (Ed.)
workers and consequently there is—as was stated in our presence by a leading Afghan
divine—no difference between the mullas and the young men in the Afghanistan of today.

It is the intention of the Afghan Government to reorganise the entire department of
Public Instruction on modern lines and at the same time to improve all roads which
connect Afghanistan with neighbouring countries. A beautiful and commodious palace in
Kabul has already been reserved for the new University which is gradually developing.
Higher education is being imparted in medicine, this being the first faculty to be
organised. The next faculty to be organised will be that of civil engineering. As regards
the roads a new one joining Kabul with Peshawar will be completed within the next two
years. This road has been carefully planned. A road leading to Russian frontiers has
already been completed and is of obvious importance as it brings Central Asia nearer to
Central Europe.

We had the honour of a long interview with His Majesty the King of Afghanistan
whose sole desire is to see his country flourishing and living in peace and amity with its
neighbours.

Thus Afghanistan represents today a united country where in every direction one
sees signs of a new awakening and where the authorities are engaged in drawing up
programmes of well-planned work. We have come back from that country with a
conviction that if those who are in power are given an opportunity of continuing their
work for ten years, he future prosperity of Afghanistan will have been assured.
IV. Miscellaneous Statements, etc.

(28)
Statement Explaining the Attitude of
Muslim Delegates to the Round Table Conferences,
issued on 6th December, 1933.

I have never had the pleasure of meeting Pandit Jawahar Lal, though I have always admired his sincerity and outspokenness. His latest statement in reply to his Mahasabhite critics has a ring of sincerity which is rare in the pronouncements of present-day politicians in India. It seems, however, that he is not in full possession of the facts regarding the behaviour of Muslim delegates to the Round Table Conferences held in London during the past three years.

He has been led to believe that Mr. Gandhi offered personally to accept all the Muslim demands on condition that Muslims assured him of their full support in the political struggle for freedom and that reactionaryism rather than communalism prevented Muslims from accepting this condition. This is a perfectly wrong statement of what happened in London.

Pandit Jawahar Lai has described His Highness the Agha Khan as the greatest inspirer of “political reactionaryism” among Muslims. The truth, however, is that it was the Agha Khan himself who assured Mr. Gandhi in the presence of several Indian delegates, including myself, that if the Hindus or the Congress agreed to Muslim demands, the entire Muslim community would be ready to serve as his (Mr. Gandhi’s) camp-followers in the political struggle.

Mr. Gandhi weighed the Agha Khan’s words and his offer to accept Muslim demands came later and was hedged round with conditions. The first condition was that Mr. Gandhi would accept the Muslim demands in his personal capacity and would try to secure, but not guarantee, the
acceptance of his position by the Congress. I asked him to wire to the Congress Executive and secure its consent to his offer. He said he knew that the Congress would not make him their plenipotentiary on the question.

Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru can easily refer to Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, who sat near me at the time, as to her observations which she shared with me on Mr. Gandhi’s attitude. Mr. Gandhi was then asked to secure at least the Hindu and Sikh delegates’ consent to his offer. He did make something like an attempt to do so but failed and privately expressed his disappointment with their attitude.

Mr. Gandhi’s second and most unrighteous condition was that Muslims should not support the special claims of Untouchables, particularly their claim to special representation. It was pointed out to him that it did not lie in the mouth of Muslims to oppose those very claims on the part of the Untouchables which they were advancing for themselves and that if Mr. Gandhi could arrive at a mutual understanding with the Untouchables the Muslims would certainly not stand in their way. Mr. Gandhi, however, insisted on this condition. I should like to know how far Pandit Jawahar Lal with his well-known socialist views would sympathise with such an inhuman condition.

This is the inner history of the negotiations between Mr. Gandhi and Muslim delegates. I would leave it to Pandit Jawahar Lal to judge whether the alleged political reactionaryism among Muslim delegates or the narrow political outlook of others was responsible for the result of negotiations.

The offer which His Highness the Agha Khan made to Mr. Gandhi two years ago still holds good. If under Pandit Nehru’s leadership the Hindus or the Congress agree to the safeguards which Muslims believe to be necessary for their protection as an all-India minority, the Muslims are still ready to serve, in the Agha Khan’s words, as camp-followers.
of the majority community in the country’s political struggle. If, however, he is unable to accept this offer let him at least not accuse Muslims of political reactionaryism but leave those who understand the motive and purposes of Hindu communalism to draw the conclusion that he is in essential agreement with the Mahasabha in the latter’s campaign against the Communal Award.

Another accusation which Pandit Jawahar Lal brings against Muslims is that some of them are definitely “anti-national”. If by “nationalism” he means a fusion of the communities in a biological sense, I should personally plead guilty to the charge of anti-nationalism. The building up of a nation in this sense is in my opinion neither possible nor perhaps desirable in the peculiar circumstances of India. In this sense perhaps the greatest anti-national leader in India of today is Mr. Gandhi who has made it a life-mission to prevent the fusion of Untouchables with other communities and to retain them in the fold of Hinduism without any real fusion even between them and the caste Hindus. As far as I can judge it, his message to the Untouchables amounts to this: “Do not leave Hinduism. Remain in it without being part of it.”

A man who opposes nationalism in the sense of a fusion of the communities is, however, not necessarily anti-national. It is obvious that there are interests common to the various communities of India. In so far as these interests are concerned, an understanding among the communities is possible; according to my belief, it is bound to come. The present situation is only a necessary stage in the country’s political evolution. A united India will have to be built on the foundation of concrete facts, i.e. the distinct existence of more than one people in the country. The sooner Indian leaders of political thought get rid of the idea of a unitary Indian nation based on something like a biological fusion of the communities, the better for all concerned.

Pandit iawahar Lal further seems to think that Muslims,
while believing in democracy as a religious institution, are afraid of democracy in practice. He overlooks the fact that the communal electorates and other safeguards on which Muslims insist are only intended to prevent 80 million members of a comparatively poor and backward community from being ousted from all real advantages of democracy. The Muslim wants safeguards not because he is afraid of democracy but because he has reason to be afraid of communal oligarchy in the garb of democracy in India. He wants to ensure the substance of democracy even at the expense of its conventional form.

As for his reference to the speeches made by His Highness the Agha Khan, Dr. Shafaat Ahmed and myself before a gathering of members of the House of Commons, I have only to say that the kind of statements attributed to us were never magic. It is unfair to cite the impressions of a Press correspondent instead of an authorised text of our speeches in such an argument. No Indian can believe for a moment that it is impossible to govern India except through a British agency.

In conclusion I must put a straight question to Pandit Jawahar Lal. How is India’s problem to be solved if the majority community will neither concede the minimum safeguards necessary for the protection of a minority of 80 million people nor accept the award of a third party, but continue to talk of a kind of nationalism which works out only to its own benefit? This position can admit of only two alternatives. Either the Indian majority community will have to accept for itself the permanent position of an agent of British imperialism in the East or the country will have to be redistributed on a basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities so as to do away with the question of electorates and the communal problem in its present form.
IV. Miscellaneous Statements, etc.

(29)
Statement on the Congress Attitude towards the Communal Award, issued on 19th June, 1934.

The Congress claims to represent equally all the communities of India and declares that, in view of the sharp difference of opinion in India regarding the Communal Award, it can neither accept nor reject it; yet its comments on the Award amount to a rejection by implication. Consistently with its claim it ought not to have expressed any opinion about the Award. The Congress Working Committee has deliberately chosen to ignore the important fact that the Award, though it has been incorporated in the White Paper, does not stand or fall with it, but stands on an entirely different footing. While the other parts of the White Paper are proposals, the Award represents a decision given by the British Premier at the request of the very men who are now opposing it.

The Congress Working Committee has tried by this resolution to hide its inner communalism, but in the very act of doing so has unveiled its designs to such an extent that no Muslim will fail to see through the game. At this critical juncture I would advise the Muslims of India to stand boldly by the Communal Award even though it does not concede all their demands. This is the only course they can adopt as a practical people.
(30)

I am still invalid and fear I cannot write to you a long letter giving you in detail my views on the Palestine Report and the strange thoughts and feelings which it has engendered or is likely to engender in the mind of Indian Muslims as well as the Muslims of Asia generally. I think it is time for the National League of England to rise to the occasion and to save the British people from the great injustice to Arabs, to whom definite promises were given by British politicians in the name of British people. Through wisdom alone comes power; and when power abandons the ways of wisdom and relies upon itself alone, its end is death.

Prince Muhammad Ali of Egypt has made a constructive suggestion which must receive consideration from the British people. We must not forget that Palestine does not belong to England. She is holding it under a mandate from the League of Nations, which Muslim Asia is now learning to regard as an Anglo-French institution invented for the purpose of dividing the territories of weaker Muslim peoples. Nor does Palestine belong to the Jews, who by the Arabs. Nor is Zionism a religious movement. Apart from the movement, the Palestine Report itself has brought out this fact in a perfectly clear manner. Indeed the impression given to the unprejudiced reader is that Zionism as a movement was deliberately created, not for the purpose of giving a National Home to the Jews but mainly for the purpose of giving a home to British Imperialism on the Mediterranean littoral.

The Report amounts, on the whole, to a sale under duress to the British of the Holy Places in the shape of the
permanent mandate which the Commission has invented in order to cover their imperialist designs. The price of this sale is an amount of money to the Arabs plus an appeal to their generosity and a piece of land to the Jews. I do hope that British statesmen will abandon this policy of actual hostility to the Arabs and restore their country to them. I have no doubt that the Arabs will be ready to come to an understanding with the British and, if necessary, with the French also. If the British people are duped by propaganda against the Arabs, I fear the consequences of the present policy will be grave.

(31)
Statement on the Report Recommending the Partition of Palestine, Read at a Public Meeting Held under the Auspices of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League at Lahore on 27th July, 1937.

I assure the people that I feel the injustice done to the Arabs as keenly as anybody else who understands the situation in the Near East. I have no doubt that the British people can still be awakened to the fulfillment of the pledges given to the Arabs in the name of England. The British Parliament, I am glad to say, have in the recent Parliamentary debates left the question of partition open. This decision affords an excellent opportunity to the Muslims of the world emphatically declare to that the problem which the British statesmen are tackling is not one of Palestine only, but seriously affects the entire Muslim world.

The problem, studied in its historical perspective, is
purely a Muslim problem. In the light of the history of Israel, Palestine ceased to be a Jewish problem long before the entry of Caliph ‘Umar into Jerusalem more than 1300 years ago. Their dispersion, as Professor Hockings has pointed out, was perfectly voluntary and their scriptures were for the most part written outside Palestine. Nor was it ever a Christian problem. Modern historical research has doubted even the existence of Peter the Hermit. Even if we assume that the Crusades were an attempt to make Palestine a Christian problem, this attempt was defeated by the victories of Salah-ud-Din. I, therefore, regard Palestine as a purely Muslim problem.

Never were the motives of British imperialism as regards the Muslim people of the Near East so completely unmasked as in the Report of the Royal Commission. The idea of a national home for the Jews in Palestine was only a device. In fact, British imperialism sought a home for itself in the form of a permanent mandate in the religious home of the Muslims. This is indeed a dangerous experiment, as a member of British Parliament has rightly described it, and can never lead to a solution of the British problem in the Mediterranean. Far from being a solution of the British problem in the Mediterranean it is really the beginning of the future difficulties of British imperialism. The sale of the Holy Land, including the Mosque of ‘Umar, inflicted on the Arabs with the threat of martial law and softened by an appeal to their generosity, reveals bankruptcy of statesmanship rather than its achievement. The offer of a piece of rich land to the Jews and the rocky desert plus cash to the Arabs is no political wisdom. It is a low transaction unworthy and damaging to the honour of a great people in whose name definite promises of liberty and confederation were given to the Arabs.

It is impossible for me to discuss the details of the Palestine Report in this short statement. There are, however, important lessons which Muslims of Asia ought to
take to heart. Experience has made it abundantly clear that the political integrity of the peoples of the Near East lies in the immediate reunion of the Turks and the Arabs. The policy of isolating the Turks from the rest of the Muslim world is still in action. We hear now and then that the Turks are repudiating Islam. A greater lie was never told. Only those who have no idea of the history of the concepts of Islamic jurisprudence fall an easy prey to this sort of mischievous propaganda.

The Arabs, whose religious consciousness gave birth to Islam (which united the various races of Asia with remarkable success), must never forget the consequences arising out of their deserting the Turks in their hour of trial.

Secondly, the Arab people must further remember that they cannot afford to rely on the advice of those Arab kings who are not in a position to arrive at an independent judgment in the matter of Palestine with an independent conscience. Whatever they decide they should decide on their own initiative after a full understanding of the problem before them.

Thirdly, the present moment is also a moment of trial for the Muslim statesmen of the free non-Arab Muslim countries of Asia. Since the abolition of the Caliphate this is the first serious international problem of both a religious and political nature which historical forces are compelling them to face. The possibilities of the Palestine problem may eventually compel them seriously to consider their position as members of that Anglo-French institution, miscalled the League of Nations, and to explore practical means for the formation of an Eastern League of Nations.
(32)
Letter to Miss Farquharson about the
Palestine Problem, 6th September, 1937.

I am very glad to see that the National League is taking a keen interest in the matter of Palestine and I have no doubt that the League will eventually succeed in making the British people realise the true meaning of the situation and the political consequences which may follow in case Britain loses the friendship of the Arabs. I have been more or less in touch with Egypt, Syria and Iraq. I also received letters from Najaf. You must have read that the Shi’as of Kerbala and Najaf have made a strong protest against the partition of Palestine. The Persian Prime Minister and the President of the Turkish Republic have also spoken and protested.

In India too the feeling is rapidly growing more and more intense. The other day 50,000 Muslims met at Delhi and protested against the Palestine Commission. It is further reported in the Press that some Muslims have been arrested in Cawnpore in connection with the Palestine question. It is now perfectly clear that the entire Muslim world is united on this question

I have every reason to believe that the National League will save England from the grave political blunder and in so doing it will serve both England and the Muslim world

(33)
Statement Urging the Creation of a Chair
for Islamic Research, published on
10th December, 1937.

I am very grateful to Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan for the
many kind things he has said of me in his message to the Inter-Collegiate Muslim Brotherhood, Lahore.

I wish, however, to say a few words regarding his proposal that my readers and others interested in my work should present a purse to me. I feel that the needs of the people as a whole are far more pressing than the needs of a private individual even though his work may have been a source of inspiration to most people. The individual and his needs pass away: the people and their needs remain.

The creation of a chair for Islamic research on modern lines in the local islamia College is the crying need of the country. Nowhere in India has the ignorance of Islamic history, theology, jurisprudence and Sufism been so successfully exploited as in the Punjab.

It is high time to show to the people by a careful genetic study of islamic thought and life what the faith really stands for and how its main ideas and problems have been stifled under the pressure of a hard crust which has grown over the conscience of modern Indian Islam. This crust demands immediate removal so that the conscience of the younger generation may find a free and natural expression.

Even now Muslims will find much of interest in this institution, for Islam is and has been a very important phase in the life of Asiatic peoples and has played a great role in the religious and intellectual evolution of mankind.

I do hope this will meet the Premier’s approval and his influence will make this proposal a success. I offer a humble contribution of Rs. 100 to the fund.
The modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified. Today space and time are being annihilated and man is achieving amazing successes in unveiling the secrets of nature and harnessing its forces to his own service. But in spite of all these developments, the tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face in the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way of which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. The so-called statesmen to whom government and leadership of men was entrusted have proved demons of bloodshed, tyranny and oppression. The rulers whose duty it was to protect and cherish those ideals which go to form a higher humanity, to prevent man’s oppression of man and to elevate the moral and intellectual level of mankind, have, in their hunger for dominion and imperial possessions, shed the blood of millions and reduced millions to servitude simply in order to pander to the greed and avarice of their own particular groups. After subjugating and establishing their dominion over weaker peoples, they have robbed them of their religions, their morals, of their cultural traditions and their literatures. Then they sowed divisions among them that they should shed one another’s blood and go to sleep under the opiate of serfdom, so that the leech of imperialism might go on sucking their blood without interruption.

As I look back on the year that has passed and as I look at the world in the midst of the New Year’s rejoicing, it may
be Abyssinia or Palestine, Spain or China, the same misery prevails in every corner of man’s earthly home, and hundreds of thousands of men are being butchered mercilessly. Engines of destruction created by science are wiping out the great landmarks of man’s cultural achievements. The governments which are not themselves engaged in this drama of fire and blood are sucking the blood of the weaker peoples economically. It is as if the day of doom had come upon the earth, in which each looks after the safety of his own skin, and in which no voice of human sympathy or fellowship is audible.

The world’s thinkers are stricken dumb. Is this going to the end of all this progress and evolution of civilisation, they ask, that men should destroy one another in mutual hatred and make human habitation impossible on this earth? Remember, man can he maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battle ground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational forces of the whole world are directed to inculcating in man respect for mankind. Do you not see that the people of Spain, though they have the same common bond by one race, one nationality, one language and one religion, are cutting one another’s throats and destroying their culture and civilisation by their own hands owing to difference in their economic creed? This one event shows clearly that national unity too is not a very durable force. Only one unity is dependable, and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be

9. The references here are to Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, the unrest in Palestine resulting from the Peel Commission’s recommendation to partition Palestine, Civil War in Spain and the invasion of China by Japan. (Ed.)
able to lead a happy and contended life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise.

Let us therefore begin the New Year with the prayer that God Almighty may grant humanity to those who are in places of power and government and teach them to cherish mankind.

(35)
Statement on Islam and Nationalism in Reply to a Statement of Maulana Husain Ahmad, published in the Ehsan on 9th March, 1938.

In my verse

I have used the world “milat” in the sense of “qaum” (nation). No doubt, the world “millat” has been used to mean law and religion in Arabic, and especially in the Holy Quran, but there exists in modern Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages considerable evidence to show that the word “millat” is also used in the sense of nation. In my writings I have generally used the word in the latter sense. But in view of the fact that the meaning of the word “milat” does not, to any extent, affect the issues under consideration, I, leaving aside this controversy altogether, take it that Maulana Husain Ahmad said that nations are formed by lands. As a matter of fact, I have nothing to say even against this statement of the Maulana. Objection must, however, be raised when it is contended that in modern times nations are formed by lands and the Indian Muslims are advised to
IV. Miscellaneous Statements, etc.

accept this view. Such advice brings before our minds the Western modern conception of nationalism, to one aspect of which it is absolutely essential for a Muslim to take exception. It is a pity that my objection has led the Maulana to think that what I had in mind was to propagate the cause of some political party. Far from it. I have been repudiating the concept of nationalism since the time when it was not well known in India and the Muslim World. At the very start it had become clear to me from the writings of European authors that the imperialistic designs of Europe were in great need of this effective weapon the propagation of the European conception of nationalism in Muslim countries—to shatter the religious unity of Islam to pieces. And the plan did succeed during the Great War. It has now reached its climax inasmuch as some of the religious leaders in India lend their support to this conception. Strange, indeed, are the vicissitudes of time. Formerly, the half Westernised educated Muslims were under the spell of Europe; now the curse has descended upon religious leaders. Perhaps modern conceptions of Europe seem attractive to them but alas!

I have just said that the Maulana’s statement that nations are formed by lands is not open to objection. This is so because from remote past nations have been associated with countries and countries with nations. We are all Indians and are so called because we live in that part of the world which is known by the name of India. So with the Chinese, the Arabs, the Japanese, the Persians, etc. The word “country” used in this statement is merely a geographical term and, as such, does not clash with Islam. Its boundaries change with time. Till recently those living in Burma were Indians: at present they are Burmese. In this sense every human being loves the land of his birth, and according to his capacity
remains prepared to make sacrifices for it. Some unthinking persons support this by the saying ___________ 10 which they think is a tradition of the Prophet, but this is hardly necessary. Love of one’s native land is a natural instinct and requires no impressions to nourish it. In the present-day political literature, however, the idea of nation is not merely geographical: it is rather a principle of human society and as such it is a political concept. Since Islam also is a law of human society, the word “country” when used as a political concept, comes into conflict with islam. No one else knows it better than Maulana Husain Ahmad that in its principles of human association Islam admits of no modus vivendi and is not prepared to compromise with any other law regulating human society. Indeed it declares that every code of law other than that of islam is inadequate and unacceptable. This principle raises some political controversies closely connected with India. For instance, cannot the Muslims live in unity with other nations? Cannot the various nations and communities unite for serving the country’s ends and so on and so forth? I must, however, perforce, leave these questions aside because at the moment my object is to criticise the religious aspect alone of the Maulana ’s statement.

 Besides rational arguments, experience also proves the truth of the above-mentioned claim of Islam. First, if the purpose of human society is to ensure peace and security for the nations and to transform their present social organism into a single social order, then one cannot think of any other social order than that of Islam. This is so because, according to my reading of the Quran, Islam does not aim at the moral reformation of the individual alone; it also aims at a gradual but fundamental revolution in the social life of mankind, which should altogether change its national and racial viewpoint and create in its place a purely human consciousness. The history of religions conclusively shows

 10. “Love of one’s country is a part of one’s faith.”
that in ancient times religion was national as in the case of Egyptians, Greeks and Persians. Later on, it became racial as that of the Jews. Christianity taught that religion is an individual and private affair. Religion having become synonymous with private beliefs, Europe began to think that the State alone was responsible for the social life of man. It was Islam and Islam alone which, for the first time, gave the message to mankind that religion was neither national and racial, nor individual and private, but purely human and that its purpose was to unite and organise mankind despite all its natural distinctions. Such a system cannot be built on beliefs alone. And this is the only way in which harmony and concord can be introduced in the sentiments and thoughts of mankind. This harmony is essential for the formation and preservation of a community. How beautifully sings Maulana Roomi:

Any other way will be irreligious and contrary to human dignity. The example of Europe is before the world. When the religious unity of Europe got shattered and the nations of that continent became disunited, Europeans began to search for the basis of national life. Obviously, Christianity could not be such a basis. The Europeans found this basis in the idea of nationality. But what has been the end of their choice?—The Reformation of Luther, the period of unsound rationalism, and separation—indeed war—between the principles of religion and State. Where did these forces drive Europe to?—To irreligiousness, religious scepticism and economic conflicts. Does Maulana Husain Ahmad desire that the experiment should be repeated in Asia? The Maulana thinks that in the present-day world land is the necessary basis of a nation. No doubt, this is the general feeling these days, but it is also evident that this basis is by itself inadequate. There are a number of other forces also which are necessary for the formation of a nation. For instance, indifference towards religion, absorption in the
day-to-day political issues, and so on. Besides, there are also other factors which statesmen think out for themselves as means for maintaining unity and harmony in that nation. The Maulana ignores the fact that if such a nation-comprises different religions and communities, the communities generally die away and the only common factor that remains in the individuals of that nation is irreligiousness. Not even a layman, let alone religious leaders, who thinks that religion is a necessary factor for human life, desires that such a state of affairs should he brought about in India. So far as the Muslims are concerned, it is a pity that, simple-minded as they are, they are not fully aware of the consequences of this view of nationalism. If some Muslims have fallen into the error that religion and nationalism can go hand in hand as a political concept, then I want to give a timely warning to the Muslims that this course will ultimately lead to irreligiousness. And if this does not happen, Islam will be reduced to an ethical ideal with indifference to its social order as an inevitable consequence.

But the mischief latent in Maulana Husain Ahmad's statement demands closer examination. I, therefore, hope that readers will peruse the following lines carefully. Maulana Husain Ahmad is a learned divine: he cannot therefore be unaware of the dangerous consequences of the view he has set forth for the followers of Muhammad. Whether he has used the word “qaum” or “millat” is immaterial. To use a word for a party which, according to him, consists of the followers of Muhammad and to say that land forms the basis of that party is very regrettable and unfortunate. It appears from his statement that he does feel conscious of his mistake, but not to the extent which should lead to its admission or rectification. A purely verbal and philological argument is mere quibbling. And a philological distinction between mi/kit and qaum is no consolation. The distinction may perhaps console those who are unaware of the truths of the faith of Islam. Surely, this statement cannot deceive those who are in the know of things.
The Maulana has not realised that by offering his interpretation he has put before the Muslims two wrong and dangerous views. First, that the Muslims as a nation can be other than what they are as a mu'at. Secondly, because as a nation they happen to be Indian, they should, leaving aside their faith, lose their identity in the nationality of other Indian nations or in “Indianism”. It is merely quibbling on the words qaum and millat. Otherwise the view is the same that has been described above and which the majority community in this country and its leaders are every day persuading the Indian Muslims to adopt, viz, that religion and politics are entirely separate, and if the Muslims want to live in this country, they must understand religion to be a merely private affair which should be confined to individuals alone. Politically they should not regard themselves as a separate nation: they should rather lose themselves in the majority.

By saying that he has not used the word “millat” in his speech, the Maulana seems to pretend that he regards millat as something higher than nation. “There is,” he says, “a world of difference between the two, and if the nation be compared to the earth, millat is like heaven.” In actual practice, however, he has left no place for millat by preaching to the eight crore Muslims to lose their identity in the country, and therefore in the majority, and to make nation a heaven and to ignore the fact that Islam will thereby be reduced to the status of the earth.

By supposing that I was unaware of the difference between the meanings of qaum and millat and that before writing the verse I had neither examined the Press report of the Maulana’s speech nor looked up the Qamus, the Maulana has charged me with ignorance of the Arabic language. I welcome the charge. It would, however, have been better if the Maulana had, if not for me, at least for the sake of the Muslim community, passed beyond the Qamus and referred to the Quran and, before placing this
dangerous and un-Islamic view before the Muslims, had consulted the holy revelation sent by God. I admit that I am neither a learned divine nor a litterateur in Arabic:

But why was the Maulana content with Qamus alone? Has not the word “qaum” been used hundreds of times in the Quran? And has not the word “millat” occurred repeatedly in the Quran? What do qaum and millat mean in the Quranic verses? Is not the word “ummat” also used in addition to these two words to denote the followers of the Prophet? Are these words so divergent in meaning that because of this difference one single nation can have different aspects, so much so that in matters of religion and law it should observe the divine code, while from the viewpoint of nationality it should follow a system which may be opposed to the religious system.

Had the Maulana sought evidence from the Quran, I am confident, the solution of this problem would have automatically suggested itself to him. The philological meaning of the words given by the Maulana is to a great extent correct. “Qaum” literally means “a group of persons excluding women” Philologically, then, women are not included in qaum. But it is obvious that when the Holy Quran makes mention of the qaum of Musa and the qaum of ‘Ad, women are included in qaum. millat also means religion and law. But the question is not one of difference between the dictionary meanings of the two words. The real question is this: First, are the Muslims collectively a single, united and definite party founded on the Unity of God and the Finality of Prophethood as its basis, or are they a party which, owing to the requirements of race, nation and colour can, leaving aside their religious unity, adopt some other social order based upon a different system and law? Secondly, has the
Quran ever employed the word “qaum” to denote this idea? Or does it use the words “ummat” or “millat” only? Thirdly, which word does the divine revelation employ in this connection? Does any Quranic verse say, ‘O ye people,” or “O ye faithful! join the qaum of Muslims or follow it”’? Or is the call to follow the millat and to join the ummat?

So far as I have been able to understand, wherever the Quran calls upon the people to follow and join the Muslim party, the word “millat” or “ummat” is used. There is no call to follow or join any particular nation. For instance, the Quran says:

11.

The call is to obey and to follow millat because millat stands for a religion, a law and a programme. As qaum is no law or religion, it was of no use calling upon people to follow and to adhere to it. A group, whether it be a tribe or a race, a band of dacoits or a company of business men, the dwellers of a city or the inhabitants of a country as a geographical unit, is a mere group either of men or of both men and women. From the viewpoint of divine revelation and of a Prophet, this group is not yet a guided one. If revelation to a Prophet appears in this group, it will be the first to be addressed and it is for this reason associated with it, e.g. qaum of Noah, qaum of Moses and qaum of Lot. If, on the contrary, this group instead of following a Prophet follows a king or a chief, it will be attributable to him also, e.g. the qaum of ‘Ad, the qaum of Pharaoh. If two groups happen to live in one country and if they follow mutually opposed leaders, they can still be associated with both the leaders; for instance, the qaum of Moses lived side by side with the qaum of Pharaoh:

11. “Who is better in religion than he who surrendereth his purpose to Allah while doing good (to men) and followeth the ,isillat of Abraham, the upright?” iv. 125).
But wherever the world “qaum” occurs, it is used to mean a group including both the guided and the unguided. Those who followed the Prophet, professed the Unity of God, became part and parcel of the millat of that Prophet and his religion. In plainer language, they became Muslims. It must be remembered that the unbelievers can also have a faith and millat:

A qaum can have a millat or a particular way of life. The millat of a qaum, on the other hand, has nowhere been used. This means that, in the Quran, God has used the word “millat” and not “qaum” for the those persons who after renouncing different qaums and millats embraced the millat of Abraham.

What I have said above means that, so far as I have been able to see, no other word except ummat has been used for Muslims in the Holy Quran. If it is otherwise, I would very much like to know it. Qaum means a party of men, and this party can come into being in a thousand places and in a thousand forms upon the basis of tribe, race, colour language, land and ethical code. Millat, on the contrary, will carve out of the different parties a new and common party In other words, millat or ummat embraces nations but cannot be merged in them.

Circumstances have forced the present-day utema to say things and interpret the Quran in a way which could never have been the intention of the Prophet and the Quran. Who does not know that Abraham was the first Prophet in whose revelation the distinctions of nations, races and lands were

12. The chiefs of Pharaoh’s people said, ‘(O king?) wilt thou suffer Moses and his people to make mischief in the land?’ (vii. 127).
13. “LO! I have forsaken the religion of a people who do not believe in God” (xii. 37).
set aside? Humanity was divided into two classes only monotheists and polytheists. Since then there are only two ummats in the world, without a third. The guardians of the Kaaba have today neglected the call of Abraham and Ishmael. Those who have put on the garb of nationalism do not think of that prayer of the founders of this millat which the two Prophets uttered when laying the foundation of the Kaaba:

14. “And when Abraham and Ishmael were raising the foundations of the House, (Abraham prayed): Our Lord? accept from us (this duty). Lo! Thou only Thou, art the Hearer, the Knower. Our Lord and make us submissive unto thee and of our seed a nation submissive unto Thee” (ii. 127-28).

After getting the name of ummat-i-Muslimah from the Court of God was there any room left for merging part of the form of our society into some Arabian, Persian, Afghani, English, Egyptian or Indian nationality? There is only one millat confronting the Muslim community, that of the non-Muslims taken collectively.

The name of the faith which the Muslim community professes is “din-i-qayyim” in which term lies concealed a remarkable Quranic point, namely, that it is this religion alone in which is vested the responsibility of sustaining the present and future life of a group of people which surrenders its individual and social life to its system. In other words, according to the Quran, it is the religion of Islam alone which sustains a nation in its true cultural or political sense. It is for this reason that the Quran openly declares that any system other than that of Islam must be deprecated and rejected.

There is another subtle point which the Muslims must ponder over. If the sentiment of nationalism was so important and valuable, why then did some of the people of
his own family, race and land rise against the Holy Prophet (God’s blessings be upon him)? Why did the Prophet not regard Islam as an all-embracing millat and from the viewpoint of nation or nationalism continue to own and encourage Abu Jahl and Abu Lahab? Indeed, why did he not keep the bond of national affinity with them in the political affairs of Arabia? If Islam stood for complete independence, the Quraish of Mecca had the same ideal before them. It is unfortunate that the Maulana does not consider the fact that the Messenger of God was concerned with the freedom of the upright faith of Islam and the Muslim community. To ignore the Muslims or to make them subservient to some other social order and then to seek some other kind of freedom was simply meaningless. The Prophet had to wage a defensive war against Abu Jahl and Abu Lahab because they could not tolerate Islam flourishing in freedom.

Before his call to Prophethood, the nation of Muhammad (peace be upon him) was no doubt a nation and a free one, but as Muhammad’s ummat began to be formed, the status of the people as a nation became a secondary one. Those who accepted Muhammad’s leadership became part and parcel of the Muslim or Muhammadan community irrespective of the fact whether they belonged to his own nation or other nations. Formerly they had been slaves of land and race: land and race now became their slaves:

It was a very easy course for Muhammad to tell Abu Lahab, Abu Jahl, or the Unbelievers of Mecca that they could stick to their idol-worship while he himself would hold fast to the worship of God and that they could together form an Arabian unity by virtue of the factors of race and land common to them both. God forbid, but if he had adopted this course, it would certainly have done him credit as a
patriot but not as the last Prophet. The ultimate purpose of the prophetic mission of Muhammad (may peace be upon him) is to create a form of society, the constitution of which follows that divine law which the Prophet Muhammad received from God. In other words, the object is to purify the nation of the world of the abuses which go by the name of time, place, land, nation, race, genealogy, country, etc., although the differences of nations, tribe, colours and languages are at the same time acknowledged. It is thus to bestow upon man that spiritual idea which at every moment of his life remains in constant contact with Eternity. This is where Muhammad stands and this is the ideal of the Muslim community. How many centuries will it take man to reach these heights, none can say, but there is no doubt that in removing the material differences between the nations of the world and in bringing about harmony among them in spite of their differences of nations, tribes, races, colours and languages, Islam has done something in thirteen hundred years what other religions could not do in three thousand years. Take it from me that the religion of Islam is an imperceptible and unfeelable biologico-psychological activity which is capable of influencing the thoughts and actions of mankind without any missionary effort. To invalidate such an activity by the innovations of present-day political thinkers is to do violence to mankind as well as to the universality of that prophetic mission which gave birth to it.

That part of Maulana Husain Ahmad’s statement in which he has asked the Editor of the Ehsan to produce an authority in support of the view that the millat of Islam is founded upon human dignity and brotherhood, must surprise many Muslims. To me, however, it has not come as a surprise, because, like misfortune, error too never comes alone. When a Muslim’s mind and heart are over-powered by that idea of nationalism which the Maulana is preaching, then it is inevitable that various kinds of doubts should arise in his mind concerning the foundation of Islam. From nationalism thoughts naturally move towards the idea that
mankind has been so sharply divided into nations that it is impossible to bring about unity among them. This second error which arises from nationalism gives birth to the conception of the relativity of religions, i.e. the religion of a land belongs to that land alone and does not suit the temperaments of other nations. This third error must inevitably lead to irreligiosity and scepticism.

This is the psychological analysis of that unfortunate Muslim who becomes a victim of spiritual paralysis. So far as the question of authority is concerned, the whole of the Quran is an authoritative verdict for it. There should be no misunderstanding about the words “dignity of man”. In Islamic thought these words mean that higher reality which has been vested in the heart and conscience of man, i.e. his inner structure derives itself from the immutable divine law, and that his dignity depends for its continuance and preservation upon that yearning for the Unity of God which permeates his whole being.

The history of man is an infinite process of mutual conflicts, sanguine battles and civil wars. In these circumstances can we have among mankind a constitution, the social life of which is based upon peace and security? The Quran’s answer is: Yes, provided man takes for his ideal the propagation of the Unity of God in the thoughts and actions of mankind. The search for such an ideal and its maintenance is no miracle of political manoeuvring; it is a peculiar greatness of the Holy Prophet that the self-invented distinctions and superiority complexes of the nations of the world are destroyed and there comes into being a community which can be styled _____ and to whose thoughts and actions the divine dictate ______ justly applies.

The truth is that in the mind of Maulana Husain Ahmad

15. A nation submissive to Thee.
16. Witnesses against mankind.
and others who think like him, the conception of nationalism in a way has the same place which the rejection of the Finality of the Holy Prophet has in the minds of Qadianis. The upholders of the idea of nationalism, in other words, say that, in view of the present-day needs, it is necessary for the Muslim community to take up a position in addition to what the divine law has prescribed and defined for them for all time to come in the same way in which the Qadiani view, by inventing a new prophethood, directs the Qadiani thought into a channel which ultimately leads to the denial of the perfection and consummation of prophethood in Muhammad. Prima fade, nationalism is a political concept while the Qadiani denial of the Finality of Muhammad is a theological question, but between the two there exists a deep inner relationship which can be clearly demonstrated only when a Muslim historian gifted with acute insight, compiles a history of Indian Muslims with particular reference to the religious thought of some of their apparently energetic sects.

Let me conclude this article by quoting two verses from Khaqani in which he has addressed his contemporary Muslim thinkers who thought that perfection of knowledge consisted in interpreting the truths of Islam in the light of Greek philosophy. With a little change in meaning these verses aptly describe the present-day Muslim political thinkers:
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